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ABSTRACT  
This Report analyses the EU’s instruments to tackle aggressive tax planning and harmful 
tax practices. Based on desk research, interviews with stakeholders and expert 
assessments, it considers the coherence, relevance, and added value of the EU’s approach. 
The instruments under analysis are found to be internally coherent and consistent with 
other EU policies and with the international tax agenda, in particular with the OECD/G20 
BEPS framework. The Report also confirms the continued relevance of most of the original 
needs and problems addressed by the EU’s initiatives in the field of tax avoidance. There 
is also EU added value in having common EU instruments in the field to bolster 
coordination and harmonise the implementation of tax measures. One cross-cutting issue 
identified is the impact of digitalisation on corporate taxation. Against this background, 
the Report outlines potential improvements to the EU tax strategy such as: making EU tax 
systems fit for the digital era; leading the international debate on tax avoidance; enabling 
capacity building in Member States and developing countries; strengthening tax good 
governance in third countries; ensuring a consistent approach at home and abroad; 
achieving a level playing field for all companies; and increasing tax certainty and legal 
certainty. 
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CITIZENS’ SUMMARY  
Tax avoidance reduces the public money available for important state responsibilities such 
as social services, healthcare, and infrastructure. It may also favour large multinational 
companies over smaller, local businesses. The EU’s main measures to combat tax 
avoidance are in line with international rules, are internally coherent and in keeping with 
other EU policies that aim to ensure fair competition between all companies, help 
developing countries and foster international trade, for example. The objectives of these 
EU measures are still relevant. EU taxation rules increase coordination between Member 
States and make sure that companies pay their fair share of tax, wherever they are located 
and whatever their business. Yet more could be done to tackle tax avoidance in the EU, 
such as:  
• updating the tax system because the digital era means that companies could have 
more room to pursue tax avoidance strategies;  
• helping national tax authorities and non-EU countries fight against tax avoidance; 
• making sure the same rules apply within the EU and abroad; 
• ensuring fair treatment of companies operating in the EU; and 
• setting out tax rules that are easy to understand and apply. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1 Context and scope 
The role of the EU in combating aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices 
has increased substantially in recent years. Globalisation, digitalisation of the economy 
and the mounting pressure on domestic budgets following the financial and economic crisis 
have, along with various revelations on Member States’ dubious tax practices, increased 
overall awareness of the need for a more coordinated approach to tax matters. These 
realities are reflected in the EU instruments that have been adopted in the field. 
Against this background, this Report provides some reflections on the objectives of 
the EU’s instruments to tackle tax avoidance issues, and suggests potential 
improvements. The analysis focuses on three research criteria: i) coherence, which looks 
at the degree to which the EU instruments under analysis are consistent with each other, 
with other EU policies and with the international framework; ii) relevance, which 
considers whether the rationale underlying the instruments is still appropriate or requires 
revision to account for changing needs and problems; and iii) EU added value, which 
assesses the additional impacts of addressing tax avoidance issues and setting objectives 
at the EU level rather than leaving the matter solely in the hands of Member States. The 
Report focuses on a set of specific instruments, divided into three categories: 
• Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices, comprising: the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive; the Directive on Administrative Cooperation; the Commission 
Recommendation on aggressive tax planning; the Commission Recommendation 
on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse; the Commission 
Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence; 
the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation; and the tax avoidance provisions in the 
European Semester. 
• Business facilitation, focusing on the Parent Subsidiary Directive and the Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum. 
• External policies, including the Commission Recommendation on minimum 
standards of good governance in third countries and the Communication on an 
External Strategy for Effective Taxation.  
2 Methodology 
The Report relies on a mix of sources – desk research, interviews, expert assessments 
– to ensure a sound evidence base for the analysis. Interviews targeted international, EU- 
level and national stakeholders in 10 Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden, and the Netherlands). The team 
of researchers preparing this Report was assisted by 10 technical experts, one for each 
selected Member State. 
The collected data were validated via triangulation to ensure the robustness of 
evidence. Nevertheless, some limitations need to be acknowledged. First, the recent 
implementation of some of the instruments makes it difficult to assess their impact. 
Second, the Report accounts for, inter alia, the views of 27 stakeholders including public 
institutions, business associations and non-governmental organisations. The key findings, 
however, do not necessarily represent the views of consulted stakeholders. Third, the 
scope of the “external policies” analysis is limited to the two instruments listed above, 
which constitute only a subset of the EU instruments affecting tax policy in third countries.  
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3 Key observations 
 Coherence 
The analysis of the ‘internal coherence’ confirms that the objectives of the EU tax 
instruments covered by this Report are consistent to a large extent, while overlaps, gaps 
and contradictions are limited. Where present, the overlaps are due to maintained soft law 
measures that have been formalised into hard law. In addition, the stakeholders consulted 
consider the absence of an EU approach to digital taxation to be the main gap in the 
current EU tax framework. This gap could lead to double taxation, should Member States 
introduce their own measures at national level. 
EU tax instruments are broadly consistent with EU policies in other fields such as state 
aid, internal market, financial services, development, criminal justice, and trade. In terms 
of overlaps, one of the aspects that resulted from the analysis concerns the list of high-
risk third countries connected to the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the list of non-
cooperative tax jurisdictions. The implementation of the two lists and their two distinct, 
parallel processes, has caused some tension in relations with third countries in the past.  
Finally, the EU tax instruments are generally consistent with the international tax 
agenda, most notably the OECD/G20 BEPS framework and the UN Model Tax Convention. 
Importantly, the EU and its Member States are considered to be leading actors in the 
OECD/G20 BEPS process, as they are among the first to implement the agreements and 
go beyond the minimum BEPS requirements. 
 Relevance 
The Report confirms the continued relevance of most of the original needs and problems 
addressed by the EU instruments under analysis. Some new needs have been identified. 
First, there is a need for international tax rules fit for the digital era, as current 
corporate tax rules are no longer fit for the challenges of digitalisation and globalisation. 
Second, increasing tax fairness between companies is essential. Third, in order to 
combat tax avoidance practices, tax administrations would benefit from technical 
assistance, for example to analyse the tax information they receive from other Member 
States. 
From the perspective of business facilitation, all the needs and problems originally 
addressed by the EU rules under assessment are still relevant. For instance, transfer 
pricing is still one of the main channels used by multinational companies to shift profits; 
aggressive tax planning via interest payments is still a salient issue. Tax certainty and 
legal certainty remain priorities for both taxpayers and tax administrations. 
Some needs have been stressed with regard to third countries and tax good governance. 
First, while the room for shifting profits using third countries is shrinking, multinational 
companies are still able to put in place aggressive tax-planning strategies involving 
countries outside the EU, which may lead to a dangerous ‘race to the bottom’ on 
corporate tax. Second, to ensure compliance with tax good governance, third countries 
need more support in their efforts to reduce tax avoidance. 
 EU Added Value 
A common EU approach brings results that would otherwise not be achieved through 
individual national measures. The EU added value is most significant for measures that 
require strong coordination, including the EU’s implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS and 
promoting tax good governance principles in the relationship with third countries. In 
general, hard-law instruments bring more added value than soft-law instruments. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine the precise added value of the EU tax instruments 
as most Member States would probably have taken some measures on their own 
due to their commitments within the framework of the OECD tax work and other global 
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developments. Reportedly, the lack of public transparency in some of the soft-law tax 
instruments, such as the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, may limit how far external 
stakeholders can assess and support the policy process that leads to new measures against 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. 
4 Suggested improvements 
Based on the analysis, the following actions could be considered to increase the coherence, 
relevance and EU added value of the current EU instruments in the field of aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices. 
 Making EU tax systems fit for the digital era by ensuring a common EU 
approach to digital taxation and considering the international developments taking 
place in the OECD/G20 framework. The EU should ensure that the issue is swiftly 
addressed at the OECD/G20 level, and that the proposed solutions will be promptly 
implemented, in a consistent manner, by all Member States. 
 Leading global solutions. Tax avoidance is a global issue. The potential for EU 
instruments to bring about the desired outcomes in this field is greater the more 
countries subscribe to the same standards. The EU should therefore lead the 
international discussions, in particular within the OECD/G20 BEPS framework, and 
contribute to global solutions. Importantly, when the EU adopts a leading role in 
this process it seems to engender more effective measures at international level. 
In addition, the EU should act as a coordinator for the implementation at the 
Member State level of internationally agreed-upon measures. 
 Enabling capacity building. Most tax measures require administrative capacity 
for them to be fully effective; capacity constraints are affecting national tax 
administrations. In this regard, by relying on existing EU programmes such as the 
Fiscalis 2020 Programme and the Structural Reform Support Programme, the EU 
could provide targeted technical assistance based on a detailed assessment of 
capacity constraints at the national level.  
 Strengthening tax good governance in third countries. As some developing 
countries lack the capacity to implement tax good governance reforms, support for 
countries willing to introduce such reforms should continue in the framework of the 
Official Development Assistance, as emphasised in the New European Consensus 
on Development.  
 Ensuring a consistent approach at home and abroad. There may be a need 
to infuse more transparency and coherence into the EU’s approach to internal and 
external corporate tax issues. Further development of policies on tackling 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices inside the EU is thus needed to 
render more effective the policies promoting tax good governance externally.  
 Achieving a level playing field for all companies. Despite major efforts to 
combat tax avoidance, effective tax rates still vary according to company size, 
location, level of internationalisation and sector of operation. Introducing a 
common, minimum corporate tax rate and a common corporate tax base could 
level the playing field considerably.  
 Increasing tax certainty and legal certainty. Legal certainty may be increased 
by performing regular fitness checks of the relevant EU instruments to detect and 
remove any inconsistencies in the EU tax framework. Similar exercises could be 
conducted at Member State level to preserve the consistency of the national tax 
systems; in this respect, the Structural Reform Support Programme may offer 
valuable assistance to Member States to review and consolidate their corporate tax 
laws.  
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Introduction 
Using desk research, interviews with stakeholders and expert assessments, this Report 
analyses the coherence, relevance and EU added value of the objectives of the EU 
instruments that aim to tackle aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices.  
The Report is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 1 discusses the main developments in the field of aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices, thus providing the background for the 
analysis that follows. It considers the trends in corporate taxation and introduces 
the rationale for EU action in the field and identifies the EU instruments under 
analysis. 
 Chapter 2 outlines the methodology deployed. First, it provides an overview of 
the research framework and questions that this Report aims to answer, as well as 
the different data source and data collection methods used.  
 Chapters 3 to 5 represent the main body of the Report, addressing the research 
criteria that are part of the research framework. More specifically, the analysis is 
structured in three chapters that correspond to the following research criteria: 
o Coherence (Chapter 3); 
o Relevance (Chapter 4); 
o EU added value (Chapter 5). 
 Chapter 6 recaps the main findings of this assignment and suggests a number 
of actions to improve the coherence, relevance and EU added value of the EU 
framework addressing aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. 
The Final Report also comprises four annexes, which are presented in a separate 
document: 
 Annex A, containing the research framework used to structure and guide the 
analysis in this assignment; 
 Annex B, presenting the intervention logics for the EU instruments in the scope of 
the analysis. Annex B also includes aggregate intervention logics created in order 
to map the overall EU strategy in the field of aggressive tax planning and harmful 
tax practices. 
 Annex C, featuring the questionnaire used to perform in-depth interviews with 
selected stakeholders at the international, EU and national levels. 
 Annex D, summarising the fieldwork activities and the main takeaways from the 
stakeholders interviewed.  
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1 Background  
Growing internationalisation is putting pressure on national tax collection. With the 
advancement in automation and digital transformation, the possibilities for 
businesses and private individuals to exploit differences and gaps between tax 
systems – including through aggressive tax planning – have increased exponentially in 
recent decades. Corporate tax avoidance is estimated to reduce the tax revenues of EU 
Member States by around €50 billion to €70 billion per year.1 In particular, large and 
mobile corporations and high-wealth individuals seem to benefit from the ability to escape 
their tax obligation, forcing countries to shift the tax bill to the remaining corporations and 
citizens. Conversely, some countries compete in a harmful manner with tax measures 
aiming to attract targeting these footloose corporations and high-wealth individuals from 
other countries. Pressure on tax-raising capacity restricts governments’ distributional 
powers.2 
Increasing (public) awareness has encouraged policymakers at both national and 
international level to intervene more forcefully in the tax domain in the past few years. 
The majority of countries around the world, including EU Member States, have realised 
that in today’s world taxation can no longer be treated entirely separately. It requires 
cooperation across countries and policy fields. Indeed, there is a growing awareness of 
the impact of tax policies on socio-economic, environmental and development policies. 
Moreover, policymakers are now cooperating more at international level to ensure fair and 
effective taxation. 
Against this background, the EU plays an increasingly important role in overseeing national 
tax rules and coordinating between Member States. The EU’s interventions are primarily 
to ensure the functioning of the Internal Market. Traditionally, agreeing tax measures at 
EU level has been complicated due to the requirement for unanimity, which could either 
not be achieved or would demand lengthy negotiations. In recent years, the decision-
making process has eased considerably: less than six months were required to agree the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and about 40 days to adopt the country-by-country reporting 
between tax authorities. 
 Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices 
In the context of this assignment, aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices are 
defined as follows: 
 Aggressive tax planning constitutes a form of tax avoidance behaviour on the 
part of corporations. Tax planning is to some extent a consequence of the 
complexity of tax systems that provide multiple options for compliance. This form 
of tax planning, where taxpayers choose the least costly option and comply with 
the rules and the spirit of the law, is generally accepted. However, aggressive tax 
planning is not accepted as it entails the deliberate exploitation of the loopholes 
and mismatches within and between national tax systems. Debt shifting, transfer 
mispricing and/or location change are prime examples of aggressive tax planning. 
 Harmful tax practices refer to the competition between nation states with 
preferential tax regimes. Attempts by countries to attract corporate investment or 
national profit through such preferential tax regimes is one of the main reasons 
behind harmful tax practices. Harmful tax practices proliferate as corporations 
become more mobile. At the international level, attempts have been made to limit 
                                           
1 Dover, R. et al. (2015), Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the 
European Union. 
2 Inchauste, G. & Karver, J. (2018), Fiscal Redistribution in the European Union. Available at: 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/632981520461235859/EU-IG-Report-Fiscal-Redistribution.pdf 
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harmful tax practices, which do not necessarily reduce aggressive tax planning but 
may make it less attractive for corporations to engage in. 
 Trends in corporate taxation 
The popular support for anti-tax avoidance and evasion measures has grown 
substantially in recent years. On the one hand, there were the 2007-09 global financial 
and 2010-12 Eurozone economic crises that created pressure on public budgets. On the 
other hand, there were the revelations of numerous tax schemes such as LuxLeaks, 
Panama Papers and Paradise Papers.3 In particular, LuxLeaks placed the issue of 
corporate tax avoidance and evasion on the global political agenda. In November 2014, 
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists4 unveiled the secret tax deals 
struck by about 350 multinational corporations with the Luxembourg authorities, which 
allowed them to reduce their corporate income tax (CIT) bill. The corporations used 
mismatches in the tax systems and deals with the authorities to reduce both the 
effective tax rate and the tax base. LuxLeaks came on the heels of the public outrage 
provoked two years earlier in the UK over reports that the US coffee-shop chain Starbucks 
had substantially reduced its tax bill by paying royalties to its regional headquarters in the 
Netherlands, which has a regime with low rates on royalties. 
Many EU Member States still have tax systems with specific features such as Intellectual 
Property regimes, notional interest deduction and tax credits that allow corporations to 
lower their tax bills. There are also large differences in the headline corporate income tax 
rates, ranging between 10% in Bulgaria and 35% in Malta (see Figure 1). These corporate 
income tax rates are substantially lower than some years ago, taking the simple average 
for the EU Member States. The average rate has come down from as high as 35.2% in 
1997 to 21.7% in 2019. In fact, all EU Member States except Malta have decreased their 
rates in the past two decades (Figure 2).5  
Overall, harmful tax practices in one Member State or jurisdiction have spill-over effects 
in other Member States. Although some Member States or jurisdictions might temporarily 
or permanently benefit from higher tax revenues due to these practices, they are likely to 
decrease the tax revenues for all EU Member States combined.6 
                                           
3 The latest large tax scandal Paradise Papers (2017), revealed an intricate network of the operations and 
transactions used to conceal profits. In particular, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
disclosed that tax avoidance and evasion had outgrown its origins on the margins of the financial system. At the 
very least, a total of $8.7 trillion (around €7.7 trillion) remains hidden offshore, which equals around 11.5% of 
global wealth. In Europe, 10% of the total wealth is still overseas. See Fitzgibbon, W. & Starkman, D. (2017), 
The Paradise Papers and the long twilight struggle against offshore secrecy. Available at: 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/paradise-papers-long-twilight-struggle-offshore-secrecy/. 
4 For further details see: www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/lux-leaks-revelations-bring-swift-response-
around-world 
5 See European Commission (2019), Taxation Trends in the European Union. Statutory rates, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_trends_report_2019_statutory_rates.xlsx 
6 European Commission (2017), European Semester Thematic Factsheet: Curbing Aggressive Tax Planning. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/european-semester_thematic-
factsheet_curbing-agressive-tax-planning_en.pdf. 
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Figure 1 Corporate income tax rates across EU Member States (%, 2018) 
 
Note: Corporate income tax rate in the figure below is the adjusted top statutory tax 
rate on corporate income. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (2018). 
 
Figure 2 Relative development of tax rates in the EU28 (2008=100), 2000-19 
 
Note: The figure above shows the index of the EU28 simple average (base year=2008) 
for three different types of tax: consumption tax: standard value-added tax (VAT); 
personal income tax: top personal income tax rate; and CIT: adjusted top statutory tax 
rate on corporate income. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on Eurostat (2019). 
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The competition based on tax schemes presses other Member States to make their 
tax systems also more attractive for corporations, to preserve their competitive position. 
This tax competition is especially relevant in integrated markets with high capital mobility 
such as the EU, which puts additional pressure on other Member States to compete on tax 
rates.7 In order to avoid a drop in tax revenues, Member States need to broaden the tax 
base and shift the tax burden to other corporations or private individuals that are 
less mobile and as such have fewer means to avoid taxes (see Figure 2). The consumption 
of European citizens is hampered by the increase in the average rate of value-added tax 
(VAT) in recent years.8 The top personal income tax rates remained stable but might have 
decreased if a higher (or more effective) CIT rate could be charged. The higher-than- 
necessary labour costs made it less attractive or more difficult for employers to hire new 
personnel, raise net salaries and/or improve profitability.9 
Additionally, part of the (multinational) corporations use mismatches and gaps between 
tax systems for aggressive tax planning strategies. Besides the location of intellectual 
property rights and intangible assets in jurisdictions with preferential regimes, debt 
shifting and mis(use) of transfer pricing are traditionally considered as the main 
channels for aggressive tax planning strategies.10 Debt shifting is used to move profits 
artificially from high to low tax jurisdictions by – in simple terms – increasing the debt 
costs in the high tax jurisdiction and registering financial revenues in the low tax 
jurisdiction. Similarly, transfer pricing is (mis)used with intra-group transactions in which 
the costs in the high tax jurisdiction are increased through high import intragroup prices 
and the revenues in the low tax jurisdiction are increased through high export intragroup 
prices or vice versa to lower the tax base in the high tax jurisdiction. The multinationals 
might further benefit from bilateral tax treaty provisions to minimise their tax bill 
(including the repatriation of dividends).11 Indeed, these bilateral tax treaties were in the 
past mainly concluded to avoid double taxation rather than double non-taxation. Overall, 
multinationals in high-tax jurisdictions are estimated to pay 30% less tax than similar 
domestic companies.12 
Going forward, environmental, social and corporate governance factors are likely to 
become increasingly important in the corporate tax domain in coming years. Corrective 
taxation could potentially contribute to achieving the objectives of such factors, noting 
also the ongoing discussion on CO2 taxation.  
 
                                           
7 Dover, R. et al. (2015), op. cit., p.27; Genschel, P. et al. (2011), Accelerating Downhill: How the EU Shapes 
Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market. Available at: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02136.x 
8 VAT increases are likely to have a negative impact on the quantity of goods and services sold. Although sales 
might initially increase due to an announcement effect, they fall thereafter to a greater extent. The extent of the 
impact is found to be different across various types of goods and services (Buettner, T. And B. Madzharova, 
2019, Sales and Price Effects of Pre-announced Consumption Tax reforms: Micro-level Evidence from European 
VAT. Available at: http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/7423/).   
9 De Groen, W.P. (2015), Corporate Taxation in Europe: Let’s get it together! Available at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/corporate-taxation-in-europe-lets-get-it-together/ 
10 Ramboll Management Consulting and Corit Advisory (2015), Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning 
and Indicators, Taxation Paper No 61. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/b936799c-d60a-11e5-a4b5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 
11 European Commission (2017), European Semester Thematic Factsheet: Curbing Aggressive Tax Planning. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/european-semester_thematic-
factsheet_curbing-agressive-tax-planning_en.pdf. 
12 Egger, P., W. Eggert and H. Winner (2010), Saving Taxes through Foreign Plant Ownership, Journal of 
International Economics, 81: 99-108. 
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 EU instruments addressing aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices 
Although the room for the EU to act in the area of taxation has grown substantially in the 
past few years, direct taxation remains largely a prerogative of the Member 
States.13 Hence, Member States are free to choose, design and implement their own tax 
systems insofar as the increasingly comprehensive EU rules are respected. The EU tax 
rules are primarily focused on ensuring the functioning of the Internal Market: i) free flow 
of capital, goods and services; ii) level-playing field between businesses from various EU 
Member States; and, iii) equal treatment of tax measures for consumers, workers and 
businesses (non-discrimination).  
The current EU strategy in taxation is largely derived from the EU overarching policy 
strategy, most recently the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth in the EU and the Single Market Act. In line with previous strategies, it is 
predominately focused on the Internal Market. In particular, it aims to eliminate 
obstacles for individuals and corporation when conducting cross-border 
business. These include discrimination, double taxation, difficulties with tax refunds and 
information on foreign tax systems.  
In the last decade or so, the focus of the EU strategy in taxation has shifted towards 
tackling tax avoidance and ensuring fair tax competition, including international 
policy measures and deeper EU coordination and tackling of common challenges 
(for further details see Box 1). Both the international initiatives and the EU aim to ensure 
that generated economic value is taxed where it is generated and actually taking place. 
Part of the EU policy measures are based on international agreements such as the 
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)14 Action Plan and information exchange.  
The United Nations (UN) with its Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters is also active in the area of international policy coordination. 
However, it primarily targets national bilateral tax treaties and tax cooperation among tax 
authorities of developed and developing countries.  
The EU has an important role in the negotiations of the agreements and afterwards 
translating the internationally agreed principles in hard law. The main advantage 
of the implementation at EU-level is that it provides the possibility for common 
standards for the entire Union, which enhances the effectiveness of the measures, but 
also reduces the uncertainty, administrative burden, risk of double taxation and legal 
challenges for businesses. The joint implementation of the agreements allows the EU to 
go beyond what has been agreed at international level. For example, the EU transparency 
requirements go beyond the OECD BEPS agreements. Member States are required to share 
pre-defined information on their cross-border tax rulings and pricing arrangements with 
other Member States.  
The international agenda is also important because tax avoidance is a global challenge. 
The EU aims to motivate third country jurisdictions to close their loopholes, obey the good 
governance principles and avoid engaging in harmful tax competition. It contributes to 
this within the international fora, but also with its own initiatives under the External 
Strategy for Effective Taxation. In the context of this strategy, the EU will use a wide range 
                                           
13 In March 2019 the European Commission launched a discussion with Member States, the European Parliament 
and all stakeholders on the possibility to change decision-making in the tax area from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting. 
14 For further details see: http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/. 
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of tools (e.g. trade agreements, EU funds, list of non-cooperative jurisdictions) when 
necessary to encourage third countries to adopt higher standards of tax good governance. 
Box 1. International initiatives in the field of aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices 
The OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan 
The OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan was launched in 2013, encompassing 15 Actions 
designed to provide governments with domestic and international instruments to tackle 
tax avoidance issues.15 The OECD and G20 countries developed the BEPS Package of 
actions over the course of two years, and the main aspects of the package were finalised 
and delivered in 2015.  
Given the global dimension of tax avoidance, participation in the implementation of the 
BEPS outcomes was opened to over 100 countries committed to applying the standards. 
In this regard, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS was launched in July 2016 
in Kyoto, Japan, with 82 countries as members of the framework. Currently, 134 
countries are part of this initiative, amounting to approximately 70% of the non-OECD 
countries, together with 14 observer organisations. Non-OECD countries participate as 
‘Associates’, being on an equal footing with the OECD members of the framework.16 
UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters 
The UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters is responsible 
for reviewing and updating the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention 
between Developed and Developing Countries17 and the Manual for the Negotiation of 
Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries.18 The Committee 
has 25 members, experts in the field of tax administration and policy.19 
 
 EU tax instruments in scope 
The EU tax policy to fight against aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices is a 
combination of hard and soft law, summarised in Table 1. Hard law in the context of 
this assignment refers to EU instruments (e.g. Directives and Regulations) that are legally 
binding for the parties involved, while soft law refers to all non-legally binding EU 
instruments (e.g. Communications, Recommendations, Advisory bodies). Most of the EU 
hard and soft law instruments primarily target aggressive tax planning but also limit the 
room for harmful tax practices. For example, the application of anti-abuse provisions and 
transparency measures can neutralise some harmful practices in Member States.  
The analysis only considers tax instruments that were adopted at EU level at the start 
of the assignment (December 2018). This means that, for instance, the proposed 
Directives for a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) and common system of 
a Digital Services Tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services 
are not considered among the tax instruments under analysis. 
                                           
15 OECD (2017), Background Brief. Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf. 
16 See: OECD (2019), BEPS. Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/. 
17 See: https://www.un-ilibrary.org/economic-and-social-development/united-nations-model-double-taxation-
convention-between-developed-and-developing-countries-2017-update_cc8f6035-en 
18 See: https://www.un-ilibrary.org/economic-and-social-development/united-nations-manual-for-the-
negotiation-of-bilateral-tax-treaties-between-developed-and-developing-countries-2019_37b3acb6-en 
19 See: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/47651851.pdf 
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Most of the EU tax instruments that have been implemented in recent years address tax 
transparency, enhance international tax cooperation, and contribute to convergence and 
coordination of EU cooperate taxation. 
Table 1 EU tax instruments under analysis 
Title Type Date 
Main elements related to aggressive 
tax planning and/or harmful tax 
practices 
Anti-Tax 
Avoidance 
Directive (ATAD) 
1 & 2 
Hard 
law 
Adoption: July 2016 (I), May 
2017 (II) 
In force: January 2020 (I), 
January 2022 (II) 
 Interest limitation 
 Exit taxation 
 Hybrid mismatches 
 Controlled foreign company rule 
 General Anti-Abuse Rule  
Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive (PSD) 
Hard 
law 
Adoption: July 1990, 
November 2011 (recast), 
July 2014 (amendment) 
In force: January 1992, 
January 2012 (recast), 
December 2015 
(amendment) 
 Anti-abuse rule 
 Withholding tax exemption for 
dividends 
 Mechanism for the elimination of 
double taxation of dividends 
 List of companies  
Administrative 
Cooperation 
Directive (DAC) 3, 
4 & 6 
Hard 
law 
Adoption: December 2015 
(III), May 2016 (IV), May 
2018 (VI). 
In force: January 2017 (III), 
June 2017 (IV), July 2020 
(VI). 
 Automatic exchange of information 
(cross-border rulings, cross-border 
tax planning arrangements, pricing 
arrangements) 
 Country-by-country reporting 
 Mandatory disclosure rules for 
intermediaries 
Commission 
Recommendations 
to Council 
Soft law 
Publication: December 2012 
(2012/771/EU), December 
2012 (2012/772/EU), 
January 2016 
(COM(2016)271), March 
2018 (C(2018)1650) 
 Minimum standards of good 
governance in tax matters for third 
countries 
 Addressing aggressive tax planning 
 Measures against tax treaty abuse 
 Corporate taxation of a significant 
digital presence 
Code of Conduct 
for Business 
Taxation 
Soft law Established: December 1997 
 Rollback 
 Standstill 
 Geographical extension 
European 
Semester (limited 
to measures 
related to 
aggressive tax 
planning) 
Soft law 
First recommendations: June 
2011 
Inclusion of aggressive tax 
planning in country-specific 
recommendations: May 2018 
 Addressing/reducing aggressive tax 
planning among Member States via 
 Assessment of national reform 
programmes  
 Economic policy coordination  
 Recommendations for Member 
States  
Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum 
(JTPF) 
Soft law 
Established: June 2002 
Finished: April 2019 
 Common interpretation and 
application of OECD transfer pricing 
rules across the EU 
Communication 
on an External 
Strategy for 
Effective Taxation 
Soft law Published: January 2016 
 Re-examining EU good governance 
criteria  
 Enhancing agreements with third 
countries on tax good governance 
 Assistance for developing countries 
to meet tax good governance 
standards 
 Developing an EU process for 
assessing and listing third countries 
 Reinforcing the link between EU 
funds and tax good governance 
Note: The assignment does not cover instruments that have been proposed by the 
Commission but have not yet been adopted by Member States. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
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2 Methodology 
 Research framework 
The Report is based on a research framework consisting of six research questions, grouped 
around three research criteria, which can be summarised as follows (the full research 
framework appears in Annex A):  
 Coherence is a measure of the degree to which the EU instruments addressing 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices (Table 1) are consistent with 
each other (‘internal coherence’) and with the EU (‘external coherence’) and 
international (‘international coherence’) policy framework.  
 Relevance is intended as the alignment between the original objectives of the EU 
instruments under analysis and the current needs and problems experienced by 
stakeholders and the EU at large. In other words, the relevance criterion checks 
whether the rationale underlying the instruments is still appropriate or requires a 
revision to account for changing needs and problems.  
 EU-Added Value assesses the additional impacts generated by addressing 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices and setting relevant objectives 
at the EU level, as opposed to leaving the subject matter in the hands of Member 
States.  
To lay the foundation of the analysis, the Research Team first constructed the intervention 
logics of all the EU instruments of interest for this Report (these intervention logics are 
presented in Annex B.2). The intervention logic is a tool that aims to clarify the reasoning 
followed by EU decision-makers when introducing a new policy or law. In a nutshell, it 
includes a detailed description of: 
 The rationale for the intervention in terms of needs and problems addressed, 
drivers affecting such problems as well as general, specific and operational 
objectives to be achieved. 
 The intervention components, i.e. the means (inputs/activities) used by the 
intervention to address the relevant needs and problems and achieve its objectives. 
 The expected results of the intervention in terms of (expected) outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts. 
Based on the individual intervention logics, the Research Team then constructed three 
aggregate intervention logics, which facilitated the analysis of the interaction between the 
instruments in the scope of this Report (the list of instruments is available in Table 1). The 
aggregate intervention logics revolve around three thematic areas (the aggregate 
intervention logics are presented in Annex B.1):  
 Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices, comprising the following 
instruments: the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation (DAC 3, 4, and 6), the Commission Recommendation on aggressive 
tax planning (2012/772/EU), the Commission Recommendation on the 
implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse (COM(2016)271), the 
Commission Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation of a significant 
digital presence (COM(2016)271), the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, and 
the tax avoidance provisions in the European Semester. 
 Business facilitation, focusing on the Parent Subsidiary Directive and the Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum. 
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 External policies, including Commission Recommendation on minimum standards 
of good governance in third countries (2012/771/EU) and the Communication on 
an External Strategy for Effective Taxation (COM/2016/024 final).  
 Data collection 
The Report relies on a mix of sources – scoping interviews with Commission officials, in-
depth interviews with stakeholders, expert assessment and literature – to ensure a sound 
evidence base to address the relevant research questions. In line with the requirements 
set by the Commission for the Report, in-depth interviews and expert assessment targeted 
not only the international and EU level but also the Member States listed in Table 2. The 
mix of countries ensures adequate coverage of different EU regions (Central-Eastern 
Europe, North-Western Europe and Southern Europe), different degrees of economic 
development, different corporate tax rates and different qualities of legislation when it 
comes to fighting aggressive tax planning.  
Table 2 Member States selected for country-level analysis 
Member 
State 
Geographical 
region 
GDP per 
capita (€, 
2017) 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
(main rates, 
2018) 
Room for aggressive tax planning 
(European Semester 2018) 
Belgium NWE 38,500 29.6% yes 
Cyprus SE 22,800 12.5% yes 
Germany NWE 39,600 29.9% no 
Hungary CEE 12,700 10.8% yes 
Ireland NWE 61,200 12.5% yes 
Italy SE 28,500 27.8% no 
Luxembourg NWE 92,800 26.01% yes 
Netherlands NWE 43,000 25% yes 
Romania CEE 9,600 16% no 
Sweden NWE 47,200 21.4% no 
Note: CEE=Central-Eastern Europe, NWE=North-Western Europe and SE=Southern Europe. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat and European Semester Country Reports. 
 
Four scoping interviews were conducted with Commission officials (DG TAXUD, DG 
COMP and SECGEN). The scoping interviews were used to validate the intervention logics 
prepared for the EU instruments of interest (all intervention logics are presented in Annex 
B), thus ensuring the soundness of the framework later on used for the in-depth interviews 
and expert assessments. The fieldwork also included in-depth interviews with 
institutional stakeholders, NGOs, and business associations at the international, EU, and 
national levels (see Table 3). These interviews were based on a questionnaire agreed upon 
with the Commission and structured in four main parts (the questionnaire is presented in 
Annex C): i) overall coherence; ii) aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices; iii) 
business facilitation; and iv) external policies. Each interviewee was asked to provide 
his/her answers limited to one or more specific parts of the questionnaire, thus ensuring 
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an appropriate duration of the interviews and maximising participation. Out of a total 
number of 31 invited organisations, 27 stakeholders agreed to provide their input on time. 
No interview was conducted in Hungary; nevertheless, a thorough expert assessment was 
carried out for this country (see Table 4). 
Table 3 Overview of in-depth interviews 
Level Type Organisation 
Part I 
Overall 
coherence 
Part II 
Aggressive tax 
planning and 
harmful tax 
practices 
Part III 
Business 
facilitation 
Part IV 
External 
policies 
BE NGO CNDC - 11.11.11   -  
BE Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance * * * * 
CY NGO Cyprus Integrity 
Forum 
  -  
CY Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance     
DE NGO Netzwerk 
Steuergerechtigkeit 
(Tax Justice 
Network) 
  -  
DE Tax 
Authority 
Tax Authority     
EU Institution DG TAXUD   - - 
EU NGO Oxfam International 
- EU Advocacy 
Office 
  -  
EU Institution DG COMP   - - 
EU Business 
association 
BusinessEurope General remarks 
EU Institution DG TRADE  - -  
EU Institution DG DEVCO  - -  
EU NGO TaxJustice  General remarks - General 
remarks 
EU Professional 
association 
Confédération 
Fiscale Européenne 
(CFE) - Tax 
Advisers Europe 
   - 
EU Institution DG JUST   - - 
Global Institution UN Committee of 
Experts on 
International 
Cooperation in Tax 
Matters 
  - - 
Global Institution OECD   -  
HU Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance * * * - 
HU Business 
association 
MGYOSZ – 
BUSINESSHUNGAR
Y; Hungarian 
Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
** ** ** ** 
IE Business 
association 
ISME - Irish SME 
Association 
   - 
IE Tax 
Authority 
Department of 
Finance 
   General 
remarks 
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Level Type Organisation 
Part I 
Overall 
coherence 
Part II 
Aggressive tax 
planning and 
harmful tax 
practices 
Part III 
Business 
facilitation 
Part IV 
External 
policies 
IT Business 
association 
UnionPMI    - 
IT Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of 
Economy and 
Finance 
    
LU Business 
association 
Union des 
Entreprises 
Luxembourgeoises 
  General 
remarks 
- 
LU Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance     
NL Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance     
NL NGO Centre for Research 
on Multinational 
Corporations 
(SOMO) 
  -  
RO NGO Transparency 
International 
Romania20 
 - - - 
RO Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance; 
National Agency for 
Fiscal 
Administration 
    
SE Business 
association 
Företagarna 
(Swedish 
Federation of 
Business Owners) 
   - 
SE Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance * * * * 
Notes: “General remarks”: Some stakeholders chose to offer only general remarks rather than fill 
in the questionnaire. *Stakeholders unable to take part in the interview. **No answer received.  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The Research Team also featured 10 technical experts, one for each selected Member 
States (see Table 4). By relying upon guidelines agreed upon with the Commission, the 
experts performed: i) an assessment of the main developments and trends in the field of 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices at the national level; ii) an analysis of 
the internal and external coherence of the instruments; and iii) suggestions for future 
adjustments based on the recent political and economic developments. 
Table 4 List of experts by country 
Country Expert 
Belgium Luc De Broe 
Cyprus Christiana HJI Panayi 
Germany Ekkehart Reimer 
Hungary Éva Erdős 
Ireland Emer Hunt 
Italy Carlo Garbarino 
Luxembourg Werner Haslehner 
Romania Mihaela Tofan 
                                           
20 Transparency International Romania was invited to respond to parts I, II, and IV of the questionnaire. Given 
their expertise, their answers were most relevant to part I, hence part II and part IV were not covered. 
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Country Expert 
Sweden Asa Gunnarsson 
The Netherlands Dennis Weber 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 Data analysis 
The questionnaire for the in-depth interviews included a mix of Likert-scale questions21 
and open questions. Given this structure, the Research Team computed descriptive 
statistics for available quantitative data (the stakeholders’ opinions collected based on a 
1 to 5 scale); in addition, the qualitative information provided during the interviews 
was aggregated, compared and summarised in order to support and complement 
quantitative indicators. The findings from the data collection were then arranged to match 
the success criteria defined in the research framework. Beyond the results of the 
interviews, evidence from desk research and expert assessments was used to answer the 
various research questions and assess the four research criteria covered by this 
Report.  
The collected data were validated via triangulation in order to ensure the robustness 
of evidence. In fact, for all research criteria and questions data were collected from 
multiple sources, using different tools to ascertain that all the findings of the Report 
are based on well-grounded evidence. Triangulation allows for increased confidence in 
collected data, reveals unique findings and provides a clearer understanding of the 
problem. 
The Better Regulation Toolbox defines triangulation as “the application and combination 
of several research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”.22 
Triangulation ensures the validity of the results. Validity requires checking whether the 
findings of a study are true and certain: “true” in the sense that research findings 
accurately reflect the situation; and “certain” in the sense that research findings are 
supported by evidence”.23 In this respect, the Research Team relied on three different 
types of triangulation to provide a solid basis for the findings of this Report: 
 Triangulation of data. Data and information were collected from multiple sources 
and stakeholders. 
 Triangulation of methods. Data and information were collected via at least two 
different data collection methods (interviews, desk research, expert feedback). 
 Triangulation of analysts. Several members of the Research Team were involved in 
data collection activities; in addition, each research question and criterion was 
addressed by at least two members of the Research Team, and conclusions were 
agreed upon by at least two researchers. 
                                           
21 Likert-type questions help structure the answers of respondents based on a given scale. In this Report, 
respondents were thus asked to provide their feedback by referring to a scale from (1) to (5), where the scores 
have the following significance: 1 - not at all; 2 - to a limited extent; 3 - to some extent; 4 - to a high extent; 5 
- to the fullest extent. 
22 European Commission (2017), Better Regulation "Toolbox", https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-
regulation-toolbox_2.pdf, p. 20. 
23 Lisa A. Guion, David C. Diehl, and Debra McDonald (2011), Triangulation: Establishing the Validity of 
Qualitative Studies. 
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 Limitations 
Before presenting the key findings of this Report, it is worth stressing that the analysis 
performed faced the following limitations.  
 The recent implementation of some of the instruments makes it difficult to assess 
their impact. To understand the full effects of such instruments, another 
assessment relying on the same research framework could be performed in the 
future.  
 In the case of Hungary, no interviews were performed with national stakeholders. 
The analysis for this country was therefore based on the assessment provided by 
professor Éva Erdős, the Hungarian expert that is part of the Research Team (see 
Table 4).  
 The Report relies, inter alia, on the views of 27 stakeholders active at the EU level 
and in the Member States, from the public sector, business associations and NGOs. 
The findings of the Report, however, do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
consulted stakeholders. 
 In line with the requirements set by the Commission for the Report, the scope of 
the “external policies” section in the chapters on Relevance and EU Added Value is 
limited to two instruments, namely the Commission Recommendation on minimum 
standards of good governance in third countries (2012/771/EU) and the 
Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation (COM/2016/024 
final). Other instruments relevant for the assessment of external policies in the 
field of taxation (e.g. the Cotonou Agreement) are only covered when assessing 
the external coherence criterion in Chapter 3. 
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3 Coherence 
KEY OBSERVATIONS 
Are the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis consistent with the EU's agenda 
for fair and effective taxation? (Internal coherence) 
 Most stakeholders believe that the objectives of the EU tax instruments are to a 
large extent consistent, with only a few overlaps/contradictions/gaps. 
 There is some overlap in the policy measures, which only to a very limited extent 
has led to inconsistencies. Most of the overlap is due to soft law that has been 
followed-up by hard law and similar hard law provisions applied in different fields. 
 Stakeholders consider the absence of an EU approach to digital taxation to be 
the main gap in the current EU tax framework.  
 The use of minimum standards in the hard law instruments might limit the 
possibilities to achieve the full harmonisation objective. The extent to which there 
are inconsistencies in national implementation is still to be assessed as not all 
Member States have already implemented all the instruments under analysis. 
Is there coherence between the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis and the 
objectives of instruments in other policy areas? How could this be improved? (External 
coherence) 
 EU tax instruments are broadly consistent with other EU policies such as state 
aid, internal market, financial services, development, criminal justice, and trade. 
 In the absence of an EU measure on digital taxation, Member States are 
considering or have already introduced their own measures, which might give 
rise to double taxation and harm the functioning of the Internal Market. 
 The differences in the lists and processes for addressing the issues associated 
with high-risk third countries under the anti-money laundering Directive and 
non-cooperative tax jurisdictions has in the past created some tension in 
relations with third countries; 
 Some of the developing countries identified as non-cooperative tax jurisdictions 
might be penalised too heavily, as they do not – according to several 
stakeholders - have the institutional capacity to implement tax good governance 
principles. 
Are the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis coherent with international 
objectives for fair taxation? (International coherence) 
 EU tax instruments are generally consistent with the international tax agenda 
(OECD BEPS, UN Model Tax Convention, etc.). 
 The EU and its Member States are considered as leading actors in the OECD BEPS 
process, as they are among the first to implement the agreements and go beyond 
the minimum requirements defined by the OECD BEPS. 
 
 Introduction 
The coherence analysis assesses whether the EU instruments are internally, externally and 
internationally coherent. The internal coherence assesses whether the various elements 
of the EU tax instruments in scope operate together to achieve their general, specific and 
operational objectives. Similarly, the external coherence assesses whether the various 
elements of the EU instruments and those of other policy areas work together to achieve 
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the EU policy objectives. The broadest form of external coherence – with international 
initiatives – has been singled out from the external coherence assessment and is assessed 
separately. The international coherence accounts for the interaction with international 
initiatives from the OECD, the G20 and UN. In this context, the coherence criterion is 
translated into three research questions: 
 Are the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis consistent with the EU's 
Agenda for Fair and Effective Taxation?  
 Is there coherence between the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis 
and the objectives of instruments in other policy areas? How could this be 
improved?  
 Are the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis coherent with 
international objectives for fair taxation? 
The internal, external and international coherence in line with the research framework 
(see Annex A) are assessed by relying on three success criteria, respectively: 
 Extent of coherence among the EU instruments under analysis (‘Internal 
coherence’); 
 Extent of coherence between the EU instruments under analysis and other EU 
policy areas (e.g. competition, financial services, development, justice, trade, 
employment) (‘External coherence’); 
 Extent of coherence between the EU instruments under analysis and the 
international tax agenda (e.g. G20, OECD, UN) (‘International coherence’). 
Based on the analysis this chapter, some suggestions to increase the relevance of the EU 
framework in the field of aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices are discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
 Analysis 
The analysis in this section is based on a combination of data obtained through interviews 
with stakeholders and data gathered via a literature review and expert assessments. This 
approach allows a cross-validation of the key findings. 
3.2.1 Internal coherence 
The internal coherence assesses whether the various elements of the EU instruments in 
scope are consistent. Many of the EU tax instruments in scope have been launched during 
the 2014-2019 legislature of the European Commission, the collection of tax instruments 
initiated during this period are in some cases referred to as the EU’s Agenda for Taxation24 
or the EU’s Agenda for Fair and Effective Taxation.25 The set of instruments26 initiated in 
the field of corporate taxation after 2014 was the EU’s response to a surging public and 
political demand for action to address harmful tax practices and aggressive tax planning, 
owing to pressure on domestic public budgets in the aftermath of the financial and 
economic crises as well as various tax scandals (e.g. LuxLeaks, Offshore Leaks, Swiss 
Leaks, Bahamas Leaks, Panama Papers, Paradise Papers). Most notable was LuxLeaks in 
2014, which exposed tax rulings of the Luxembourg authorities involving more than 340 
                                           
24 European Commission (2016), An EU Agenda for Taxation. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/2-years-on-taxation_en_0.pdf. 
25 European Commission (2018), A Fair Share. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/a_fair_share_brochure_taxud_en.pdf. 
26 European Commission (2015), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for 
Action. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0302&from=EN. 
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multinational enterprises. These rulings reduced taxes on profits that multinational 
enterprises shifted to Luxembourg. Although such deals are legal, they can constitute 
aggressive tax planning practices.27 Tax fraud, evasion and avoidance are estimated to 
reduce the tax revenues in the EU by around €50 billion to €70 billion per year.28 Moreover, 
they reduce the distributive capabilities of EU Member States, create competition between 
Member States, distort the level playing field within the Internal Market and reduce the 
trust of citizens in the State.29  
The general objective of the EU Agenda is to build a fair society, with a strong Internal 
Market and robust economy that contributes to economic growth, job creation and public 
investment. Fair taxation is according to the Agenda important as sufficient tax raising 
capacity is critical to allow the society to function (education, health care, etc.), maintain 
taxpayer morale, and contribute to the level playing field between domestic and 
multinational companies and between Member States as well as in relation to third 
countries. 
According to the specific objectives spelt out in the Agenda, more transparent, effective 
and accountable tax systems should contribute to this general objective. The policy 
instruments in the Agenda closely relate to the specific objectives and can be grouped 
under three pillars: 
 Tax transparency covers initiatives with the aim to enhance the openness and 
cooperation between Member States on tax issues. The Administrative Cooperation 
Directive (DAC) including automatic information exchange on tax rulings (DAC 3), 
country-by-country reporting for multinationals (DAC 4) and transparency 
requirements for intermediaries (DAC 6) under this pillar are in the scope of the 
present assignment. 
 Effective taxation covers initiatives to ensure that taxes are paid in the country 
where the profits are generated. The anti-abuse rules (included in the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive) and transfer pricing rules under this pillar are within the scope 
of this assignment. 
 Global good governance covers initiatives with the aim to create a global level 
playing field. EU’s External Strategy for Effective Taxation and the EU’s list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions under this pillar are covered by this assignment. 
Additionally, the Commission has presented the CCCTB and two proposals in the context 
of the digital taxation package (Digital Services Tax and Significant Digital Presence), 
which have not yet been adopted under the Agenda. At the time of writing the CCCTB is 
still under negotiation30 and the proposals on digital taxation31 were not agreed by the 
ECOFIN Council, as the Member States decided to wait for the results of the work 
performed in the context of the OECD. Neither of these instruments (not yet adopted) is 
covered within the context of this assignment. 
The assessment of internal coherence also considers several EU taxation instruments not 
referenced in the EU’s Agenda for Fair and Effective Taxation, which almost exclusively 
                                           
27 ICIJ, Luxembourg Leaks. Available at: https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks/about-project-
luxembourg-leaks/ 
28 Dover, R. et al. (2015), Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the 
European Union. 
29 European Commission (2018), A Fair Share, op. cit.  
30 European Parliament, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-
strengthened-industrial-base-taxation/file-common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-(ccctb) 
31 European Parliament, Digital Services Tax. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-
train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-industrial-base-taxation/file-digital-
services-tax-on-revenues-from-certain-digital-tax-services  
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covered initiatives that are new or have been re-launched by DG TAXUD during the 2014-
2019 legislature. For this reason most of the following initiatives were not explicitly 
referenced in the context of the Agenda: Parent Subsidiary Directive, Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation, European Semester, EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Commission 
Recommendation on measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum 
standards on good governance in tax matters (2012/771/EU), Commission 
Recommendation on aggressive tax planning (2012/772/EU), and Commission 
Recommendation on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse 
(2016/271/EU).  
Most of the interviewees believe there is some degree or even a high degree of 
complementarity and synergy between the objectives of the EU instruments in 
scope, while in general they see few overlaps/contradictions/gaps. This is confirmed by 
the experts consulted for this assignment. The EU is considered by several interviewees 
to act as a defensive coalition. Internally, the EU instruments against aggressive tax 
planning ensure a coordinated approach aiming to limit negative tax externalities, for 
instance by avoiding that profits generated in a Member State are artificially shifted to 
another Member State or that profits generated in the EU are artificially moved elsewhere. 
Externally, the EU instruments allow the Member States to act as a single unit, by 
promoting tax good governance principles and incentivising third countries to implement 
such principle.  
Most of the stakeholders consulted for this assignment believe that the instruments are 
much more complementary than contradictory. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive provides 
the legal base for fighting against aggressive tax planning, whereas the Directive on 
Administrative Cooperation addresses harmful tax practices. Moreover, the Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxation creates peer pressure on Member States to take measures 
in those areas that are not covered by hard law.  
The sequencing of the instruments can also reveal synergies over time in the taxation 
agenda. The instruments under analysis have been issued at different moments in time 
and some of them represent the follow-up to pre-existing instruments. This is primarily 
the case with soft-law instruments that were eventually followed by more specific or even 
hard-law instruments. For instance, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive adopted in 2016 is 
the follow-up of the Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning 
(2012/772/EU), and the Communication on External Strategy of an External Strategy for 
Effective Taxation published in 2016 followed-up on the Commission Recommendation on 
measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards on good 
governance in tax matters (2012/771/EU). The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation has 
in the past discussed the exchange of rulings and treatment of dividends, which have been 
realised by the third amendment to the Directive on Administrative Cooperation and the 
Parent Subsidiary Directive. The effects stemming from this sequencing of the instruments 
is further discussed in the chapter on EU Added Value (Chapter 5). 
In some cases, existing overlaps may reinforce certain measures. For example, there 
are general anti-abuse rules (GAAR) and hybrid instrument rules included both in the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive and the Parent Subsidiary Directive.32 The Anti-Tax Avoidance 
                                           
32 The open-ended general anti-abuse rule of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Parent Subsidiary 
Directive might be complementary, they however bear some technical complications. In recent cases dealing 
with the (old version of the) general anti-abuse provisions of the Parent Subsidiary Directive, it was reiterated 
that such provisions should still be targeted against wholly artificial arrangements and should not be too broadly 
phrased. In the Eqiom & Enka case (Case C-6/16 Eqiom & Enka, ECLI:EU:C:2017:641), it was emphasised that 
there cannot be an initial presumption of abuse where an EU parent company was controlled by shareholders in 
third states. A similar conclusion was reached in the Diester Holding case (Joined Cases C-504/16 Deister Holding 
and C-613/16 Juhler Holding, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1009). Moreover, recent cases of the ECJ involving Denmark 
(Joined cases C-116/16 and C-117/16; Joined cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16) confirm that 
Member States must refuse to grant the benefit of EU law provisions (e.g. the Parent Subsidiary Directive) in 
cases of abuse, i.e. where those provisions are relied upon in a manner which is not consistent with their 
objectives. The decisions are innovative because they state that, given the general legal principle that EU law 
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Directive confines the intervention of the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules to 
cases in which the actual corporate tax paid on its profits by the entity or permanent 
establishment is lower than the difference between the fictitious corporate tax in the 
Member State of the taxpayer and the actual corporate tax paid on its profits. In general, 
it ensures the necessary coherence with the Parent Subsidiary Directive by restricting the 
application of the CFC rules. However, a possible incoherence with the Parent Subsidiary 
Directive becomes apparent in case of an artificial construction where both the sub-
subsidiary and subsidiary lack a substantive economic activity and are both residents in 
low-taxing foreign countries. 
In addition, there are also gaps between the various instruments. The main gap 
identified by nearly all interviewees is in the field of digital taxation. More specifically, 
the Commission Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence (2018/1650/EU) cannot be applied effectively without an EU approach to digital 
taxation. Indeed, the Recommendation refers to a legislative proposal concerning a 
significant digital presence that is still pending. Moreover, especially the interviewees 
representing businesses indicated that the EU measures should focus not only on the level-
playing field inside the EU, but also on the global level. For this the EU would have to 
become more active within international fora such as the OECD and G20 (see the section 
3.2.3 on International coherence below). Additionally, several NGO representatives as well 
as tax experts indicate the need for more far-reaching initiatives to let EU Member States 
form a joint block for tax matters to counter external instances of aggressive tax planning 
and harmful tax practices. In theory this would require a global taxation of profits of 
companies based in the EU together with a foreign tax credit.33 
There might also be some differences between the intentions behind the EU tax 
instruments and how they are meant to be actually implemented that could lead to 
inconsistencies. One of the experts noted that the use of Directives (Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, Parent Subsidiary Directive, Directive on Administrative Cooperation) for the 
hard-law instruments leaves room for national discretion, i.e. differences in 
implementation by Member States. Under the current provisions in Article 115 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) hard law instruments in the field of direct 
taxation can exclusively be implemented through Directives. 
Finally, several of the interviewees representing national administrations and businesses 
indicated that it is not possible to fully assess the internal coherence of all the tax 
measures. Some of the measures have only been implemented recently or still have to be 
implemented and might give rise to contradictions or overlap (see Table 1). For example, 
one of the business representatives consulted for this assignment believes that the CFC 
rules under the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive might potentially lead to double taxation, if 
Member States implement the rules that are applicable since January 2019 differently. 
3.2.2 External coherence (other EU policies)  
The external coherence assesses whether the objectives of various EU instruments in 
scope are consistent with those of other EU policy areas. Nearly all interviewees identified 
other EU policies that have synergies/complementarities and/or overlaps/contradictions 
with the objectives of the EU tax instruments. These include, but are not limited to, state 
aid, internal market, financial services, development, criminal justice, and trade. Broadly 
speaking, the EU tax instruments discussed in this assessment are consistent with other 
EU policies. 
                                           
cannot be relied on for abusive ends, the requirement to refuse such benefits applies even in the absence of 
anti-abuse provisions in the domestic law or tax treaties of the Member State concerned.  
33 An example of this is Article 74 of the CCCTB Proposal launched in 2011 about the computation of income of 
a foreign permanent establishment of a consolidated group in a third country. Indeed, the revenues, expenses 
and other deductible items are determined according to the same rules as applicable to revenues, expenses and 
other deductible items for EU Member States. 
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The EU tax instruments affect Internal Market policy, including the Digital Single Market. 
The Digital Single Market aims to maintain a level playing field, foster innovation and 
strengthen the digital economy.34 The Commission Recommendation related to the 
corporate taxation of a significant digital presence (2018/1650/EU) – that complemented 
the digital taxation package with two as yet not adopted proposed Directives – aims to 
ensure fair taxation for all companies in the EU, regardless of their size and degree of 
digitalisation. Establishing fair taxation for the Digital Single Market could increase 
certainty for business investment and spur innovation.35 DG TAXUD worked together with 
DG GROW to ensure that any tax would be compatible with the objectives of the Digital 
Single Market strategy. The 2018 Recommendation aims to promote the revision of tax 
treaties of Member States based on the proposed Directive on significant digital 
presence.36 However, this Directive has not been adopted. One interviewee representing 
an NGO emphasised that without the adoption of the Directive there remains a distorted 
playing field between digital and other companies as well as multinational and local 
companies. More specifically, and as an illustration of this, one of the business 
representatives stressed that several Member States have taken unilateral measures in 
the field of digital taxation on their own.37 This might give rise to double taxation. In turn, 
a stakeholder from a business association emphasised that the proposal has a one-sided 
focus on tax avoidance, which does not sufficiently consider the overarching objectives of 
the Commission policies to create jobs and economic growth (a more extensive analysis 
on the issues related to digital companies is presented in the chapter on Relevance – 
Chapter 4). 
There are also complementarities between the objectives of the state aid rules and those 
of the tax instruments in the scope of this assignment. Whilst the EU tax instruments are 
forward-looking, fiscal state aid examines existing legislation and tax rulings, with 
the aim of assessing whether a particular taxpayer or group of taxpayers are 
treated better than others in a comparable situation. The aim is to prevent unfair 
advantage in comparable factual and legal situations. There are strong 
complementarities between state aid rules and the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation. The Commission has a broad mandate to choose which state aid cases to 
pursue. In principle, the cases chosen focus on incorrect application of transfer pricing 
rules and on cases that deal with selective domestic non-taxation. Although the priorities 
of the Commission in this area are not communicated, there is some coordination between 
the experts working under the Code of Conduct and the Commission (DG COMP). 
Whenever a potential case of aggressive tax planning is detected by both the Code of 
Conduct and DG COMP, priority is given to the DG COMP investigations to avoid different 
outcomes on the same instance of aggressive tax planning. A representative of an NGO 
argued that state aid rules are being used to fix some of the major limitations existing on 
the tax policy side. State aid rules often address abuses that were not tackled directly by 
the tax framework in place at the time of the abuse, as indicated by a consulted 
                                           
34 European Commission, Shaping the Digital Single Market. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market 
35 European Commission (2017), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, pp. 3, 7. Available 
at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/communication_taxation_digital_single_market_en.
pdf 
36 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/proposal_significant_digital_presence_21032018_e
n.pdf. 
37 The governments of various EU Member States, including France, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia have 
decided since the launch of the proposal in 2018 to implement a digital tax similar to the Commission proposal. 
See also KPMG (2019), Taxation of the digitalized economy, available at 
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2019/digitalized-economy-taxation-developments-
summary.pdf. 
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stakeholder from the Commission. The Commission addresses tax avoidance through state 
aid instruments to avoid unfair tax competition between multinational companies receiving 
tax advantages not available to their competitors.  
The EU instruments to tackle tax avoidance are largely complementary to criminal 
justice policies as tax evasion can qualify as a criminal offence in some Member States.38 
The absence of tax transparency creates favourable conditions for tax evasion, avoidance 
and criminal activities.39 For example, opaque transactions routed through tax havens 
facilitate money laundering.40 The Directive on Administrative Cooperation aims to 
facilitate information sharing between Member States to reduce tax avoidance, while the 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4 & 5) aims to facilitate information sharing between 
Member States to combat illicit financial flows.41 However, there are some differences 
between the high-risk third countries under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive42 and 
non-cooperative tax jurisdictions.43 Although there are quite a few third countries on both 
lists, there are also jurisdictions on just one list due to the different objectives, criteria 
and identification processes. The process to define the EU list of non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions is led by the Council, whereas the selection process for the high-risk third 
countries is led by the Commission. According to representatives of the Commission, this 
difference created some tension in relations with third countries. In the Commission, anti-
money laundering and tax cooperation are considered distinct policy areas, whereas third 
countries do not necessarily make this clear distinction. In practice, this means that third 
countries may be approached by two different Commission Directorates at different 
moments in time on issues that they view as connected.  
According to one of the interviewees following the process within the Commission, the 
coordination concerning the listing of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions has improved over 
time and is now working well. In fact, initially the communication with third countries took 
an EU domestic revenue perspective with very hard deadlines for third countries to comply 
with. The approach has changed, however, and it now focuses more on tax good 
governance. This shift in focus means that the communication with third countries on tax 
issues revolves around explaining why it would be in the interest of third countries to take 
certain measures to restore their tax base, but also how tax measures impact neighbouring 
countries and the EU. Moreover, there is more technical assistance to implement EU 
demands. 
                                           
38 Thirion, E. & Scherrer, A. (2017), Member States’ capacity to fight tax crimes, p. 23. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603257/EPRS_STU(2017)603257_EN.pdf 
39 Rameur, C. (2015), Tax transparency. Openness, disclosure and exchange of information. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565902/EPRS_IDA(2015)565902_EN.pdf 
40 Rameur, C & Dobreva, A. (2019), The fight against tax fraud. Available at: https://what-europe-does-for-
me.eu/data/pdf/focus/focus03_en.pdf 
41 European Commission (2015), Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering or terrorist financing. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849 
42 The EU list of high-risk third countries consisted as of February 2019 of 12 jurisdictions listed by the Financial 
Action Task Force (The Bahamas, Botswana, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen) and 11 additional jurisdictions identified 
by the European Commission (Afghanistan, American Samoa, Guam, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Panama, Puerto Rico, 
Samoa, Saudi Arabia, and US Virgin Islands). See European Commission (2019), EU Policy on High-Risk Third 
Countries. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/anti-
money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing/eu-policy-high-risk-third-countries_en. 
43 The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes consist as of October 2019 of 9 jurisdictions 
(American Samoa, Belize, Fiji, Guam, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, US Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu). The 
countries in bold are both among the additional jurisdictions identified by the European Commission for the list 
of high-risk third countries and on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes published by the 
Council. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019XG0621(01). For the 
latest version of the list, see: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-cooperative-
jurisdictions/. 
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EU tax instruments also relate to socioeconomic policies. Tax evasion and avoidance 
can undermine the tax revenues of Member States.44 EU tax revenues play a crucial role 
in – among others – social protection and inclusion policies, which aim to reduce 
poverty and inequality.45 The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the Parent Subsidiary Directive 
and the Commission recommendations regarding measures intended to encourage third 
countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters (2012/771/EU), 
aggressive tax planning (2012/772/EU) and relating to corporate taxation of a significant 
digital presence (2018/1650/EU) all aim to secure tax revenues of Member States. 
Securing tax revenues is highly important for poverty reduction.46 Reduced tax revenues 
could disproportionally impact vulnerable households, which rely more on social transfers. 
Securing tax revenues is also important to combat gender inequality.47 According to a 
report from the European Parliament, on average women rely more on social transfers 
than men; reduced tax revenues can negatively and disproportionally affect the economic 
security of women, lowering their income and access to public services.48 
Looking at the coherence between the EU tax instruments and trade policy, the 
interviewees agreed that both policy areas primarily work in parallel. Indeed, most 
of the trade policy does not interfere with international taxation rules. Trade policy is in 
general defined so as not to restrict the scope of taxation policy. For this purpose, there 
is a tax exemption in trade agreements, whereby for instance double tax treaties of 
Member States with third countries are considered to take precedence over the trade 
agreement. Otherwise trade agreements feature only very few taxation aspects, except 
for the promotion of international standards such as the tax good governance 
standards. Tax good governance standards together with other provisions such as those 
promoting international standards on financial regulations and anti-money laundering are 
part of the EU bilateral/regional agreements with third countries. While the provisions are 
binding, they follow the best endeavour formula, meaning that the countries involved 
endeavour to promote international standards. 
The EU tax instruments under consideration are also linked to development policy. 
According to Article 208 of the TFEU, EU policies likely to affect developing countries need 
to be coherent with the objectives of development cooperation. To reduce poverty in the 
world and ensure sustainable development, DG DEVCO works on domestic revenue 
mobilisation (tax administration, tax policy, international tax good governance,  etc.) in 
developing countries. Domestic tax revenues form the largest and most reliable source 
of finance for third countries and they also have the greatest potential to generate own 
resources for developing countries. Countering tax avoidance and evasion plays a key role 
to ensure that states can rely on enough revenues, but also that there is a fair distribution 
of the tax burden. Domestic revenues allow third countries to finance their public services, 
but also their broader development (public investments, etc.). This requires creating a 
well-functioning governance system that provides tax certainty to improve the investment 
climate.  
Some of the EU tax instruments in the scope of this assignment affect developing countries 
as a couple of measures explicitly address third countries. For example, the Commission 
Recommendation on the measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU) aims to 
counter treaty shopping and other abusive strategies. The recommendation encourages 
Member States to include provisions on a GAAR and updated definition of permanent 
establishment in their tax treaties concluded with third countries. Treaty abuse impacts 
                                           
44 Carter, A. & Matthews, S. (2012), How tax can reduce inequality. Available at: 
http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3782/How_tax_can_reduce_inequality.html 
45 Inchauste, G. & Karver, J., Fiscal Redistribution in the European Union. Available at: 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/632981520461235859/EU-IG-Report-Fiscal-Redistribution.pdf 
46 Carter, A. & Matthews, S. (2012), op. cit. 
47 Ibid. 
48 European Parliament (2018), Report on gender inequality and taxation policies in the EU, pp. 11, 13, 14. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0416_EN.pdf?redirect 
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all contracting parties but has a larger influence on developing countries that rely 
more heavily on tax revenues for their public budget.49 Moreover, DG TAXUD responsible 
for the tax instruments and DG DEVCO responsible for development policy are cooperating 
to ensure that, among others, the Tax Good Governance standards are included in all 
cooperation agreements and association agreements. In the same vein, when it comes to 
external investments, the financial regulation has been amended so that the EU only 
invests in third countries that are cooperative. These requirements pose significant 
problems in the cooperation of DG DEVCO with international organisations as these are 
not in a position to accept EU-specific legislation and standards.  
Nevertheless, several interviewees argued that development policy and the EU tax 
instruments are not fully consistent. Some of the jurisdictions identified as non-
cooperative might be penalised too heavily. More specifically, when developing countries 
are struggling to implement complex rules and effective administrative infrastructure to 
apply the international tax agreements, denying access to funding from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and other International Financial Institutions operating with a 
guarantee from the EU might thwart the objectives of development policy.  
Indeed, there are certain third countries that do not have the domestic capacity to 
implement the tax measures, which require outside support for institutional development 
and capacity building. Although developing countries without a financial center are allowed 
more time to deliver on their commitment, they might still end up on the list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions. Certain EU instruments take the development policy objectives 
into account (e.g. the Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, which 
refers to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 agenda for sustainable 
development), but they still limit the financing in the least developed countries recognised 
as non-cooperative. There might thus still be some potential to better align the tax policies 
and development policies for third countries that do not have the institutional capacity to 
deliver on the expected commitments in the area of taxation. 
It must be noted, however, that, this report focuses particularly on the 2012 
Recommendation and the 2016 Communication when it comes to third countries and tax 
good governance. Therefore, other instruments of development policy, covering aspects 
related to tax good governance are not covered. An example is the Cotonou Agreement,50 
which was signed in June 2000, ratified in 2003 and is re-examined every five years, 
having been revised in 2005 and 2010. The agreement supports the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries, among others, in their institutional development and capacity 
building. The cooperation aims to assist in the reform, rationalisation and modernisation 
of the public sectors. Looking at the cooperation in the field of taxation, the agreement 
must contribute to the improvement of public finance and fiscal management, allowing the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to increase their tax revenues (i.e. enhance 
domestic revenue management capacities, promote participation in international 
organisations facilitating tax cooperation, and support implementation of international 
best practices). 
3.2.3 International coherence 
The international coherence assesses whether the objectives of the EU instruments in 
scope are consistent with international policies and instruments. Nearly all interviewees 
identified international policies and instruments that have synergies/complementarities 
and/or overlaps/contradictions with the objectives of the EU tax instruments. The main 
                                           
49 Eurodad (2015), Fifty shades of tax dodging. Available at: https://eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546494-fifty-shades-
of-tax-dodging-the-eu-s-role-in-supporting-an-unjust-global-tax-system.pdf 
50 The Cotonou Agreement. Available a: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-
acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en 
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international policies considered are the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) Action Plan and UN Model Tax Convention.51 
OECD, together with the G20, regularly analyse international practices and instruments in 
the field of taxation. Based on the analysis they develop international standards and 
guidelines to efficiently address global corporate tax issues. Although OECD/G20 
provisions are not binding, most countries follow the agreed standards. 
The OECD tax framework is built on four pillars: i) enhancing transparency in taxation; 
ii) reducing tax avoidance; iii) promoting sustainable and inclusive growth; and iv) 
ensuring that taxation contributes to the development purposes.52 The most notable 
initiatives by the OECD are BEPS and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The OECD BEPS 
Action Plan53 was developed in response to large tax revenue losses due to base erosion 
and profit shifting. The OECD estimated that countries are losing $100 billion to $240 
billion (between €90 billion and €215 billion) in tax revenues per year.54 
The EU tax instruments under consideration are generally consistent with the international 
tax agenda. Many of the instruments have been initiated to ensure a coherent EU approach 
in implementing the OECD BEPS Action Plan. BEPS has the general objective to address 
the weaknesses in the international tax framework that allow firms to engage in base 
erosion and profit-shifting practices. It also has a set of specific objectives, which aim 
to reduce tax avoidance and evasion, ensure coherence of international tax rules and 
ensure transparency of tax environment. In the EU, the OECD BEPS Action Plan was 
adopted across several EU tax instruments. 
Most of the interviewees believe that the EU is reinforcing the work of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan. In fact, the EU is often the first or among the first to implement the actions 
agreed within the context of the OECD. The EU implementation is mostly quite close to 
the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Although the OECD BEPS Action Plan is, according to the 
interviewees, largely in line with the interests of the larger Member States, there are some 
slight differences of opinion. For example, there are different views both within the EU and 
at international level on where tax should be collected, i.e. at source or sales. 
In some areas, the EU even goes beyond the OECD BEPS framework. For example, 
the EU has, in agreement with all Member States, adopted a measure to actively promote 
tax good governance in third countries. Similarly, the EU has adopted, in agreement with 
all Member States, mandatory country-by-country reporting for multinationals through the 
Directive on Administrative Cooperation, which goes beyond the minimum disclosure 
required by the OECD. According to an interviewee representing an international 
organisation, this sometimes causes problems for Member States in review processes, as 
there are two different processes and two different standards they must adhere to. At the 
same time, the EU initiatives also contributed to more ambitious international standards. 
For example, the automatic exchange of information was initially used by the EU for saving 
accounts and was afterwards adopted by the OECD for all tax areas.55  
The need for further efforts was emphasised by several interviewees (especially NGOs) 
and experts. One interviewee (representing an NGO) indicated that the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan is an important driver of EU tax reforms but is sometimes rather weak. This requires 
the EU to go beyond the agreement reached within OECD BEPS, which has happened as 
                                           
51 The international trade agreements have been excluded as the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) basically exempt taxation issues. 
52 OECD (2018), OECD work on taxation. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/centre-for-tax-policy-and-administration-brochure.pdf 
53 OECD (2017), Inclusive framework on BEPS. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-
inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf 
54 OECD (2018), OECD work on taxation, op. cit., p. 9. 
55 See: https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/. 
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mentioned in the previous paragraph, but is not always the case. For example, the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan does not cover special economic zones regimes and the norms are in 
many cases considered not very stringent and advantageous to developed countries. In 
practice, most of the requirements were already applied before the reforms by EU Member 
States. 
A closer look at the EU instruments that implement the OECD BEPS actions reveals 
additional elements of coherence. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive aims to ensure 
the coherent implementation of Actions 2, 3 and 4 of OECD BEPS Action Plan. More 
specifically, it aims to reduce base erosion and profit-shifting practices and achieve a 
uniform implementation of the Action Plan across the EU and Member States.56 Although 
this directive is considered to be generally consistent with the objectives of the Action 
Plan, there are some provisions that are not fully aligned. For example, some of the tax 
experts argue that the GAAR in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive is more general than the 
principal purpose test57 under Action 6 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Some national 
administrations take the view that the GAAR under Action 6 of the OECD BEPS Action Plan 
only concerns the Parent Subsidiary Directive that also has a GAAR provision, which limits 
its effect. According to an interviewee from a national tax administration, the prevention 
tax avoidance only works well if it also covers tax treaties. Especially multinationals are 
using provisions in the bilateral tax treaties for their aggressive tax planning strategies 
(including the repatriation of dividends).58  
The Parent Subsidiary Directive was amended in 2015 and incorporated some 
parts of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Originally, the objective of this Directive was to 
avoid double taxation of corporate profits in the EU. As this led to increasingly double non-
taxation, the Directive was amended for the transposition of the OECD BEPS Actions 2 and 
6.59 Actions 2 and 6 of OECD BEPS Action Plan aimed to neutralise the effects of hybrid 
mismatches and to prevent treaty benefits from being granted in inappropriate 
circumstances. 
The third amendment to the Directive of Administrative Cooperation implements Action 5 
of the OECD BEPS Action Plan on harmful tax practices in EU Member States. The Directive 
aims to discourage the use of aggressive cross-border rulings and advance pricing 
arrangements. This includes secret multilateral tax agreements, such as those that were 
exposed by the Lux Leaks60 or old rulings. The Directive deviates from Action 5 in a number 
of technical areas such as timelines, some exclusions, the scope for SMEs, types of rulings 
covered, different definitions, and timing for the exchanges. This means that all EU 
Member States, except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania that are not 
members of the OECD, need take two different standards into account in their 
implementation , which might lead to inefficiencies. 
The Commission Recommendation on the implementation of measures against tax treaty 
abuse (2016/271/EU) was developed to accommodate Actions 6 and 7 of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan in tax treaties concluded by EU Member States. Action 6 aims to prevent tax 
treaty abuse and Action 7 addresses the definition of permanent establishment in tax 
                                           
56 EY (2017), The latest on BEPS – 2017 in review. A review of OECD and country actions in 2017, page, 5, 9, 
10. Available at: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-the-latest-on-BEPS-2017-in-
review/$FILE/EY-the-latest-on-BEPS-2017-in-review.pdf 
57 The principle purpose test assesses whether bilateral treaties are abused based on the purposes of transactions 
or arrangements. 
58 European Commission (2017), European Semester Thematic Factsheet: Curbing Aggressive Tax Planning. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/european-semester_thematic-
factsheet_curbing-agressive-tax-planning_en.pdf. 
59 Hemels, S. (2018), Implementation of BEPS in European Union hard law, page 93-94. Available at: 
http://ritsumeikeizai.koj.jp/koj_pdfs/67205.pdf 
60 ICIJ (2014), An ICIJ investigation Luxembourg leaks: global companies’ secrets exposed. Available at: 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks/ 
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treaties. The Commission Recommendation aims to contribute to a common minimum 
level of protection against tax avoidance in the EU.61 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines62 were further developed within the context of the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan for multinationals and national tax administrations to provide guidance 
on the application of the “arm's-length principle”.63 Transfer-pricing constitutes a large 
part of the profit shifting by multinationals. The general objective of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines is to reduce profit shifting stemming from transfer pricing activities. The 
specific objectives of the guidelines are to assist governments in ensuring that taxable 
profits of multinationals are not artificially shifted, and the reported tax base reflects their 
economic activity and that the arm's-length principle is applied correctly. 
The consistent application of Transfer Pricing Guidelines is promoted through the EU Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum, which between June 2002 and April 2019 aimed to advise the 
European Commission on transfer pricing issues. Its guidance was found to be consistent 
with the OECD BEPS Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which cover Actions 8, 9 and 10 of OECD 
BEPS Action Plan on transfer pricing for intangibles, risks and capital, and other high-risk 
transactions respectively.64 Once the OECD agreed on the concrete actions to tackle 
transfer pricing, the Forum sought to assist Member States in consistently applying them 
across the EU.65 
The OECD list of uncooperative tax havens and EU list of non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions show certain contradictions. The OECD list includes jurisdictions that refuse 
to make a formal commitment to the OECD standards of transparency and exchange of 
information. As of August 2019, there were no jurisdictions considered as uncooperative 
tax havens by the OECD.66 By contrast, the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions 
contained nine jurisdictions as of October 2019: American Samoa, Belize, Fiji, Guam, 
Oman, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, US Virgin Islands and Vanuatu.67 Several 
interviewees stressed that the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is more stringent in 
the assessment of the commitments of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions than the OECD.  
Beyond the OECD, there were a few interviewees that considered the initiatives of the UN 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters relevant as they 
primarily target national Member States. Indeed, the work of the Committee focuses on 
bilateral tax treaties between developed and developing countries as well as cooperation 
between national tax administrations. Although largely outside the scope of the EU tax 
instruments, some of the soft-law instruments target the bilateral tax treaties. 
  
                                           
61 European Commission (2016), COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 28.1.2016 on the implementation of 
measures against tax treaty abuse, 2016/271/EU, pp. 2, 4. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2016/EN/3-2016-271-EN-F1-1.PDF 
62 OECD (2017), Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-
tax-administrations-20769717.htm 
63 The arm’s-length principle is the base to determine the transfer pricing for related party transactions. The idea 
is that the price in the related party transaction is the same as if the transaction was between two unrelated 
parties. 
64 Hemels, S. (2018), op. cit., pp. 89, 90, 93.  
65 European Commission (2014), Communication on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum during 
July 2012 – January 2014, pp. 2, 3, 6. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/transf
er_pricing/forum/com%282014%29315_en.pdf.  
66 See: https://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/list-of-unco-operative-tax-havens.htm 
67 See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdictions/ 
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4 Relevance 
KEY OBSERVATIONS 
To what extent are the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis still relevant, 
taking into account any changes in the political and economic environment since they 
were set? 
 The Report confirms the continued relevance of most of the original needs and 
problems addressed by the EU instruments in the field of aggressive tax planning 
and harmful tax practices. 
 Introducing an international taxation system fit for the digital era and adapting 
double tax conventions accordingly are the most pressing needs according to 
consulted stakeholders. In fact, international corporate tax rules are no longer 
adequate in the digital era.  
 Some of the needs that were originally addressed by the EU instruments under 
assessment are now perceived as less prominent, namely the need for 
coordinating the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS reports and Common 
Reporting Standard across Member States, the need for ensuring more 
transparency and a more binding approach to information exchange, and the 
need for introducing national feedback processes between tax administrations. 
This is mostly because they have been effectively addressed at the EU level by 
the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation. Nevertheless, the objectives of the two instruments are still fully 
relevant insofar as the EU rules must be properly implemented and applied by 
Member States and new challenges and loopholes may emerge in these areas.  
 Focusing on business facilitation, all the needs and problems originally addressed 
by the EU rules under assessment are still relevant. For instance, transfer pricing 
is still one of the main channels used by multinational companies to shift profits; 
and aggressive tax planning via interest payments is still very prominent. Tax 
certainty remains a priority issue for both taxpayers and tax administrations and 
double taxation issues may still arise.  
 Two of the needs and problems originally addressed by the EU rules covered by 
this assignment that affect external policies in the field of taxation are still 
considered highly relevant by consulted stakeholders. First, while the room for 
shifting profits in third countries is becoming smaller, multinational companies 
are still able to put in place aggressive tax planning strategies involving countries 
outside the EU and this may lead to a dangerous ‘race to the bottom’ on corporate 
tax. Second, to ensure compliance with tax good governance, third countries still 
need support in their efforts to reduce tax avoidance. Tax laws and policies have 
become increasingly complex and globally intertwined; their effective 
implementation and enforcement require sufficient skills and expertise, 
sophisticated IT and administrative systems and international cooperation.  
Should the objectives of future EU instruments to tackle aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices be adjusted, in light of new political or economic developments? 
 The objectives of EU instruments to tackle aggressive tax planning and harmful 
tax practices should be progressively adjusted to address the outstanding issues 
related to digital taxation.  
 The objectives of future EU instruments should also account for additional needs 
and problems that are currently experienced by EU stakeholders, such as: 
 42 
 
o The need for providing more technical assistance to national tax 
authorities to analyse the data and information they receive from other 
Member States; and, more generally, the problems linked to the limited 
capacity of national tax authorities in addressing aggressive tax planning 
and harmful tax practices, which is affecting both EU Member States and 
third countries. 
o The increasing tax and legal uncertainty for corporates due to the 
frequent changes in tax rules, which are also linked to the piecemeal 
approach adopted so far at the EU level and may increase the complexity 
of the national tax systems. 
 Introduction 
Based on the research framework prepared for this assignment (see Annex A), the 
relevance criterion aims to assess the alignment between the original objectives of the 
EU instruments under investigation and the current needs and problems experienced by 
key stakeholders and the EU at large. More specifically, the analysis performed in this 
chapter revolves around two main research questions selected by the Commission: 
 To what extent are the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis still 
relevant, taking into account any changes in the political and economic 
environment since they were set? 
 Should the objectives of future EU instruments to tackle aggressive tax planning 
and harmful tax practices be adjusted, in light of new political or economic 
developments? 
To answer these questions, the following success criteria are considered: 
 Degree of alignment between stakeholders’ perception of current needs and 
problems at the international, EU and national levels and the objectives of the EU 
instruments under analysis. 
 Degree of alignment between the current international and EU political and 
economic priorities and the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis. 
In line with the methodology proposed for this assignment (Chapter 2), the present 
chapter focuses on three thematic areas: i) aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices ; ii) business facilitation; and iii) external policies. For each area, it looks at the 
alignment between the original needs and problems the instruments under investigation 
intended to address (for the full list of needs and problems and the intervention logics of 
these instruments, see Annex B) and the current needs and problems experienced by EU 
stakeholders, in light of the political and economic developments affecting aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices in the EU. The Report then investigates whether 
achieving the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis (for the full list of objectives 
of the instruments, see Annex B) can contribute to address the current needs and 
problems, or whether such objectives should be revised. Based on the key findings of this 
chapter, some suggestions to increase the relevance of the EU framework in the field of 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices are discussed in Chapter 6.  
 Analysis  
As detailed in Chapter 2, the analysis of the relevance criterion relies on three main 
sources: i) relevant literature; ii) assessments conducted by technical experts in 10 
Member States; and iii) in-depth interviews with institutional stakeholders, 
representatives of NGOs and business associations. The variety of sources consulted for 
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this assignment ensures the cross-validation of conclusions and accounts for potentially 
different perspectives on the issues at hand. 
For each of the three thematic areas within the remit of the assignment, the analysis in 
this chapter first looks at whether the original needs and problems that the EU 
instruments intended to address are still experienced by stakeholders. Then, it identifies 
new needs and problems (if any) affecting EU stakeholders. Finally, it checks the 
alignment between the proposed objectives of the EU rules under assessment and 
outstanding needs and problems. 
4.2.1 Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices 
Current needs and problems 
Given the rapid economic and political developments affecting corporate taxation, it is 
necessary to check whether the needs and problems originally targeted by the different 
EU instruments under investigation are still relevant (for the list of identified needs and 
problems and the intervention logics of these instruments, see Annex B).  
The evidence collected in the context of this assignment appears to confirm the continued 
relevance of most of the original needs. In light of the increasing digitalisation of the 
economy, it is no surprise that introducing an international taxation system fit for 
the digital era is among the most pressing needs, according to the stakeholders 
consulted. In this respect, the Commission emphasises that digital businesses may 
underpay taxes; on average, traditional business models are subject to an effective tax 
rate of 20.9%, whereas digital businesses may face a rate of 8.5%.68 More specifically, as 
confirmed by some of the technical experts contributing to this Report, digital technologies 
allow enterprises to sell goods or provide services in the territory of a given country 
without any physical presence. As tax rules are traditionally based on physical presence, 
it is often impossible for that country to levy a tax on the income generated from those 
activities. This conclusion is confirmed by the Commission,69 which emphasised the need 
to adapt the current tax framework to the globalised and digitalised economic 
environment. This remains one of the main outstanding needs, which would require an 
international agreement, for instance at OECD level. This opinion is shared by some 
institutional stakeholders70 as well as NGOs interviewed for this assignment. Introducing 
an international taxation system fit for the digital era would also entail the revision of 
existing double tax conventions.  
National corporate taxation rules, policies, and approaches to address aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices still require coordination at the EU level. In some 
cases, for instance with regard to the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, it is still too early to 
capture the impact of EU instruments on meeting the need for coordination because of the 
very recent implementation by EU Member States. In addition, some institutional 
stakeholders consulted for this assignment argued that even those rules that are 
commonly defined at the EU level may not be applied in the same way at Member State 
level. By way of example, and as confirmed by some of the experts contributing to the 
Report, the fact that the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive contains minimum requirements 
                                           
68 European Commission (2017), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, p.6. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/1_en_act_part1_v10_en.pdf. The estimations of the 
effective tax rate are based on PwC & ZEW (2017), Digital Tax Index. Available at: 
https://www.pwc.de/de/industrielle-produktion/executive-summary-digitaliiserungsindex-en.pdf. 
69 European Commission (2017), A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single 
Market, op. cit. 
70 See for instance the political statement issued by three Denmark, Finland and Sweden: EU Tax News Issue 
2018 – nr. 004 May – June 2018 – PwC, pp.11-13. Available at: 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/eu-direct-tax-newsletters/assets/pwc-eudtg-newsletter-may-
june-2018.pdf) 
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and often provides for optional exceptions allows for different interpretations across EU 
countries; this could still leave some room (albeit more limited) for tax competition. In the 
same vein, De Groot and Larking show that, due to the options available to Member States, 
the CFC rules laid down in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive may not result in a fully 
consistent approach across the EU.71 
Ensuring a level playing field for all companies active in the EU is another original 
need that is still experienced by consulted stakeholders. Most of the NGOs interviewed for 
this assignment emphasised that there are still large discrepancies when it comes to 
aggressive tax planning between SMEs and large companies, especially multinational 
entities. The OECD points out that insufficient coordination in the design of tax policies 
might give rise to tax avoidance on a global scale since multinational entities might take 
advantage of gaps between tax systems, and especially from low-tax jurisdictions.72 
Aggressive tax planning not only affects tax fairness between EU Member States but also 
between companies operating in the same jurisdiction. A business association argued that 
levelling the playing field would require, among others, the introduction of a common, 
minimum corporate income tax rate in all EU countries. In the same vein, an institutional 
stakeholder stressed that a level playing field cannot be adequately achieved without a 
common corporate tax base. 
Finally, also the need to tackle tax treaty abuse, which was mainly addressed by the 
2016 Recommendation,73 is still central. This is partially because a soft law approach tends 
to be less effective than a hard law approach when it comes to countering aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices. The relevance of this need is confirmed by the 
literature on the topic. Van’t Riet & Lejour74 estimate that treaty shopping can reduce the 
average withholding tax rates on dividends by 6%. In the same vein, a study prepared by 
EY shows that treaty shopping is one of the main drivers of aggressive tax planning.75  
Stakeholders consulted for this assignment believe that three of the needs that were 
originally addressed by the EU instruments under assessment are now less salient:  
 the need for coordinating the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS reports 
and Common Reporting Standard across Member States;  
 the need for ensuring more transparency and a more binding approach to 
information exchange on tax rulings as well as on internal transactions 
within multinational groups; and  
 the need for introducing national feedback processes within tax 
administrations and between tax administrations and their national 
reporters (such as banks, employers and pension companies).  
These needs are perceived to be less relevant now because they have been effectively 
addressed at the EU level by two hard law instruments, i.e. the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive and the Directive on Administrative Cooperation. It is worth remarking, however, 
that the objectives of the two instruments are still fully relevant for a number of reasons:76 
                                           
71 De Groot, I., and Larking, B. (2019), “Implementation of Controlled Foreign Company rules under the EU Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive (2016/1164)”, European Taxation 2019. 
72 OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2017, p.151 and OECD (2013), Policy Brief, Taxing Multinational 
Enterprises. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/policy-briefs/PB-Base-Erosion-Profit-Shifting-(BEPS)-Nov-
2013.pdf 
73 Commission Recommendation on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU), 
C(2016) 271 final, Brussels, 28.01.2016. 
74 Van’t Riet, M. & Lejour, A. (2014), Ranking the stars. Network analysis of bilateral tax treaties, p.31. Available 
at: https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/cpb-discussion-paper-290-ranking-stars_0.pdf  
75 EY (2017), The latest on BEPS – 2017 in review. A review of OECD and country actions in 2017, p.14 
76 It is worth remarking, as presented in Figure 1 of Annex B that the EU instruments under analysis aimed to 
achieve three main general objectives when it comes to aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices: i) to 
improve the functioning of the Single Market by ensuring a fair, efficient and growth-friendly corporate taxation, 
discouraging the use of aggressive cross-border tax planning and protecting Member States against cross-border 
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for instance, EU rules still have to be properly implemented and applied by Member States, 
and new challenges and loopholes may emerge in the future. 
The stakeholders consulted confirmed that all the problems originally tackled by the 
EU instruments in the scope of this assignment are still relevant, at least to some 
extent. In line with the analysis of the needs presented above, the most pressing problem 
relates to the digital economy. In fact, international corporate tax rules are no longer 
adequate in the digital area, and EU measures have so far been ineffective at solving 
this problem. In particular, NGOs and institutional stakeholders surveyed for this Report 
believe that one of the most crucial issues to be tackled in the near future is the taxation 
of digital activities. As previously stated, the effective tax rate paid by digital companies 
in the EU is likely to be lower than the one paid by traditional business models.77 
Policymakers are struggling to find adequate solutions to ensure that tax policy  keeps  
pace with globalisation and digitalisation, and there is still no international agreement on 
the point. This is a pressing issue due to the growing magnitude of the problem. In 2017, 
nine out of the 20 most capitalised companies in the EU were technology companies, 
accounting for about 54% of the total top-20 capitalisation; and the top five e-commerce 
retailers have sustained their revenue growth rates at around 32% per year between 2008 
and 2016, while the entire EU retail sector has registered on average a 1% growth rate in 
revenues per year in the same period.78 In addition, digital platforms are projected to 
capture around 30 to 40% of the value created in industrial value chains.79 
Potential tax losses due to aggressive tax planning continue to represent a 
considerable problem. In fact, a representative from an NGO consulted for this assignment 
stressed that tax losses are real and experienced in several Member States. Institutional 
stakeholders also emphasised that the magnitude of the problem varies from country to 
country. On a more general note, it seems that more should be done to reduce such losses. 
Empirical studies confirm that losses in tax revenues due to tax base erosion are an 
ongoing issue, rather common in many EU Member States.80 In a report for the European 
Parliament, Janský81 shows that estimated losses in tax revenues vary markedly among 
available studies and country income groups; on average, however, 1 to 10% of total 
corporate income tax revenues are lost due to aggressive tax planning strategies. In OECD 
countries, roughly $400 billion (around €300 billion) of long-run revenue losses are 
attributable to tax avoidance and evasion.82 On a global scale, in 2015 multinational 
companies were estimated to shift around 40% of their total profits, which results in $600 
                                           
tax fraud and avoidance; ii) to reduce harmful tax competition; iii) to address issues related to taxing the digital 
economy among the Member States. 
77 European Commission (2017), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, p.6. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/1_en_act_part1_v10_en.pdf. The estimations of the 
effective tax rate are based on PwC & ZEW (2017), Digital Tax Index. Available at: 
https://www.pwc.de/de/industrielle-produktion/executive-summary-digitaliiserungsindex-en.pdf. 
78 European Commission (2017), op. cit., p.4. The estimations are based on Global Top 100 Companies by market 
capitalisation' PWC, 2017. Available at: https://www.pwc.fr/fr/assets/files/pdf/2017/06/pwc-etude-global-top-
100.pdf 
79 Recommendations of the Strategic Policy Forum on Digital Entrepreneurship (2016), Big data and B2B digital 
platforms: the next frontier for Europe’s industry and enterprises, p.6. Available at: http://edz.bib.uni-
mannheim.de/daten/edz-h/gdb/16/Big%20data%20and%20B2B%20digital%20platforms.pdf 
80 Institute for Advanced Studies, CPB, DONDENA (2017), Aggressive Tax Planning Indicators – final report, 
Taxation paper No. 71, European Commission, pp.29, 67, 70, 84. Available online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_papers_71_atp_.pdf 
81 Janský, P. (2019), European Parliament, TAX3 Committee: Hearing on Evaluation of Tax Gap. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/161049/2019%2001%2024%20-
%20Petr%20Jansky%20written%20questions%20-%20Ev_TAX%20GAP.pdf  
82 Crivelli, E. et al. (2015), Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries, p.21. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Base-Erosion-Profit-Shifting-and-Developing-
Countries-42973  
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billion (around €480 billion) of tax revenue losses per year.83 The reduction in tax revenues 
mostly hits those countries that rely relatively more on fiscal income and where there is 
weak tax enforcement. The solution to the problem is far from simple. The OECD84 shows 
that diverging national corporate income tax rates lead to tax competition and may 
contribute to a surge in tax avoidance. In this context, while some NGOs85 argue that a 
minimum effective tax rate is needed to limit the ‘race to the bottom’, other NGOs 
interviewed for this assignment explained that a minimum tax rate may act as a focal 
point, leaving no room for Member States to set higher rates.  
Interviewed stakeholders also identified some additional needs and problems related 
to combatting aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices that were not originally 
addressed by the EU instruments under assessment and are currently experienced by EU 
stakeholders. For instance, the need for providing technical assistance to national 
tax authorities to analyse the data and information they receive from other Member 
States was mentioned by both technical experts and stakeholders. A study conducted in 
2018 on tax administration capacity and tax avoidance highlights that some EU countries 
make limited use of the data and information transmitted by foreign tax authorities.86 This 
may happen due to limited skills and expertise (tax authorities are still missing the relevant 
tools to understand and analyse the data received) and limited capacity (tax authorities 
are understaffed and do not have personnel to deal with the large amount of data they 
receive), which lead to ‘mock compliance’ (i.e., tax administrations fulfil the formal 
requirements of the OECD/G20 BEPS regarding the exchange of country-by-country 
reports but fail to make any use of the information received). The Commission confirmed 
that while the exchange of information linked to the Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation is working well and generates a large amount of data,87 there is no clear 
evidence of the actual use of such information. In fact, tax administrations did not increase 
the number of tax staff dedicated to EU administrative cooperation, and IT resources to 
use the received information are still to be developed. The Commission concluded that 
“without adequate resources at Member States tax administrations, little can be done even 
with more data”.88  
The increasing tax uncertainty for corporates seems to be another notable problem. 
An institutional stakeholder interviewed for this assignment reported that the changes in 
tax rules introduced by EU legislation generated some uncertainty for corporates. The 
OECD emphasises that tax uncertainty discourages investments and impinges on 
economic growth.89 One of the consulted experts also highlighted that, in Belgium, 
advance tax rulings were requested with regard to the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive even 
before its implementation, which shows that taxpayers are seeking more certainty about 
                                           
83 Torslov, T., Wier, L. & Zucman, G. (2018), The missing profits of nations, p.22. Available at: https://gabriel-
zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf  
84 OECD (2015), Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11, p.180. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/measuring-and-monitoring-beps-action-11-2015-final-report-9789264241343-
en.htm 
85 See for instance: Weyzig, F., Oxfam, “Why a Minimum Effective Tax Rate is Urgently Needed?”, April 4, 2019. 
Available at: http://kluwertaxblog.com/2019/04/04/why-a-minimum-effective-tax-rate-is-urgently-
needed/?doing_wp_cron=1564245749.0264079570770263671875. 
86 Heitmüller, F., Harari, M. & Meinzer, M. (2018), Tax administrations’ capacity in preventing tax evasion and 
tax avoidance, pp.68-70. Available at: https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Tax-
administrations%E2%80%99-capacity-in-preventing-tax-evasion-and-tax-avoidance.pdf  
87 European Commission (2017), Commission Staff Working Document on the application of Council Directive 
(EU) no 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation, pp.3-8,11. Available at: 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6af83b56-e402-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1 
88 European Commission (2017), Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the application of Council Directive (EU) 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation. 
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0781  
89 OECD/IMF (2019), Progress Report on Tax Certainty. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/fr/ctp/g20-report-on-
tax-certainty.htm. 
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the application of future rules.90 Furthermore, the problem of tax uncertainty was also 
reiterated by another consulted expert, who was also concerned by the additional dose of 
uncertainty for multinational entities introduced by the Brexit process. 
In addition to tax uncertainty, several stakeholders and experts also referred more 
generally to legal uncertainty. In this respect, the piecemeal approach adopted so far at 
the EU level may increase the complexity of the national tax systems, as Member States 
are required to introduce additional tax rules to counter aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices, which are not necessarily aligned with their existing national rules.91 
In this context, one of the experts contributing to this Report indicated that although a 
GAAR is crucial to combat tax avoidance, it is unclear when the GAARs introduced by EU 
rules apply and how they interact with similar national rules, thus still leaving room for 
tax avoidance. The perceived legal uncertainty also seems to be rooted in a more 
fundamental question concerning the overall objectives of the EU intervention in the field 
of aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. In fact, some of the consulted 
stakeholders reported that it is not clear whether the main objective is to increase the 
competitiveness of the EU vis-à-vis other trade blocks or if EU rules just seek to achieve 
a greater harmonisation of national tax policies, irrespective of any competitiveness 
consideration. This fundamental question reflects two conflicting goals pursued by national 
tax policies: on the one hand maximising tax revenues and on the other attracting capital 
by lowering tax rates. 
Alignment between objectives and needs and problems 
When asked about the alignment between the objectives of the EU instruments under 
assessment (for the full list of objectives and the intervention logics of these instruments, 
see Annex B) and the original needs they intended to address, participants in the targeted 
consultation activities identified the strongest alignment with the following needs: 
 Ensuring more transparency and a more binding approach to information exchange 
on tax rulings as well as on internal transactions within multinational groups. 
 Coordinating the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS reports and Common 
Reporting Standard across Member States and, more generally, coordinating 
national corporate taxation rules, policies, and approaches to addressing 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices.  
 
The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Directive on Administrative Cooperation are key 
to explaining the strong alignment between the objectives of the EU rules in the 
scope of this assignment and these needs. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
complements and reinforces the OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan and creates a framework 
within which Member States can deliver on their BEPS commitments in a coordinated 
manner.92 In the same vein, Knobel93 concludes that the third amendment to the Directive 
on Administrative Cooperation (DAC 3) goes beyond the OECD/G20 BEPS Action 5 and 
offers a framework in which each EU country is compelled to exchange information. In this 
                                           
90 Advance tax rulings were requested to the Belgian Ruling Commission with regard to the hybrid mismatch 
provision (decision no. 2018.0521 of 14 July 2018) and the CFC rules (decision no. 2018.0231 of 24 April 2018).  
91 The high complexity of the Member State corporate tax system is confirmed by the impact assessment 
accompanying the proposals on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB) (Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposals for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base and a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), 2016. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/swd_2016_341_en.pdf) 
92 EY (2017), The latest on BEPS – 2017 in review. A review of OECD and country actions in 2017, p.5. Available 
at: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-the-latest-on-BEPS-2017-in-review/$FILE/EY-the-latest-
on-BEPS-2017-in-review.pdf  
93 Knobel, A. (2018), Reporting taxation: Analysing loopholes in the EU’s automatic exchange of information and 
how to close them, p.4. Available at: http://extranet.greens-efa-service.eu/public/media/file/1/5729  
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respect, EU rules are essential for those EU countries that are not members of the OECD. 
For instance, an EY report acknowledges that the transposition of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive in Cyprus is expected to significantly amend the national tax system.94 Consulted 
stakeholders and experts argue, however, that achieving full coordination is a very 
complex issue that requires accounting for many additional elements not currently covered 
by any EU instruments. By way of example, the CFC rule set by the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive does not set minimum taxation for profits and this can generate a ‘race to the 
bottom’. This issue might open the way to aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices. 
Consulted stakeholders believe that the objectives of the EU instruments are not aligned 
with the need for an international taxation system fit for the digital era. At the 
same time, this is considered to be one of EU stakeholders’ most pressing needs (see the 
previous section). This would call for a revision of some of the objectives of EU rules in 
the field of aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. Nevertheless, the EU has 
decided to await the results of the OECD discussions on the topic before further 
intervening. For the time being, this appears to be a meaningful approach, especially if 
one considers that most of the digital companies operate in a global context, therefore a 
global solution would be better than a regional one. In this respect, CIOT95 and PWC96 
argued that a long-run and sustainable solution to avoiding double taxation and significant 
compliance burdens for digital businesses will only emerge from a multilateral approach. 
By contrast, an EU level solution might adversely affect EU competitiveness and stifle 
economic growth and innovation. Both CIOT and PWC advocate for more cooperation 
between the EU and the OECD on the topic. Given the global dimension of the issues, 
some of the technical experts participating in this assignment suggest aligning future EU 
measures with the OECD/G20 initiatives in the field, especially the first pillar of the OECD’s 
recent work in this area, i.e. the revised nexus and profit allocation rules.97 
Interestingly, consulted stakeholders argue that by achieving their objectives, the EU 
instruments under analysis will only partially be able to address the problems 
that are currently experienced by EU stakeholders. In line with the discussion above, 
stakeholders are particularly concerned by the very limited alignment between the current 
EU rules’ objectives and taxation issues in the digital era. In addition, they also identify 
a significant mismatch between the current objectives and the fact that national 
corporate tax rules are no longer adequate and allow for tax avoidance strategies. 
In this respect, they argue that the lack of progress on the CCTB and CCCTB proposals is 
illustrative of the issue, especially if one considers that the general objective of these 
proposals was to enhance “the fairness of the tax system by addressing some of the root 
causes of corporate tax avoidance by multinational companies”.98 However, one expert 
contributing to this Report emphasised that tax remains an area of national competence, 
and while more EU legislation would be necessary in order to counter tax avoidance, 
                                           
94 EY (2017), op. cit., p.10.  
95 CIOT (2018), EU Commission Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence Response by the Chartered Institute of Taxation. Available at: 
https://www.tax.org.uk/sites/default/files/180516%20EU%20Corporate%20taxation%20of%20a%20significan
t%20digital%20presence%20CIOT%20comments%20FINAL.pdf  
96 PWC (2018), European Commission Proposals for Directives regarding fair taxation of the digital economy 
(“Digital Tax Package”). Available at: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about/assets/reponse-ec-proposals-digital-
tax-package.pdf  
97 OECD (2019), Addressing The Tax Challenges Of The Digitalisation Of The Economy. Public consultation 
document. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-addressing-the-tax-
challenges-of-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf; OECD (2019), Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus 
Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-
arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf  
98 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposals for a Council 
Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base and a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 2016, p. 
23. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/swd_2016_341_en.pdf  
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unanimity voting makes it more difficult to introduce substantial and timely changes to 
tax rules.99 
On more a general note, when it comes to problems related to tax treaty abuse and 
specific exceptions to the definition of permanent establishment as well as to the 
potential tax losses due to aggressive tax planning, some of the stakeholders 
interviewed in the context of this assignment emphasised that while some of the objectives 
of EU soft law are in line with such problems, it is likely that these objectives will not be 
achieved and, in turn, the problems will not be addressed. This is because soft law tends 
to be less effective than hard law. In fact, a hard law approach induces swifter compliance 
and allows for the desired effects to materialise quicker in comparison to a soft law 
approach, where the voluntary action of Member States and their reaction time could delay 
the uniform application of tax standards. For instance, some representatives from NGOs 
and public institutions indicated that tax treaty abuses are now mainly targeted by the 
2016 Recommendation and there is no guarantee this will lead to major changes in 
bilateral treaties, especially if one considers that some Member States may fear that any 
change in tax treaties will lead to multinational enterprises relocating part of their activities 
beyond the EU borders. 
Finally, most of the stakeholders interviewed for this assignment argued that achieving 
the objectives of the EU instruments under analysis would hardly meet additional 
needs and address new problems currently experienced in the EU, such as the need 
for technical assistance to national tax authorities and tax and legal uncertainty due to 
changes in EU and national rules (as discussed above, in the previous section of this 
chapter). It is worth noting, however, that other EU instruments that are not analysed in 
this assignment may tackle these needs and problems. For instance, the Fiscalis 2020 
Programme allows the Commission to support the administrative capacity of national tax 
authorities.100 In the same vein, the Structural Reform Support Programme helps Member 
States introduce institutional, administrative and growth-enhancing reform in several 
areas, including tax revenues and public finance management.101 An institutional 
stakeholder also made the point that the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum and the Double 
Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanism102 may help increase tax certainty. 
4.2.2 Business facilitation 
Current needs and problems 
Focusing on the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum and the Parent Subsidiary Directive (i.e. the 
two pieces of legislation covered by this assignment under the business facilitation 
thematic area, see Chapter 2 for further details), consulted stakeholders agreed that, at 
least to some extent, all the needs and problems originally addressed by these two 
EU instruments are still relevant (for the full list of needs and problems and the 
intervention logics of the instruments, see Annex B).  
In addition to the broad need to avoid double taxation, stakeholders consulted for this 
assignment stressed that also the specific need to broaden the definition of parent 
company and the types of legal entities covered by the Parent Subsidiary 
Directive was largely met at the EU level. In fact, annex I to this Directive provides an 
                                           
99 For further details, please see “Decision making on EU Tax Policy”, European Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/decision-making-eu-tax-policy_en 
100 For further details, please see: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fiscalis-programme_en 
101 For further details, please see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-
programmes/overview-funding-programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en 
102 Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on tax dispute resolution mechanisms in the European 
Union OJ L 265. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1852/oj 
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“exhaustive list”103 of the legal entities covered by the law, and Article 3 of the Directive 
provides a clear definition of parent company. The types of companies are either expressly 
named or broadly determined based on national law, depending on the Member State.  
By contrast, more should be done when it comes to aggressive tax planning via inter-
group dividend payments. While the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive addresses the double 
non-taxation related to this issue, the Parent Subsidiary Directive mainly aims to solve the 
problem of double taxation of dividends at the level of the parent company. In this respect, 
a recent study led by the Institute for Advanced Studies explains that “since zero tax 
countries are outside the EU, the lack of a binding CFC rule and the ability to repatriate 
the dividends without additional repatriation taxes become more relevant”.104 The study, 
by relying on firm-level data to build aggregated aggressive tax planning indicators, argues 
that some EU countries may play a role when it comes to dividend repatriation routes.105 
Van’t Riet and Lejour106 investigate worldwide treaty shopping and conclude that the 
potential avoidance of dividend repatriation taxes is around 6% for multinational 
enterprises. Van’t and Lejour107 also estimate bilateral repatriation tax rates for each 
country pair and show that the Netherlands applies the lowest average inward repatriation 
tax rate (3.4%) for dividends. At the other end of the spectrum, Slovakia relies on the 
highest rate (13.1%). Nonetheless, the recent change of focus in the Parent Subsidiary 
Directive from avoiding double-taxation to countering double non-taxation may reignite 
the risk of double taxation. This potential obstacle to business facilitation is 
emphasised by both the business associations interviewed for this assignment and some 
literature on the topic.108 The impact assessment of the Directive on Double Taxation 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms also identifies this aspect as a crucial problem.109 In fact, 
double taxation issues may still arise, in spite of the adoption of tax treaties and double 
taxation conventions. This is likely to happen when Member States have a different 
interpretation of such instruments.  
The relevance of the needs and problems addressed by the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
is confirmed by the main literature on the topic. Transfer pricing is one of the main 
channels used by multinational enterprises to shift profits. Based on Commission 
estimates,110 the pricing of intra-firm transactions and the strategic relocation of 
intellectual property rights account for about 70% of profit shifting. Davies at al. confirm 
the existence of transfer pricing issues by using French firm-level data.111 The intra-firm 
                                           
103 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case 
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. See Annex I. Available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011L0096 
104 Institute for Advanced Studies, CPB, DONDENA (2017), Aggressive Tax Planning Indicators – final report, 
Taxation paper No. 71, European Commission, p.32. Available online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_papers_71_atp_.pdf 
105 Institute for Advanced Studies (2017), op. cit., Chapter 3 and p.12. 
106 Van’t Riet, M. and Lejour, A. M. (2014), Ranking the stars. Network analysis of bilateral tax treaties, CPB 
Discussion Paper No. 2014-290. Available at: https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/cpb-
discussion-paper-290-ranking-stars_0.pdf. 
107 Van't Riet, M. and Lejour, A. M. (2017), Optimal Tax Routing: Network Analysis of FDI Diversion, CPB 
Discussion Paper No. 2017-022. 
108 Lang, M., Owens, J., Pistone, P., Rust, A., Schuch, J., and Staringer, C. (2016). GAARs - A Key Element of 
Tax Systems in the Post-BEPS World, IBFD, Chapter 2.2.  
109 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council 
Directive on Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the European Union, pp.14-17. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/swd_2016_343_en.pdf. 
110 European Commission (2015), Commission Staff Working Document, Corporate Income Taxation in the 
European Union Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action. 
Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/fairer
_corporate_taxation/swd_2015_121.pdf. 
111 Davies, R.B., Martin, J., Parenti, M. and F. Toubal (2014), Knocking on Tax Haven’s Door: multinational firms 
and transfer pricing, Oxford University Center for Business Taxation, Working Paper 15/01. 
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prices appear to be significantly lower than arm’s length prices if the receiving country has 
lower taxes. Also, 70% of exports were sent to tax havens by relying on transfer-pricing 
and then further resold. The relevant underreporting by French firms in 1999 was 
estimated at €333 million. Davies et al. also found that most companies engaging in 
transfer pricing were large multinationals. Similar results were found by Egger et al.: in 
high tax countries, foreign subsidiaries showed lower profits than domestic companies; by 
contrast, in low tax countries, the opposite is bound to happen.112 Egger concluded that 
profit shifting through transfer pricing and abuses of intellectual property regimes is the 
primary origin of tax avoidance for foreign-owned firms operating in the EU.  
On a more general note, according to several consulted representatives from business 
associations, tax certainty remains a priority issue for business facilitation. This 
issue can be seen from two perspectives: on the one hand, EU and national institutions 
aim to protect the tax base of national governments, and on the other hand companies 
wish to have a good business climate relying on tax and legal certainty. In the same 
vein, a recent OECD/IMF report113 stresses that tax certainty is a priority for both 
taxpayers and tax administrations.  
Alignment between objectives and needs and problems  
When it comes to business facilitation, consulted stakeholders confirmed the general 
alignment between the objectives of the pieces of legislation in the scope of the 
analysis and the needs and problems they originally intended to tackle (for the 
full list of objectives and the intervention logics of the instruments, see Annex B). In 
addition, most of the interviewees emphasised that the objectives of the Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum and the Parent Subsidiary Directive are particularly aligned with: 
 The need to broaden the definition of parent company and the types of legal entities 
covered by the Parent Subsidiary Directive.  
 The problems related to transfer pricing that affect cross-border business activities 
in the Single Market. 
First, the Parent Subsidiary Directive includes a list of legal entities covered by 
the Directive, and this explains the stakeholders’ feedback. Second, consulted 
stakeholders consider that the objectives of the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum have the 
potential to address the issues related to transfer pricing in the Single Market. In this 
respect, a tax authority and an institutional stakeholder interviewed for this assignment 
stressed that base erosion caused by harmful transfer pricing practices can artificially 
shift GDP from one Member State to another and that achieving the Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum’s objectives may contribute to solving the problem. In their study, Lohse and 
Riedel114 collected data on transfer price legislation from 26 EU Member States and 
multinational firms and investigated whether rules are efficient at reducing multinational 
income shifting behaviour. Their findings show that sound legislation can reduce profit 
shifting by 50%. In this respect and in order to tackle this problem to the highest extent, 
a consulted stakeholder suggested that more should be done to intervene in those complex 
situations where companies may rely on entities based in third countries as an 
intermediary for intra-company transactions between EU Member States. KPMG confirms 
that in some cases the nature of the relations between entities is not based on any justified 
                                           
112 Egger, P. et al. (2019), The taxing deed of globalization, American Economic Review, vol. 109, no. 2. Available 
at: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20160600  
113 OECD/IMF (2019), Progress Report on Tax Certainty. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/fr/ctp/g20-report-
on-tax-certainty.htm. 
114 Lohse, T., Riedel, N. (2013), Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International Income Shifting? Evidence from 
European Multinationals, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4404. Available at: 
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4404.pdf 
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economic reasons; this might include structures aiming to circumvent transfer pricing 
regulations.115  
4.2.3 External policies 
Current needs and problems 
Two of the needs and problems originally addressed by the EU rules covered by this 
assignment that affect external policies in the field of taxation are still considered highly 
relevant by consulted stakeholders (for the list of identified needs and problems and the 
intervention logics of the instruments, see Annex B): 
 The problem generated by low/no income taxes in some third countries that limit 
the possibilities for Member States to enforce their tax policy. 
 The need to support developing and other third countries in the fight against tax 
avoidance and their integration in the international good governance tax agenda. 
First, when it comes to low/no income taxes in some third countries, the stakeholders 
interviewed in the context of this assignment acknowledged that, while the room for 
shifting profits in third countries is shrinking, multinational companies are still able to put 
in place aggressive tax planning strategies involving countries outside the EU. The rise of 
phantom investments – defined as “investments that pass through empty corporate shells” 
– shows that some tax policy strategies, such as offering very low or zero effective 
corporate tax rates, are still effective when it comes to attracting fictitious foreign direct 
investments that allow the global tax bill of multinational enterprises to be minimised.116 
In a similar vein, reportedly, some notorious tax schemes still enable multinationals to 
shift profits from the EU to tax havens.117 Torslov et al. estimated that multinational 
companies artificially shift around 45% of their profits into tax havens.118 The authors 
concluded that profit-shifting and low enforcement accelerate a ‘race to the bottom’ with 
regard to corporate income tax rates.  
The dangerous race to the bottom on corporate tax was also emphasised by Oxfam,119 
which pointed out that this is impinging not only on developed countries but also on those 
developing countries that are deprived of the tax revenues they would need to address 
poverty and invest in infrastructure, healthcare, education, etc. Kar and Spanjers120 
estimate that over the period 2003-2012, the opacity linked to tax haven jurisdictions, 
among other factors, might have deprived developing countries of up to $6.6 trillion. More 
specifically, the Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that tax 
avoidance alone costs developing countries between $70 billion and $120 billion per 
                                           
115 KPMG (2018), TP Alert: Significant changes in transfer pricing regulations in 2019. Available at: 
https://home.kpmg/pl/en/home/insights/2018/11/tp-alert-significant-changes-in-transfer-pricing-regulations-
in-2019.html  
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year.121 This issue was also stressed at the Third Conference on Financing for Development 
in July 2015.122  
In this context, it is worth mentioning however that the introduction of an EU list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes123 contributed to raising the standards of 
tax good governance on a global scale.124 Some of the interviewees also stressed that 
digital companies may have more room for manoeuvre insofar as most EU and 
international tax systems still rely on the notion of physical rather than digital presence. 
Aggressive tax planning strategies based on digital presence are scrutinised by both the 
OECD125 and the Commission.126 In fact, in order to tackle new tax challenges stemming 
from the digitalisation of the economy, the OECD/G20 framework is now also considering 
establishing new international rules for a minimum tax rate for multinationals.127  
Second, to ensure compliance with tax good governance, third countries need support in 
their efforts to reduce tax avoidance. While the EU is stepping up pressure on third 
countries to comply with minimum standards of good governance in tax matters, some of 
the consulted stakeholders and technical experts contributing to this Report have pointed 
to issues of limited capacity and need for assistance to help developing countries 
ensure they meet and maintain their obligations. In fact, developing countries may be 
missing basic administrative infrastructures to abide by tax good governance 
standards. A report by Eurodad128 shows that, while the need to support developing 
countries is still central, EU Member States have rather different views and approaches to 
the topic. In this respect, the IMF emphasised that due to their difficulties in mobilising 
revenues, international tax issues are not necessarily a priority for low income countries 
and pressures to comply with global standards may detract scarce talent and resources 
from more pressing revenue needs and reform efforts.129 The IMF, OECD, UN and World 
Bank Group could therefore play a role as leading providers of capacity building via e.g. 
the Platform for Collaboration on Tax.130  
Against this background, the limited capacity of national tax authorities is one of the 
additional problems that, according to the institutional stakeholders and NGOs consulted 
for this assignment, is affecting some EU Member States and third countries. Tax laws and 
policies have become increasingly complex and globally intertwined; their effective 
implementation and enforcement require sufficient skills and expertise, sophisticated IT 
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and administrative systems and international cooperation. The OECD has acknowledged 
the need to measure and analyse capacity constraints in tax administration systems as a 
first necessary step to build additional capacity.131 However, some stakeholders have 
stressed that the limited capacity of national tax authorities may also serve as a pretext 
to leave room for aggressive tax planning.  
Fostering third countries to adopt tax good governance principles and supporting them in 
building capacity is a complex issue. In this respect, there are mechanisms that can be 
further harnessed to provide assistance. The EU is engaged in initiatives at the 
international level, the regional level, and the bilateral level. Examples are the involvement 
in a number of domestic revenue mobilisation initiatives aiming to strengthen the 
participation of countries to international standards and increase their administrative 
capacity, such as the Addis Tax Initiative, IMF Trust Funds, the Tax Administration 
Diagnostic Assessment Tool, EU regional programme on fiscal transition in West Africa and 
other global, regional and national domestic revenue mobilisation initiatives.132 
Alignment between objectives and needs and problems 
When it comes to the alignment between the objectives of the EU instruments under 
assessment (for the full list of objectives and the intervention logics of the instruments, 
see Annex B) and the needs and problems currently experienced by stakeholders, most of 
the representatives of national tax administrations and NGOs interviewed for this 
assignment emphasised that the problems stemming from low/no income taxes in some 
third countries and the need to provide support to developing countries are only partially 
targeted by the current soft law approach.  
For instance, one technical expert contributing to this Report argued that the ‘name-and-
shame’ approach used to foster tax havens to exchange information for tax purposes tends 
to fail due to complex aggressive tax planning strategies undertaken by multinational 
enterprises. While the EU list of uncooperative jurisdictions is seen as a step forward, as 
it introduces more comprehensive criteria than those used by the OECD, an NGO points 
out that issues such as transparency could dent the impact of the list. It is important to 
note, however, that the transparency issues signalled by civil society in 2017 when the 
first list was published133 have been improved through, for instance, the publishing of 
letters sent to “grey-listed” countries. Nevertheless, civil society still raises concerns about 
the transparency of the negotiations taking place in the Code of Conduct Group as the list 
is prepared and updated.134 Furthermore, the instruments under investigation in this 
assignment do not contribute to addressing the capacity constraints experienced by 
national tax authorities. According to Majdanska,135 inter-agency cooperation is the 
missing milestone in fostering global tax good governance. As mentioned above, other EU 
and international instruments for development policy may bridge this gap. 
                                           
131 OECD (2011), Supporting the Development of More Effective Tax Systems, Chapter 4. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/48993634.pdf  
132 See for instance: European Commission, Achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals: Putting together 
the means of implementation: Highlights on EU early achievements in three key areas, 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/oda-light-touch-report-11042017_en_0.pdf. 
133 Oxfam (2017), Blacklist or Whitewash? What a real EU blacklist of tax havens should look like, Oxfam Briefing 
Note, pp. 6-7. Available at: https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bn-blacklist-whitewash-
tax-havens-eu-281117-en_0.pdf 
134 Oxfam (2019), Off the Hook: How the EU is about to whitewash the world’s worst tax havens, p. 13. Available 
at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620625/bn-off-the-hook-eu-tax-havens-
070319-en.pdf. 
135 Majdanska, A. (2018), How to effectively promote tax good governance in third countries: A missing touch-
stone on the EU Agenda, Chapter 3 in Inter-agency Cooperation and Good Tax Governance in Africa. Available 
at: 
http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/images/pulp/books/legal_compilations/good_tax_governance/Chapter%203%20GO
OD%20TAX%20GOVERNANCE.pdf 
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Interestingly, consulted stakeholders also believe that the EU instruments addressing 
external taxation are not sufficiently geared towards creating a level playing field for 
all businesses, a need that is considered still relevant at the EU level. As further 
discussed in Chapter 3 on Coherence, a number of concerns have been expressed 
regarding the alignment between the EU approach and the OECD approach to the problem, 
especially as some have suggested that international cooperation in tax matters may 
require a global rather than a regional approach. 
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5 EU Added Value 
KEY OBSERVATIONS 
Was there added value to setting these objectives at EU level, rather than at national 
level? Could the same objectives be achieved through a purely national approach by the 
Member States?  
 Most stakeholders believe that the results of the EU tax instruments would only 
have been achieved to some extent by national interventions if the EU had been 
absent. 
 It is difficult to determine the precise added value of the EU tax instruments as 
most Member States would most likely also have taken some measures on their 
own, because of their commitments within the framework of the OECD tax work 
and other global developments. 
 The EU added value is most significant for measures that require strong 
coordination, including the EU implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan 
and imposing tax good governance principles in the relationship with third 
countries. 
 The hard-law instruments bring, in general, more added value than the soft-law 
instruments. 
 Reportedly, the lack of public transparency in some of the soft law tax 
instruments such as the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation may limit how 
far external stakeholders can assess and support the policy process leading to 
new measures against aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. 
 
 Introduction 
The EU added value criterion assesses whether the EU approach generated more results 
than what could have been reasonably expected from Member States’ actions at national 
level (an overview of the expected results of the EU instruments in the scope of analysis 
is presented in Annex B). More specifically, the analysis presented in this chapter aims to 
answer the following questions: 
 Was there added value to setting these objectives at EU level, rather than at 
national level? Could the same objectives be achieved through a purely national 
approach by the Member States? 
As further discussed in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 2), the remainder of this chapter 
is structured around three thematic areas: i) aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices; ii) business facilitation; and iii) external policies. In line with the research 
framework prepared for this assignment (see Annex A), the two following success 
criteria were used for the analysis of the EU added value for each of the three thematic 
areas: 
 Achievement of results that could not otherwise be attained by national 
interventions. 
 Stakeholders’ perception of the role of EU instruments vis-à-vis national 
instruments. 
Based on the main findings of this chapter, suggestions for improving the EU added value 
of the instruments under analysis are presented in the last chapter of this Report (Chapter 
6). 
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 Analysis 
The analysis in this section is based on data and information obtained through interviews 
with stakeholders, literature review and expert assessments. This approach allowed us to 
cross-validate the key findings of this chapter by triangulating multiple sources. 
5.2.1 Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices 
Results that could not otherwise be attained by national interventions 
Most interviewed stakeholders believe that most of the results of the EU instruments 
in scope would only have been achieved to a limited extent or to some extent by 
national interventions. This observation is most evident for the results of initiatives that 
have been agreed within the context of the OECD/G20 BEPS framework and are 
implemented by the EU. However, there are some nuanced differences across the various 
results. Some interviewees believe that Member States would have been better suited to 
deliver the results from the OECD initiatives that require less coordination. Especially 
country-by-country reporting by multinational groups and instances of double non-
taxation would probably have been addressed, even without the EU. By contrast, the 
interviewees believe that several results would have been less likely without the EU, for 
instance those that require more coordination or need to be undertaken at central level 
such as the creation of a central directory database with information on tax rulings and 
pricing arrangements. 
These general observations from the interviewees are confirmed by international 
organisations such as the OECD and IMF. According to the OECD,136 international 
coordination of multilateral changes is more effective in combatting tax 
avoidance. Unilateral policy changes are unlikely to lead to the same results as 
internationally coordinated measures. Maximum harmonisation and coherence with the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan are strongly preferred in order to resolve loopholes and 
mismatches facilitating aggressive tax planning. The IMF137 agrees that uncoordinated 
anti-avoidance provisions are likely to create uncertainties and, in some cases, lead to 
double taxation. The EU has an important role in pushing these international processes as 
well as contributing to effective and harmonised implementation across Member States. 
Looking at individual EU instruments, previous research has found that the EU 
interventions would not have been strictly necessary to attain certain results. However, 
unilateral initiatives would quite likely have been less effective and Member States 
would have been less likely to take the measures on their own. In particular, the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Directive on Administrative Cooperation stand out: 
the former has played a central role in the coordinated implementation of the OECD/G20 
BEPS outputs across the Member States, and the latter instrument has brought 
harmonised progress to obtaining information about potentially aggressive tax planning 
arrangements. 
                                           
136 OECD, Combating International Tax Avoidance, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/about/impact/combatinginternationaltaxavoidance.htm.  
137 IMF (2019), Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy, op. cit. 
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That said, in some cases, Member States could have at least partly reached the desired 
outcome through individual measures. Ruf and Weichenrieder138 and a ZEW study139 
found that unilateral CFC rules could effectively restrict tax planning on their own. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such measures across the EU is likely to be greater 
when organised at the multilateral level. Before the introduction of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive, CFC rules varied across Member States; for instance, while royalty 
and interest income were considered as CFC income in some Member States, in other 
Member States they were not. These mismatches allowed for the avoidance of CFC rules 
and facilitated tax avoidance schemes. Most Member States did not have effective 
measures in place before the introduction of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. In fact, only 
three Member States had rules addressing hybrid mismatches and six Member States had 
a GAAR in place before the Directive was adopted.140 This does not necessarily mean that 
Member States would not have taken any measures. The global developments that 
supported the decision- making at EU and international level might also have encouraged 
Member States to take tax measures at national level. Moreover, according to the OECD,141 
the automatic exchange of information (DAC 3, 4 and 6) is more beneficial when the model 
adopted is standardised across jurisdictions. The standardised model reduces the costs 
and complexity of information exchange, which enhances the effectiveness of the process. 
In practice, Heitmüller et al.142 concluded that, in the absence of international initiatives, 
no information would have been exchanged. The effective use is, according to various 
interviewed tax administrations, likely to be higher when the exchange follows common 
standards as was indeed provided by the EU intervention. 
The importance of multilateral initiatives is even more pronounced in the field of 
digital taxation, as technology companies are less tied to a specific location. Currently, 
there are many uncoordinated national interventions in this domain. In the EU, ten out of 
the 28 Member States have taken concrete steps towards or have already implemented a 
digital tax. As of October 2019,143 five Member States have issued a proposal (Austria, 
Belgium, Czechia, Sweden, United Kingdom) and another five Member States have already 
implemented a digital service tax (France, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia). In addition, 
several Member States have indicated that they will launch a digital service tax, while 
others have indicated they will await the OECD process. According to the IMF, the lack of 
multilateral cooperation when taxing the digital economy increases compliance costs and 
potentially leads to double taxation. The IMF calls for more thorough reforms in taxing 
digital businesses.144 While awaiting measures at the international level, the European 
Commission has issued the Commission Recommendation (2018/1650/EU) and proposed 
a Directive laying down rules related to tax digital business models.145 Discussions on the 
                                           
138 Ruf, M., Weichenrieder, A. (2013), CFC Legislation. Passive Assets and the Impact of the ECJ’s Cadbury-
Schweppes Decision. 
139 ZEW (2016), The Impact of Tax Planning on Forward-Looking Effective Tax Rates, Taxation Papers, Working 
Paper No. 64 – 2016, European Commission, pp. 60, 61. 
140 European Commission (2016), Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the document 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Anti Tax Avoidance Package: 
Next Steps towards delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU, SWD/2016/06 final, p. 
23. 
141 OECD (2014), Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, p. 11. 
142 Heitmüller, F. et al. (2018), op. cit., p. 68. 
143 KPMG (2019), Taxation of the digitalized economy, available at 
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2019/digitalized-economy-taxation-developments-
summary.pdf. 
144 IMF (2019), Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy, op. cit. 
145 European Commission (2018), Staff Working Document 81, pp. 20-21. 
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proposal have been postponed, as some Member States prefer to wait for initiatives at 
international level than to take interim measures. 
Stakeholders’ perception of the role of EU instruments vis-à-vis national 
instruments 
Some of the interviewees indicated several differences between EU measures and 
national approaches in the absence of a common EU intervention. For example, 
one of the respondents mentioned that the Member States had not taken any measures 
to publish their tax rulings before this was arranged at EU level. Some Member States 
have taken measures for hybrid mismatches, but these are often pursued in the own 
interest of securing higher tax revenues. Most of the interviewees believe that Member 
States needed international initiatives to unlock national initiatives. In this respect, the 
interviewees representing international organisations and the national administrations 
considered the OECD as the main actor to unlock the initiatives in the corporate tax area. 
Even though the OECD/G20 BEPS agreements are not binding, national administrations 
indicated in the interviews that they are very committed to the OECD process. Indeed, 
one of the representatives of the national administrations indicated that without the EU’s 
interventions, Member States would fall back on the OECD/G20 BEPS process, but most 
interviewees see the added value of the EU in this process.  
The added value of having instruments at the EU level resides in the fact that such 
instruments facilitate the harmonious implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS outputs 
across the Union. It is worth stressing that the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive was agreed 
upon in record time – the Commission released the proposal for a Directive in January 
2016146 and political agreement in the Council on the Directive was reached on 12 July 
2016. The advancement in EU legislation on the matter could be rooted in two aspects. 
First, the necessity, recognised by Member States, for a common EU approach to tackling 
certain tax avoidance practices. Second, the global developments in the field 
facilitated by the OECD/G20 BEPS platform, which increased the sense of urgency 
and could have prompted more Member States to implement measures against tax 
avoidance, thus allowing for discussions at the EU level to progress as well. 
When looking at the strong link between the EU instruments against tax avoidance 
and OECD developments, one important aspect is the way the EU and the OECD 
developments were mutually reinforcing. The OECD/G20 BEPS outputs came at a time 
when various actions were already underway in the EU – primarily soft law approaches. 
The BEPS outputs were thus “embraced quickly” in the EU, having an impact on the 
EU hard law in the field.147 Furthermore, it can be said that the “political momentum” 
generated by the OECD/G20 BEPS workings allowed the EU to effectively introduce 
more instruments for the harmonisation of rules against aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices among Member States148 and to implement more stringent 
provisions than those internationally agreed upon. For example, some of the options 
have become obligatory within the EU. More specifically, the EU has taken a common 
approach to supporting the convergence in measures to address hybrid mismatches 
(Action 2), elements of effective CFC rules (Action 3), restricting the interest deductibility 
of intra-group and third-party loans (Action 4), and obligatory disclosure of aggressive tax 
                                           
146 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, COM/2016/026 final, Brussels, 28.1.2016, 
available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0026. 
147 Hemels, S. (2018), op. cit., p. 111. 
148 HJI Panayi, C. (2018), The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance, 36 (2018) 1 Yearbook of European Law 
442-495, p.492. 
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planning arrangements and structures (Action 12).149 Moreover, the EU contributes to a 
more uniform application of the OECD/G20 BEPS agreements. 
However, there are some interviewees that questioned the results of the EU 
instruments in some domains. A consulted stakeholder from an international 
organisation believed that the Member States would also have been able to implement the 
OECD measures successfully through national interventions. Nevertheless, the 
coordination role played by the EU is relevant. In fact, one of the business representatives 
believed it was important to have sufficiently detailed harmonised measures at EU level to 
avoid differences in national implementation, which is in line with the EU’s motivation to 
act. Moreover, there are also several stakeholders emphasising that the national 
interventions would have been able to deliver the results, but not necessarily to 
the same degree as the EU measures. This was stressed, for example, with regard to 
measures to reduce double non-taxation. Consulted stakeholders from NGOs argue that 
while national interventions could achieve some results in this respect, one must take into 
account that the reduction of double non-taxation requires an international approach, as 
tax avoidance goes cross border. 
Finally, some of the stakeholders indicate that there are issues preventing a full 
assessment of the EU added value. They believe that several of the EU initiatives are 
insufficiently transparent for outsiders to provide a comprehensive assessment of their 
performance. For example, the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation does not publish 
detailed minutes, which precludes externals from following and evaluating the initiative. 
Several NGOs argue that more public transparency on tax measures could also contribute 
to improving the assessment possibilities. Indeed, currently the reporting rules effectively 
provide transparency to tax authorities but not to the public, which according to the 
interviewee reduced effectiveness and political pressures. The country-by-country 
reporting (especially if made public) and a recording of tax rulings could potentially 
increase accountability at the EU level.  
5.2.2 Business facilitation 
Results that could not otherwise be achieved by national interventions 
Most of the interviewees believe that the expected results of the EU instruments 
contributing to business facilitation would have been achieved by national 
interventions, but only to a limited extent. More specifically, the interviewees 
explained that Member States, through individual actions, would have succeeded only to 
a limited extent to avoid situations of double taxation and double non-taxation within the 
EU; this is equivalent to saying that the Commission’s actions have, according to most 
interviewees, been essential to achieving key results in terms of business facilitation. 
Moreover, the EU instruments played a pivotal role in coordinating the harmonised 
implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS Actions concerning transfer pricing. 
The interviewees and national experts consider that also soft-law EU instruments can 
exert a high level of influence and generate results that would otherwise not be 
achieved by national interventions. However, the extent of the effect is more difficult to 
assess in comparison to hard law instruments. For example, the Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum has clearly influenced the Belgian approach regarding transfer pricing. Most 
notably, the 2006 Belgian Circular Letter on transfer pricing documentation, which is one 
                                           
149 See: http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-progress-report-july-2017-june-2018.pdf 
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of the main instruments of administrative guidance on transfer pricing matters in Belgium, 
explicitly refers to the Forum and includes the text of the 2006 Resolution on a Code of 
Conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the EU (2006/C 
176/01) as an annex. In addition, the Belgian tax authorities have recently released a 
draft of a new Circular Letter on transfer pricing, which refers to the report of the Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum on the use of comparables. 
Stakeholders’ perception of the role of EU instruments vis-à-vis national 
instruments 
Interviewees that elaborated on their answers indicated that the Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum and the Parent Subsidiary Directive contribute to a more harmonised 
implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan across the EU. The OECD BEPS 
recommendations in the scope of the two instruments cover the neutralising hybrid 
mismatches (recommendation 2), addressing inappropriate granting of treaty benefits 
(recommendation 6), and alignment of the transfer pricing outcomes with value creation 
(recommendation 8 to 10). In the absence of EU interventions, Member States (23 out of 
28 are Member of the OECD) would have relied on the individual implementation of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan. Sweden is one of the few exceptions; the amendments to 
the Parent Subsidiary Directive did not require any changes to the legislation on the 
treatment of outbound dividends. The new anti-tax evasion provisions were not considered 
more comprehensive than the Swedish general tax evasion law.150 These would probably 
also have been implemented but in a less coordinated manner.  
5.2.3 External policies 
Results that could not otherwise be achieved by national interventions 
The Commission Recommendation of 2012 on minimum standards of good governance in 
third countries launched a discussion on a common approach to tax good governance, 
while the 2016 Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation developed 
a framework for minimum standards of good governance in tax matters. The 
Recommendation led to patchwork national implementation of the various 
provisions,151 which was at least partially addressed with the Communication. Without 
these measures, most of the interviewees believe that the external tax policies would have 
been achieved only to a limited extent by national interventions.  
Nevertheless, there are some notable differences regarding the extent to which the 
interviewees believe the results would have been achieved. Four aspects stand out from 
the point of view of consulted stakeholders, in the sense that they consider national 
interventions would not be able to achieve them without EU intervention.  
These four results include: i) a common EU stance on tax good governance criteria, serving 
as base for all EU external tax policies and discussions on tax good governance with 
international partners; ii) a clear and coherent EU approach to identify third countries that 
do not comply with the good governance standards; iii) unified response to third countries 
that are non-compliant with the good governance standards; and iv) the inclusion of tax 
good governance standards into the revised Financial Regulation. What these four 
expected results have in common is the need for strong coordination between 
                                           
150 Lagen (1995:575) mot skatteflykt. 
151 European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, COM/2016/024 final, p. 4. 
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Member States, action from the Commission and/or the display of a joint EU 
front.  
When it comes to tax good governance, many Member States were at first reluctant to 
move towards harmonisation. The 2012 Recommendation has helped overcome this 
reluctance by forming a common front to encourage third countries to import the EU 
minimum standards of good governance in tax matters, thus producing results that would 
not otherwise have been reached without EU soft law intervention.152 Indeed, the 2016 
Communication on an external strategy for effective taxation builds on the 2012 
Recommendation and set the way for the adoption, in the Council conclusions of 8 
November 2016, of the criteria for tax transparency and tax good governance used to 
prepare the lists of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. 
Then there are several results that require strong coordination but are only likely to be 
effective with the support of Member States. This applies to four results specifically: 
i) fostering third countries to implement principles of good governance in the tax area; ii) 
debate on fair treatment of developing countries in bilateral treaties within the Platform 
on Tax Good Governance;153 iii) efficiency and effectiveness in fighting against aggressive 
tax planning and harmful tax practices by addressing international tax challenges at EU 
level; and, iv) inclusion of an updated tax good governance clause and state aid provisions 
in negotiations of all relevant bilateral and regional agreements with third countries. 
Indeed, these results are only likely to be successful when there is a strong cooperation 
between the EU and its Member States. 
Finally, the interviewees believe that national interventions could potentially help 
developing countries secure domestic revenues and fight off threats to their tax base. 
Indeed, national development and support programmes would contribute to delivering 
these results, also in the absence of the EU interventions.  
Stakeholders’ perception of the role of EU instruments vis-à-vis national 
instruments 
One interviewee from the Commission indicated that larger Member States also have the 
potential to foster third countries to implement principles of tax good governance. In 
practice, however, most Member States do not use this opportunity. Moreover, a united 
front from all Member States together can give a more forceful signal than 
individual Member States. This is also suggested by the fact that the Commission 
initially identified many jurisdictions that were non-cooperative, but throughout the 
process some jurisdictions were no longer classified as such, having complied with the 
necessary criteria. If the previously existing national lists had been fully effective there 
might have been fewer countries on this initial EU list. The third countries on the list would 
have already taken measures to adhere to the tax good governance principles, compelled 
by the national blacklisting process. One interviewee from an NGO indicated that the 
interventions of the EU are necessary. Member States are unlikely to advocate tax good 
governance principles, as national interests usually prevail in negotiations.  
                                           
152 HJI Panayi, C. (2018), The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance, 36 (2018) 1 Yearbook of European Law 
442-495, op. cit., pp. 460, 464, 466. 
153 See: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-good-governance/platform-tax-
good-governance_en.  
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Although the consulted stakeholders representing NGOs agreed that the EU initiatives 
carry more weight, they also indicated that the EU requirements are sometimes 
weaker than those set by some Member States. For example, Belgium and the 
Netherlands are more demanding towards third countries and they usually put non-
cooperative jurisdictions earlier on their national lists than they appear on the EU list. The 
Belgian list with low-tax and non-cooperative jurisdictions published on 31 December 2018 
consists of 21 jurisdictions.154 The Dutch list makes explicit reference to the EU list with 
non-cooperative jurisdictions,155 which means that it covers all the jurisdictions on the EU 
list plus additional jurisdictions that it considers low-tax jurisdictions (i.e. corporate income 
tax below 9%). In December 2018 there were 21 jurisdictions on the Dutch list, including 
the five jurisdictions that were on the EU list at that time.156 
The role of the Commission in the debates on the bilateral trade agreements with 
developing countries is very much to ensure that they are treated fairly. Several 
interviewees including consulted stakeholders from NGOs and the Commission emphasised 
that developing countries could be treated more fairly. Countries in Africa, especially, 
sometimes lose out when bilateral tax treaties reallocate taxing rights. Similarly, another 
consulted stakeholder from the Commission made the point that Member States could 
contribute more to the domestic revenue generation of developing countries. The 
development of a more elaborate framework on tax good governance could contribute to 
limiting the leeway for Member States in the treatment of developing countries. 
In addition, one interviewee representing an NGO argued that the EU could also do more 
to advance the agenda on taxation and development policies. 
Without the contribution from the EU, the identification of third countries that do not 
comply with the tax good governance standards would not be clear and coherent, 
according to an interviewee from the Commission. At the same time, several stakeholders 
from national administrations and international organisations argued that the 
importance of the EU is somewhat restrained due to the work already performed 
within the OECD. Moreover, because of the overlapping initiatives, the EU efforts could 
to some extent go against the work of the OECD. By contrast, representatives from NGOs 
argued that the EU interventions were necessary as those of the OECD were not binding 
and not far-reaching enough. 
Finally, in order to enhance the leverage on third countries and use all the tools the EU 
has in its toolbox, the inclusion of tax good governance standards in the financial 
legislation agreed at the EU level might be logical step. This was emphasised by an 
interviewee representing the Commission. 
  
                                           
154 Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Financiën van 31 december 2018, DB 2018/216528, Stcrt. 2018, 72064. 
155 European Council (2019), Taxation: EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdictions/. 
156 Ministry of Finance (2018), Nederland stelt zelf lijst laagbelastende landen vast in strijd tegen 
belastingontwijking. Available at: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/12/28/nederland-stelt-
zelf-lijst-laagbelastende-landen-vast-in-strijd-tegen-belastingontwijking. 
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6 Conclusions and suggested improvements 
The role of the EU in fighting aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices has grown 
substantially in the past couple of years. Ongoing digitalisation and pressure on domestic 
budgets following the financial and economic crisis have, together with various tax 
scandals, increased awareness at all levels of the need for a more coordinated approach 
on tax matters. This is also reflected in the EU’s interventions, which have increased and 
become more far-reaching in the past few years. 
In this report, the coherence, relevance and EU added value of a set of three hard law and 
five soft law instruments were assessed (for further detail see Table 1), drawing on both 
stakeholder interviews and literature study. 
Based on the feedback from stakeholders, the objectives of the eight EU tax instruments 
under analysis are largely internally coherent. However, the stakeholders pointed to some 
overlap in the policy measures, which to a very limited extent lead to inconsistencies. Most 
of the overlap is due to soft law that has been followed by hard law that is going beyond 
the soft law or similar requirements applied in different fields. Various stakeholders 
considered the lack of a common EU approach to digital taxation to be the main missing 
element in the current EU tax framework. In this respect they also pointed to the two 
proposed Directives on Digital Services Tax and Significant Digital Presence respectively.  
Looking at the external coherence between the objectives of the tax instruments and other 
EU policy areas, the objectives of the EU tax instruments are found to be broadly consistent 
with other EU policies such as state aid, internal market, financial services, development, 
criminal justice, and trade. Most concerns are on the potential political implications of the 
stringent EU policies towards third countries, as well as coordination between the various 
policies affecting the least developed countries in particular. For example, the lists anti-
money laundering Directive and non-cooperative tax jurisdictions created in the past some 
tension in the relations with third countries. Additionally, a few developing countries 
identified as non-cooperative tax jurisdictions might be penalised too heavily as they lack 
the institutional capacity required to deliver on the reforms for good governance on tax 
matters. 
Turning to international coherence, the EU tax instruments are considered to be generally 
consistent with the international tax agenda (OECD BEPS, UN Model Tax Convention, etc.). 
In fact, the EU and its Member States are viewed as leading actors among international 
tax fora. This is partly because the EU Member States are among the first to implement 
the agreements. However, it is thought that the international agreements sometimes do 
not go far enough, and this can lead to an implementation of the agreements that goes 
beyond the minimum requirements agreed. 
The Report confirms the continued relevance of most of the EU instruments in the field 
of aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices under analysis. Given the 
increased digitalisation of the economy, there is a pressing need to introduce an 
international taxation system fit for the digital era. Second, and linked to the issue of 
digitalisation, there is also a need to adapt double-tax conventions to account for digital 
taxation. Third, aggressive tax planning affects not only tax fairness between EU Member 
States but also between companies operating in the same jurisdiction. As such, another 
need that was mentioned frequently is that of ensuring a level playing field for all 
companies. Stakeholders also identified additional needs and problems related to 
combatting aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. For instance, the need to 
provide technical assistance to national tax authorities to analyse the data and information 
they receive from other Member States. Increasing tax and legal uncertainty for corporates 
seems to be another salient problem. 
Regarding business facilitation, all the needs and problems originally addressed by the 
EU rules under assessment are still relevant. For instance, transfer pricing is still one of 
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the main channels used by multinational companies to shift profits; and aggressive tax 
planning via interest payments is still prevalent. Tax certainty and, more generally, legal 
certainty remain priority issues for both taxpayers and tax administrations. 
Several outstanding needs have also been expressed concerning tax good governance 
and external policies. While the room for shifting profits in third countries is shrinking, 
multinational companies are still able to put in place aggressive tax planning strategies 
involving countries outside the EU, thus leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate 
taxation. In this context, the introduction of an EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for 
tax purposes contributed to raising the standards of tax good governance on a global 
scale. The OECD/G20 framework is now also considering establishing new international 
rules for a minimum tax rate for multinationals. At the same time, implementing and 
enforcing tax good governance measures in third countries is heavily dependent on local 
capacity. In fact, developing countries may be missing basic administrative infrastructures 
to comply with tax good governance standards. Tax laws and policies have become 
increasingly complex and globally intertwined; their effective implementation and 
enforcement require sufficient skills and expertise, sophisticated IT and administrative 
systems and international cooperation. Therefore, countries still need support in their 
efforts to reduce tax avoidance.  
Most of the results of the EU tax instruments are unlikely to have been achieved with just 
national interventions, which means that the EU instruments have a clear added value. 
However, determining the exact extent of the EU added value is not straightforward as 
the actions that Member States would have taken without the EU are not observed. Neither 
are all results visible to external observers. Most Member States would have implemented 
the OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan, for instance, but it is unlikely that all Member States 
would have implemented the Action Plan in such a coordinated, far-reaching and rapid 
manner as has been the case so far. EU added value is considered to be most evident for 
measures that require strong coordination, including the EU implementation of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan and imposing tax good governance principles on relations 
with third countries. The importance of international fora and the EU in coordinating the 
implementation has become especially apparent in the field of EU digital taxation, where 
the non-adoption of two proposed Directives awaiting agreement at international level has 
led to a large number of Member States introducing their own measures, which is likely to 
distort the functioning of the Internal Market. Moreover, legally binding Directives (hard 
law) adds more value to national interventions than soft-law instruments such as 
communications, recommendations and advisory bodies. 
Against this background, the following actions could be considered to increase the 
coherence, relevance and EU added value of the current EU instruments in the field of 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. 
 Making the EU tax systems fit for the digital era. Digital taxation and the many 
challenges to traditional tax systems posed by the growing digitalisation and 
globalisation of the economy are the ‘elephant in the room’. Modernising the EU 
instruments in the field of aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices to 
account for such challenges is key to underlining their relevance. A common EU 
approach to digital taxation would address the main gaps identified by several 
stakeholders consulted for this assignment. It might also contribute to more 
uniform tax rules across Member States, as currently several of them have decided 
to implement their own digital tax, thus creating potential distortions to the 
functioning of the Single Market. At the same time, any action in this direction 
should consider the international developments taking place in the OECD/G20 
framework. The EU should ensure that the issue is swiftly addressed at the 
OECD/G20 level, and that the proposed solutions will be promptly implemented, in 
a consistent manner, by all Member States. The time frame for action in this regard 
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is short- to medium-term, considering on the one hand the urgency of the matter 
and potential impacts in terms of market fragmentation, and on the other hand the 
need for a shared, global solution. In the absence of such a global approach by the 
end of 2020, an EU solution should be relaunched without further ado. 
 Leading global solutions. Tax avoidance is a global issue. The potential for EU 
instruments in the field to bring about the desired outcomes is greater the more 
countries subscribe to the same standards. Therefore, the EU should lead the 
international discussions and contribute to finding global solutions to the problem. 
In particular, Member States attach great value to the OECD/G20 BEPS tax agenda, 
which is the main international driver in the process to eliminate strategies for 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. Importantly, a leading role of 
the EU in this process seems to contribute to more effective measures at the 
international level. As such, the EU as a whole could assume a more active role and 
contribute to a truly unified implementation with more detailed and more 
standardised measures rather than minimal measures. In addition, the EU should 
act as a coordinator for the implementation at the Member State level of 
internationally agreed-upon measures. The EU delivers most value with central 
initiatives and strong coordination of own or international initiatives. Continual 
engagement and involvement of the EU is necessary in this regard to ensure the 
coordination role as new measures are discussed or agreed upon at the 
international level. 
 Enabling capacity building. Sound rules are fundamental to combatting tax 
avoidance. Making the most of the opportunities offered by enforcing such rules is 
equally important. Most tax measures require administrative capacity for them to 
be fully effective. Capacity constraints affect both the EU (e.g. limited skills and 
resources to analyse data exchanged with other tax authorities) and third countries 
(e.g. limited capacity for tax collection and/or implementation of good governance 
standards). In this respect, the EU could provide targeted technical assistance 
based on a detailed assessment of relevant capacity constraints at the national 
level. Capacity building may rely on the Fiscalis 2020 Programme,157 which aims to 
support administrative cooperation and enhance the administrative capacity of 
participating countries, as necessary. By conducting studies to identify capacity 
constraints, the EU can ensure the targeted provision of assistance to Member 
States through Fiscalis 2020. In addition, the Structural Reform Support 
Programme158 could offer additional assistance to Member States’ authorities for 
tax reforms. EU action to support capacity building in Member States is a task for 
the short- to medium-term to ensure that the desired outcomes are delivered, 
especially considering that mechanisms are already in place to provide the 
necessary assistance.   
 Strengthening tax good governance in third countries. The EU list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes and its accompanying process is 
considered by stakeholders to be much more powerful than similar national lists of 
Member States. In using the list, special attention must be paid to those developing 
countries that lack the capacity to implement tax good governance principles, while 
also ensuring that the list carries enough weight to compel third countries to comply 
with the principles. Against this background, support for countries willing to 
                                           
157 For further details, please see: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fiscalis-programme_en 
158 For further details, please see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-
programmes/overview-funding-programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en 
 67 
 
introduce tax good governance reforms should continue in the framework of the 
Official Development Assistance, as emphasised in the New European Consensus 
on Development.159 For instance, within the development framework, the “Collect 
More – Spend Better”160 initiative of the EU can be further harnessed, as it directly 
refers to domestic revenue mobilisation and enhancing capacity in third countries 
to tackle tax avoidance among others. Promoting tax good governance in third 
countries and supporting capacity building are complex tasks, involving multiple 
stakeholders (including, inter alia, third country institutions, international 
organisations involved in development and tax avoidance issues, etc.), which can 
be fully accomplished in the medium- to long-term.  
 Consistent approach at home and abroad. There may be a need to infuse more 
transparency and coherence into the EU’s approach to internal and external 
corporate tax issues. Further development of policies focusing on tackling 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices inside the EU is needed to render 
more effective similar policies promoting tax good governance externally. The 
outcomes of an external strategy designed to tackle tax avoidance on a global scale 
are expected to be enhanced if third countries fully understand that these issues 
are equally addressed within the EU. 
 Ensuring a level playing field for all companies. In spite of the major efforts 
to fight against tax avoidance, effective tax rates still vary depending on the 
company size, location, level of internationalisation and sector of operation. EU tax 
instruments should ultimately aim to ensure a level playing field for all businesses. 
This will most likely require more coordination in tax policy at both the EU and 
international level. Introducing a common, minimum corporate tax rate and a 
common corporate tax base could provide a major contribution to levelling the 
playing field. Preparing new legislative proposals to address such issues could be 
considered in the short- to medium-term.  
 Increasing tax certainty and legal certainty. Tax certainty may benefit from 
cooperative compliance programmes between tax administrations and taxpayers, 
in particular multinationals, as recommended by the OECD and IMF.161 Legal 
certainty may be increased by performing fitness checks162 of the relevant EU 
instruments on a regular basis in order to detect and remove any inconsistencies 
in the EU tax framework. Similar exercises may be conducted at Member State 
level to preserve the consistency of the national tax systems; in this respect, the 
Structural Reform Support Programme163 may offer the required assistance to 
Member States to review and consolidate their corporate tax laws. EU action to 
increase legal and tax certainty can be taken in the medium term, considering that 
it would entail the coordination and joint efforts of several stakeholders, e.g. 
Commission, national tax administration, EU support programmes. 
                                           
159 European Commission (2016), Collect More – Spend Better. Achieving Development in an Inclusive and 
Sustainable Way, pp. 49-50. Available online: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-
consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf. 
160 See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/swd-collect-more-spend-better.pdf 
161 OECD/IMF (2019) Progress Report on Tax Certainty, op. cit. 
162 For further details, please see Chapter VI of the Better Regulation Guidelines at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines-evaluation-fitness-checks.pdf 
163 For further details, please see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-
programmes/overview-funding-programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en 
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List of acronyms and abbreviations used in the Annexes 
 
  
AEOI Automatic Exchange of Information 
ATAD  Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
ATAF African Tax Administration Forum 
BEPS  Base erosion and profit shifting 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 
CIAT Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations 
CREDAF Exchange and Research Centre for Leaders of Tax Administrations 
DG TAXUD Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission 
EU European Union 
G20 Group of Twenty 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UN United Nations 
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ANNEX A: Research framework 
Research 
criteria 
Research questions Success criteria Indicators Data sources 
Data collection 
methods 
Coherence 
 Are the objectives 
of the EU 
instruments under 
analysis consistent 
with the EU's 
agenda for fair 
and effective 
taxation?  
 Is there coherence 
between the 
objectives of the 
EU instruments 
under analysis 
and the objectives 
of instruments in 
other policy 
areas? How could 
this be improved?  
 Are the objectives 
of the EU 
instruments under 
analysis coherent 
with international 
objectives for fair 
taxation?  
 Degree of coherence among 
the EU instruments under 
analysis (‘Internal 
coherence’) 
 Degree of coherence between 
the EU instruments under 
analysis and other EU policy 
areas (e.g. competition, 
financial services, 
development, justice, trade, 
employment) (‘External 
coherence’) 
 Degree of coherence between 
the EU instruments under 
analysis and the international 
tax agenda (e.g. G20, OECD, 
UN) (‘International 
coherence’) 
 Qualitative assessment of 
complementarities/synergies/
overlaps/contradictions/gaps 
between the objectives of: 
o the EU instruments under 
analysis; 
o other relevant EU policies; 
o the international tax 
agenda. 
 Share of stakeholders 
identifying 
complementarities/synergies/
overlaps/contradictions/gaps 
between the objectives of: 
o the EU instruments under 
analysis; 
o the EU tax agenda; 
o other relevant EU policies; 
o the international tax 
agenda. 
 Primary information on 
complementarities/syner
gies/overlaps/contradicti
ons/gaps from: 
o Commission 
services; 
o International 
institutions; 
o International 
associations: 
o EU associations and 
NGOs; 
o Member State 
authorities; 
o National associations 
and NGOs. 
 Secondary information 
on objectives from 
official documents of EU 
and international 
institutions. 
 Expert opinions. 
 Desk research 
 Interviews 
 Feedback from 
technical 
experts 
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Research 
criteria 
Research questions Success criteria Indicators Data sources 
Data collection 
methods 
Relevance 
 To what extent 
are the objectives 
of the EU 
instruments under 
analysis still 
relevant, taking 
into account any 
changes in the 
political and 
economic 
environment since 
they were set? 
 Should the 
objectives of 
future EU 
instruments to 
tackle aggressive 
tax planning and 
harmful tax 
practices be 
adjusted, in light 
of new political or 
economic 
developments? 
 Degree of alignment between 
the current international and 
EU political and economic 
priorities and the objectives 
of the EU instruments under 
analysis. 
 Degree of alignment between 
stakeholders’ perception of 
current needs and problems 
at the international, EU and 
national levels and the 
objectives of the EU 
instruments under analysis. 
 Qualitative assessment of the 
alignment between the 
objectives of the EU 
instruments under analysis 
and current political and 
economic priorities. 
 Qualitative assessment of the 
alignment between the 
objectives of the EU 
instruments under analysis 
and current needs and 
problems. 
 Qualitative assessment of the 
alignment between needs and 
problems addressed by the EU 
instruments under analysis 
and current needs and 
problems. 
 Share of stakeholders 
confirming the alignment 
between the objectives of the 
EU instruments under analysis 
and current needs and 
problems. 
 Share of stakeholders 
confirming the alignment 
between needs and problems 
addressed by the EU 
instruments under analysis 
and current needs and 
problems. 
 Primary information on 
current needs and 
problems from: 
o Commission 
services; 
o International 
institutions; 
o International 
associations 
o EU associations and 
NGOs; 
o Member State 
authorities; 
o National associations 
and NGOs. 
 Secondary information 
on original objectives, 
needs and problems 
from official documents 
of EU and international 
institutions. 
 Secondary information 
on current political and 
economic priorities from 
official documents of EU 
and international 
institutions. 
 Secondary information 
on current needs and 
problems from relevant 
literature. 
 Expert opinions. 
 Desk research 
 Interviews 
 Feedback from 
technical 
experts  
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Research 
criteria 
Research questions Success criteria Indicators Data sources 
Data collection 
methods 
EU added 
value 
 Was there added 
value to setting 
these objectives 
at EU level, rather 
than at national 
level? Could the 
same objectives 
be achieved 
through a purely 
national approach 
by the Member 
States? 
 Achievement of results that 
could not be otherwise 
attained with national 
interventions. 
 Stakeholders’ perception of 
the role of EU instruments 
vis-à-vis national 
instruments. 
 Qualitative assessment of 
results generated by EU 
instruments compared with 
results generated by national 
instruments. 
 Share of stakeholders 
confirming the need for EU 
intervention to achieve 
expected results. 
 Primary information on 
results achieved by EU 
and national instruments 
from: 
o Commission 
services; 
o EU associations and 
NGOs; 
o Member State 
authorities; 
o National associations 
and NGOs. 
 Secondary information 
on results achieved by 
EU instruments from 
relevant literature. 
 Expert opinions. 
 Desk research. 
 Interviews 
 Feedback from 
technical 
experts 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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ANNEX B: Intervention logics 
B.1 Aggregate intervention logics 
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Figure 3 Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices: Aggregate intervention logic (1/2) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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Figure 4 Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices: Aggregate intervention logic (2/2) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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Figure 5 Business facilitation: Aggregate intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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Figure 6 External policies: Aggregate intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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B.2 Individual intervention logics 
1 Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (1 & 2) 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Commission Proposal for an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD; and the amendment 
to the Directive),164 together with the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying 
the Communication on the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package165 identified four main needs 
linked to tax avoidance. ATAD (1 & 2) aims to address these needs: 
 The need to reform existing corporate taxation rules; 
 The need to coordinate the implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS reports166 
across Member States; 
 The need to coordinate corporate tax policies in the Member States; 
 The need for a level-playing field across companies active in the EU. 
The Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication on the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Package identifies one main problem, namely the fact that corporate tax 
rules are no longer adequate, rendering the EU susceptible to exploitation by companies 
looking to reduce the amount of taxes they owe. Such exploitation is made possible by 
mismatches between the tax systems of the Member States, as well as by the increasing 
level of digitalisation and globalisation. Going more in detail, four main drivers feed into 
this problem, as identified in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the 
Communication on the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Proposal for an amendment to ATAD167: 
 Heterogeneity of national tax systems; 
 Tax competition between Member States; 
 Increasingly digitised companies; 
 Financial incentives for companies to reduce taxes paid. 
Objectives 
ATAD (1 & 2) aim to contribute to the coordination of Member States’ tax policies, 
especially in the context of the implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS outcomes. The 
Directives directly address the issue of taxpayers exploiting disparities between the tax 
systems of Member States in order to reduce their tax expenses. The Commission Staff 
Working Document accompanying the Communication on the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package168 identifies the following general objective: 
                                           
164 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market, COM(2016) 26 final, Brussels, 28.1.2016; European 
Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive 
amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, SWD(2016) 345 final, 
Strasbourg, 25.10.2016. 
165 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps 
towards delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU, SWD(2016) 6 final, Brussels, 
28.1.2016 
166 OECD (2015), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Final BEPS Package, available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
167 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, 
SWD(2016) 345 final, Strasbourg, 25.10.2016. 
168 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps 
towards delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU, SWD(2016) 6 final, Brussels, 
28.1.2016 
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 General objective: To enhance the smooth functioning of the Single Market and 
thereby support the ability of the Single Market to secure sustainable growth, 
employment and competitiveness, considering a fair, efficient and growth-friendly 
corporate taxation as a key element of a strong Single Market. 
The Commission Proposal for an ATAD169 emphasises the specific objective targeted by 
ATAD 1: 
 Specific objective #1: To improve the legal framework for the taxation of 
company profits through measures against unacceptable tax planning, profit 
shifting and base erosion that directly affect the functioning of the Single Market. 
 Specific objective #2: To achieve a balance between the need for a certain 
degree of uniformity in implementing the OECD/G20 BEPS outputs across the EU 
and Member States' needs to account for the special features of their tax 
systems.170 
Building on the provisions of ATAD 1, the amendment to the Directive aims to broaden the 
scope of ATAD 1 with regard to hybrid mismatches. Whereas ATAD 1 focuses on 
mismatches within the Single Market, ATAD 2 addresses external risks. Thus, the specific 
objective of ATAD 2 can be summarised as follows171: 
 Specific objective #3 (ATAD 2): To provide for rules regarding hybrid 
mismatches involving third countries which are consistent with and no less effective 
than the rules recommended by the OECD/G20 BEPS report on Action 2.  
In addition, five operational objectives can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To deter companies from using inflated interest 
payments to minimise taxes; 
 Operational objective #2: To ensure that companies do not avoid taxes when 
transferring assets or their tax residence out of the jurisdiction of a Member State; 
 Operational objective #3: To counteract aggressive tax planning when other 
rules do not apply; 
 Operational objective #4: To deter profit shifting from high tax jurisdictions to 
lower tax jurisdictions; 
 Operational objective #5: To prevent the exploitation, within the Single 
Market172 and with regard to third countries, of the differences between tax systems 
in order to achieve double non-taxation. 
Inputs 
The adopted Directives contain five measures targeting tax avoidance practices: 
 Interest limitation rule, aiming to discourage profit shifting based on inflated 
interest payments by limiting the deductibility of taxpayers’ net financial costs. 
 Exit taxation, aiming to specify the cases in which companies are subject to exit 
tax rules; 
                                           
169 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market, COM(2016) 26 final, Brussels, 28.1.2016. 
170 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market, COM(2016) 26 final, Brussels, 28.1.2016. 
171 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid 
mismatches with third countries, COM(2016) 687 final, Strasbourg, 25.10.2016. 
172 Hybrid mismatches were addressed initially by ATAD 1 only in the context of the Single Market. ATAD 2 
broadened the scope of the measure to address third countries as well. 
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 General anti-abuse rule, covering the gaps in the legislation against tax avoidance 
practices in a uniform manner across the Member States. 
 Controlled foreign company rule, aiming to deter profit shifting out of the parent 
company based in a high-tax country to subsidiaries in either a low- or no-tax 
country. 
 Hybrid mismatches:  
o The provision included in ATAD 1 targets hybrid mismatches arising from 
differences in the legal characterisation of an entity or a financial instrument 
between a taxpayer in a Member State and an associated enterprise in 
another Member State or from a structured arrangement between parties 
in Member States. 
o The provisions of ATAD 2 include rules on hybrid transfers, imported 
mismatches and dual resident mismatches, in order to prevent taxpayers 
from exploiting remaining loopholes. 
Results 
The following outputs (i.e. immediate results) related to the Directives can be identified: 
 Transposition of the Directive provisions; 
 A common EU approach to implementing the OECD/G20 BEPS agenda is agreed 
upon. 
The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) largely correspond to the specific 
objectives of the Directives and can be formulated as follows: 
 The Single Market is better protected against the most relevant tax planning 
strategies; 
 A common EU approach to implementing the OECD/G20 BEPS agenda is adopted. 
Regarding the long-term results, the Commission Proposal for an ATAD lists three global 
impacts of the Directive: 
 Taxation will take place in the jurisdiction where profits are generated, and value 
is created. This will enhance fairness in attributing the tax burden between 
companies in the EU. Thus, internationally active groups of companies will no longer 
benefit from tax planning opportunities which are not available to taxpayers (in 
particular, SMEs) who are only domestically active.  
 The tax bases of the Member States will be better protected against practices of 
base erosion and profit shifting.  
 The trust of the public, citizens and other taxpayers in the fairness of the tax 
systems will be strengthened. 
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Figure 7 Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (1 & 2): Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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2 Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Parent Subsidiary Directive (and the amendment to the Directive)173 identified three 
main needs linked to double taxation: 
 The need for a level-playing field across companies active in the EU; 
 The need to broaden the scope of the existing corporate taxation rules; 
 The need to protect national tax revenues. 
The Parent Subsidiary Directive identifies one main problem, namely the fact that cross-
border businesses are hampered by restrictions, disadvantages or distortions arising in 
particular from the tax provisions of the Member States. These arise from double taxation 
of the taxes on dividends paid by subsidiaries located in another Member State to the 
parent company. Going more in detail, three main drivers feed into this problem: 
 Heterogeneity between the treatment of local subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries; 
 Introduction of the European Company and other forms of companies in Member 
States; 
 Globalisation and economic integration in the Internal Market and Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
Objectives 
The Parent Subsidiary Directive aims to contribute to reducing double taxation of profits 
of subsidiaries. The Directive directly addresses the issue of taxation of dividends in both 
the Member State where the subsidiary is located and another Member State where the 
parent company is located. The Directive identifies the following general objective: 
 General objective #1: To enhance the smooth functioning of the Single Market 
and thereby support the ability of the Single Market to increase their productivity 
and to improve their competitive strength at the international level. 
The Directive and amendments emphasise the specific objective targeted by this piece of 
legislation: 
 Specific objective #1: To exempt dividends and other profit distribution paid by 
subsidiary companies to parent companies from withholding taxes and to eliminate 
double taxation of such income at the level of the parent company. 
In addition, four operational objectives can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To protect the national tax revenue and fend off 
circumvention of national laws, in accordance with the Treaty principles and taking 
into account internationally accepted tax rules; 
 Operational objective #2: To have tax rules which are neutral from the point of 
view of competition; 
                                           
173 Council Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies 
and subsidiaries of different Member States, Brussels, 30.11.2011, available online at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:345:0008:0016:EN:PDF; Council Directive 2014/86/EU 
amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies 
and subsidiaries of different Member States, Brussels, 8.7.2014, available online at 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fb19de7b-13cc-11e4-933d-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en; Council Directive 2014/86/EU amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common 
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, 
Brussels, 27.1.2015, available online at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0121&from=EN. 
  
83 
 
 Operational objective #3: To avoid situations of double non-taxation and 
generate unintended tax benefits for companies; 
 Operational objective #4: To ensure that tax arrangements reflect economic 
reality. 
Inputs 
The Directive (and the amendment to the Directive) contain four measures targeting the 
removal of tax obstacles for cross-border business: 
 List of companies – Aims to determine the coverage of the rules to certain company 
statuses, including private companies, co-operatives, mutual companies, savings 
banks, investment funds, European Company, etc. 
 Withholding tax exemption for dividends – Aims to determine the condition for the 
application of the provision which exempts dividends paid by a subsidiary located 
in another Member State to its parent company from withholding tax.  
 Mechanism for the elimination of double taxation of dividends – Aims to impute tax 
on dividends of cross-border subsidiaries against the profits of the parent company. 
 Anti-abuse rule – Aims to prevent misuse of the Directive and ensure greater 
consistency in its application across Member States.  
Results 
The following output (i.e. immediate results) related to the Directive can be identified: 
 Transposition of the Directive provisions; 
The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) correspond to the specific 
objectives of the Directive and can be formulated as follows: 
 A common EU approach to addressing double taxation of dividends is adopted; 
 Avoidance situations of double non-taxation. 
Regarding the long-term results, the Parent Subsidiary Directive lists one global impact: 
 The profits of subsidiaries are no longer taxed both in the Member State where the 
subsidiary is located and another Member State where the parent company is 
located. 
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Figure 8 Parent-Subsidiary Directive: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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3 Administrative Cooperation Directive (3, 4 & 6) 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Directive on Administrative Cooperation and the amendments to the Directive, 
together with the Commission Staff Working Documents174 cover both companies and 
individuals as well as taxation and anti-money laundering. This intervention logic covers 
only the Directive and amendments that cover corporate taxation (i.e. Directive on 
Administrative Cooperation 3, 4 & 6)175. The Directive, amendments and Q&A 
accompanying the amendments identified six main needs linked to corporate taxation: 
 The need to protect the national tax bases from erosion; 
 The need to have more transparency about tax rulings and internal transactions 
with related parties of multinational enterprise groups; 
 The need for a more binding approach to information exchange on tax rulings; 
 The need for national feedback processes, not only within tax administrations but 
also between tax administrations and their national reporters, such as banks, 
employers and pension companies; 
 The need to coordinate the implementation of the OECD Common Reporting 
Standard176 across Member States; 
 The need to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS 
reports177 across Member States and multinational enterprise groups respectively. 
The Directive, amendments and Commission Staff Working Documents pinpointed one 
main problem, namely the fact that Member States experience considerable reductions 
in their tax revenues due to aggressive tax planning arrangements. Such exploitation is 
made possible by using tax structures across multiple jurisdictions to exploit mismatches 
between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing or avoiding tax liabilities. 
Going more in detail, two main drivers feed into this problem: 
 Globalisation and increasing mobility of capital in the Single Market; 
 Aggressive tax-planning arrangements are becoming increasingly complex and are 
responsive to defensive countermeasures by the tax authorities; 
 Increased public awareness about fair taxation. 
Objectives 
                                           
174 COM(2015) 135 final, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, 13.3.2015; European Commission, Brussels; 
COM(2016) 25 final, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory 
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, 28.1.2016; ; SWD(2016) 6 final, Commission Staff 
Working Document accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council – Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards delivering effective taxation and 
greater tax transparency in the EU, 28.1.2016; SWD(2017) 462 final, Commission Staff Working Document on 
the application of Council Directive (EU) no 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of direct 
taxation, 18.12.2017. 
175 Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 
77/799/EEC, 15.2.2011; Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic 
exchange of information in the field of taxation, 2015/2376, 8.12.2015; Council Directive amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, 2016/881, 
25.5.2016; Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of 
information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements, 2018/822, 25.5.2018. 
176 OECD (2014), Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, available 
online at http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/. 
177 OECD (2015), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Final BEPS Package, available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
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The Directive on Administrative Cooperation aims to contribute to the exchange of 
comprehensive and relevant information about potentially aggressive tax arrangements. 
The Directive and amendments identify the following general objective: 
 General objective #1: To improve the functioning of the Internal Market by 
discouraging the use of aggressive cross-border tax-planning arrangements. 
Two specific objectives are targeted by this piece of legislation: 
 Specific objective #1: To obtain comprehensive and relevant information about 
potentially aggressive tax arrangements, including cross border rulings and 
advance pricing arrangements; 
 Specific objective #2: To contribute to the efforts for creating an environment of 
fair taxation in the Single Market. 
In addition, five operational objectives can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To provide tax authorities with the necessary 
information to enable them to take action where they observe aggressive tax 
practises; 
 Operational objective #2: To have reporting obligations for all actors that are 
usually involved in designing, marketing, organising or managing the 
implementation of a reportable cross-border transaction or a series of such 
transactions, as well as those who provide assistance or advice; 
 Operational objective #3: To capture potentially aggressive tax-planning 
arrangements through the compiling of a list of the features and elements of 
transactions that present a strong indication of tax avoidance or abuse rather than 
to define the concept of aggressive tax planning; 
 Operational objective #4: To have reporting on cross-border arrangements in 
the Union that is consistent with international developments; 
 Operational objective #5: To avoid that commercial, industrial or professional 
secrets, commercial processes or information are disclosed contrary to public 
policy. 
Inputs 
The Directive contains five measures targeting exchange of information: 
 Spontaneous exchange of information – Aims to ensure that information is 
spontaneously exchanged when a country discovers information on possible tax 
evasion relevant to another country, which is either the country of the income 
source or the country of residence. 
 Exchange of information on request – Aims to ensure that countries can obtain 
additional information from another country for tax purposes if needed. 
 Automatic exchange of information – Aims to provide automatically tax information 
including rulings and pricing arrangements to the residence country of the taxpayer 
in a cross-border situation, where a taxpayer is active in another country than the 
country of residence. 
 Country-by-country reporting – Aims to have multinational enterprise groups with 
a consolidated revenue of €750 million or more to report (annually and for each 
tax jurisdiction in which they are conducting business) the amount of revenue, 
profit before income tax, income tax paid and accrued, number of their employees, 
stated capital and accumulated earnings and tangible assets. 
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 Penalties – Aims to ensure that the conditions in the Directive are effectively 
implemented by multinational enterprise groups and countries. 
Results 
The following output (i.e. immediate results) related to the Directive can be identified: 
 Transposition of the Directive provisions. 
The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) can be formulated as follows: 
 Spontaneous exchange of information between countries on possible tax evasion; 
 Exchange of information on request for tax purposes; 
 Creation of a central directory database with information on tax rulings and pricing 
arrangements; 
 Automatic exchange of tax information between countries, including tax rulings; 
 Country-by-country reporting by multinational enterprise groups. 
Regarding the long-term results, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation and the 
amendments to the Directive178 envisage one global impact: 
 Multinational enterprise groups abandon certain practices and pay their fair share 
of tax in the country where profits are made. 
                                           
178 Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 
77/799/EEC, 15.2.2011; Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic 
exchange of information in the field of taxation, 2015/2376, 8.12.2015.; Council Directive amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, 2016/881, 
25.5.2016; Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of 
information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements, 2018/822, 25.5.2018. 
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Figure 9 Administrative Cooperation Directive (3, 4 & 6): Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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4 Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 regarding measures 
intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good 
governance in tax matters (2012/771/EU) 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The preamble of the Recommendation179 2012/771/EU and the accompanying Impact 
Assessment180 identify two main needs:  
 The need to set out minimum standards of good governance in tax matters, with 
regard to both exchange of information (more transparency) and harmful tax 
practices; 
 The need to encourage third countries to comply with minimum standards of good 
governance.  
The Impact Assessment highlights two main problems that the Recommendation 
2012/771/EU is meant to address: 
 Some countries, which engage in a low level of taxation and base their 
attractiveness on opacity and harmful tax competition, are reluctant to cooperate 
in tax matters, thus limiting the exchange of information;   
 Third-country jurisdictions with low-tax regimes that do not comply with minimum 
standards of good governance harm tax revenues of EU Member States.  
Objectives 
The Impact Assessment accompanying the Recommendation 2012/771/EU identifies a set 
of specific, general and operational objectives: 
 General objective: Ensuring, through a Union approach commensurate with the 
need to ensure the functioning of the Internal Market, better protection of Member 
State tax systems against abuses and loopholes and, in particular, against cross-
border international tax fraud and avoidance. 
 Specific objective: Improving in an EU context the leverage that Member States 
have towards third countries in tax matters, thus contributing to address the issue 
of jurisdictions not complying with minimum standards of good governance.  
 Operational objective: To secure and increase tax revenues for Member States. 
Inputs  
The Recommendation 2012/771/EU revolves around two main measures (or group 
thereof): 
 The introduction at the EU level of a common definition of jurisdiction not complying 
with minimum standards of good governance in tax matters. 
 A set of national measures vis-à-vis third countries according to their compliance 
with minimum standards of governance: 
o Measures directed against third countries not complying with minimum 
standards – Member States should publish national blacklists of countries 
not complying with the defined minimum standards and 
renegotiate/suspend/terminate their double taxation conventions concluded 
with such countries. 
                                           
179179 The Commission Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply 
minimum standards of good governance in tax matters (2012/771/EU), C(2012) 8805 final, Brussels, 
06.12.2012. 
180 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council -An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, 
the Commission Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters, and the Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, 
SWD(2012) 403 final, Brussels, 6.12.2012. 
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o Measures in favour of third countries complying with minimum standards – 
Member States should remove third countries complying with minimum 
standards from the national blacklists and start negotiating a double 
taxation convention with such countries.  
o Measures in favour of third countries which are committed to complying with 
minimum standards – Closer cooperation and assistance between Member 
States and third countries that commit to complying with minimum 
standards is facilitated in order to assist those third countries in fighting 
effectively against tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. 
Results  
The outputs (i.e. the most immediate results) of the intervention, are:  
 The elaboration of an EU definition of jurisdictions not complying with minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters. 
 The introduction of a common toolbox of measures to be used by all Member States.  
Outcomes (i.e. short to medium-term results) can be summarised as follows:  
 Higher efficiency and effectiveness in fighting against aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices by addressing international tax challenges (i.e., convincing 
third countries to cooperate with EU Member States) at the EU level.  
 Fostering third countries to implement principles of good governance in the tax 
area.  
 Strengthening the integrity and fairness of third-country tax structures and 
encouraging tax compliance by all taxpayers. 
In the long run, the Recommendation is expected to achieve the following impacts: 
 The implementation of these measures will bring additional revenues to Member 
States budget. 
 The competitiveness of EU companies will improve by broadening the geographical 
scope of tax requirements. 
 As indirect benefits, the Member States will have more resources to finance public 
investments, leading to improved welfare and infrastructures. 
 As a result of the potential re-allocation of additional tax revenues to welfare 
institutions, a positive impact could be expected with regard to some rights, such 
as those enshrined in art. 34 (social security and social assistance), art. 35 (health 
care) and art. 36 (access to services of general interest) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
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Figure 10 Commission Recommendation 2012/771/EU: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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5 Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax 
planning (2012/772/EU) 
Needs and problems 
As emphasised in the preamble of the Recommendation and in the related Impact 
Assessment,181 this instrument addresses two main needs at the EU level: 
 The need for EU Member States to follow the same general approach in addressing 
aggressive tax planning;  
 The need to enhance the efficiency of national tax systems. 
In addition, the Impact Assessment identifies two main problems that the 
Recommendation is meant to address: 
 Loopholes in individual tax systems of the Member States and mismatches between 
tax systems in the EU leading to double non-taxation in cross-border situations; 
 Limited usefulness of national measures. 
Objectives  
The Impact Assessment accompanying the Recommendation identifies the following set of 
general, specific, and operational objectives. 
General objective: To come, through a Union approach commensurate with the need to 
ensure the functioning of the Internal Market, to better protection of Member State tax 
systems against abuses and loopholes and, in particular, against cross-border international 
tax fraud and avoidance. 
Specific objectives 
 Specific objective #1: To close loopholes and the potential for abuse of Member 
States’ direct tax systems (regarding national legislation and double tax 
conventions). 
 Specific objective #2: To improve the efficiency of measures taken at the 
national level to counter international tax avoidance. 
Operational objective: To secure and increase tax revenues for Member States. 
Inputs  
The Recommendation contains two main provisions targeting aggressive tax 
planning practices: 
 Limitation to the application of rules intended to avoid double taxation – the 
provision aims to encourage Member States to amend their double taxation 
conventions concluded with other Member States or with third countries in order to 
resolve specific types of double non-taxation and to thus ensure that a given item 
of income is taxed in one of the parties to the specific convention. 
 General anti-abuse rule – the provision aims to encourage Member States to adopt 
a general anti-abuse rule adapted to domestic and cross-border situations both at 
the EU level and involving third countries, with a view to curbing practices of 
                                           
181 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council - An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, 
the Commission Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters, and the Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, 
SWD(2012) 403 final, Brussels, 6.12.2012. 
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aggressive tax planning that are not covered in the specific legislation of the 
Member States.  
Results 
The short to medium-term results, i.e. the outputs and outcomes, stemming from the 
instrument are captured in the table below. 
Table 5 Expected outputs and outcomes of Commission Recommendation 
2012/772/EU 
Specific objectives Expected outputs Expected outcomes 
Specific Objective 1:  
To close loopholes and the 
potential for abuse of 
Member States’ direct tax 
systems (regarding national 
legislation and double tax 
conventions). 
 Revision of double 
tax conventions. 
 Double non-taxation is reduced. 
 The operation of the Single 
Market is improved. 
Specific Objective 2: 
To improve the efficiency of 
measures taken at the 
national level to counter 
international tax avoidance. 
 Adoption by the 
Member States of the 
provisions of the 
Recommendation 
into national 
legislation. 
 A minimum protection standard 
against aggressive tax planning in 
Member States is achieved. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
 
On the longer term, the Recommendation is expected to have the following impacts:182  
 The competitiveness of EU companies (including SMEs) in cross-border situations 
with other EU Member States or with third countries will be improved; 
 Member States will be better enabled to finance public investments, leading to 
improved welfare and infrastructures; 
 Reducing inconsistencies in regulations implemented by Member States towards 
third countries is expected to have a positive impact on trade and investment flows 
between Member States and third countries; 
 Since national anti-abuse measures of Member States would be more consistent in 
their design, this will reduce adjustment costs for those developing countries that 
have not concluded a double taxation convention containing specific provisions on 
anti-abuse rules with the EU Member States concerned. 
 The reduction in the compliance costs with anti-abuse requirements borne by EU 
companies will, together with other factors, contribute to reducing the motivation 
for relocating economic activities outside the EU. 
 As a result of the potential re-allocation of additional tax revenues to welfare 
institutions, a positive impact is expected with regard to some rights, such as those 
enshrined in art. 34 (social security and social assistance), art. 35 (health care) 
and art. 36 (access to services of general interest) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
                                           
182European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council - An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, 
the Commission Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters, and the Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, 
SWD(2012) 403 final, Brussels, 6.12.2012.  
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Figure 11 Commission Recommendation 2012/772/EU: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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6 Commission Recommendation of 28 January 2016 on the implementation of 
measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU) 
Needs and problems 
The Action Plan on BEPS183, the final report on Action 6 (Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances184) and the Recommendation (2016/271/EU)185 
identify two main needs: 
 The need for EU Member States to tackle base erosion and profit shifting due to 
tax treaty abuse; 
 The need to update the definition of permanent establishment to prevent tax 
abuses. 
The final reports on Action 6 (Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances) and Action 7 (Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent 
Establishment Status186) as well as the Commission staff working document accompanying 
the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 187 point at two main problems that the 
Recommendation (2016/271/EU) is meant to address: 
 Tax treaty abuse is one of the most important sources of base erosions and profit 
shifting concerns. 
 There are specific exceptions to the definition of permanent establishment leading 
to common strategies to artificially avoid taxable presence. 
Objectives  
Based on the text of Recommendation 2016/271/EU and the Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package188, the following general and 
specific objective were identified: 
 General objective: To contribute to achieving a common minimum level of 
protection against tax avoidance in the EU. 
 Specific objective: Improving in an EU context the leverage that Member States 
have towards tax treaty abuses, thus addressing the issue of treaty shopping or 
other abusive strategies.  
 Operational objective: To secure and increase tax revenues for Member 
States.189 
Inputs  
The Recommendation (2016/271/EU) includes two main provisions: 
 The implementation of a general anti-avoidance rule based on a principal purpose 
test. The provision aims to encourage Member States to apply in all their tax 
treaties the principal purpose test suggested by the OECD Model Tax Convention190, 
                                           
183 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing. 
184 OECD (2017), BEPS Action 6 on Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances – 
Peer Review Documents, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD, Paris. 
185 Commission Recommendation on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU), 
C(2016) 271 final, Brussels, 28.01.2016. 
186 OECD (2015), BEPS Action 7 Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status – 2015 
Final Report,  OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
187 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending 
Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, SWD (2016) 345 final.  
188 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards 
delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU, SWD/2016/06 final. 
189 Commission Recommendation on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU), 
C(2016) 271 final, Brussels, 28.01.2016. 
190 OECD, Articles of the model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital. 
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in order to “make it more resilient against artificial structures to circumvent its 
application”.  
 An updated definition of a permanent establishment. The provision aims to 
encourage Member States to adopt in all their tax treaties the standard definition 
of permanent establishment set out by the OECD Model Tax Convention191 in order 
to address artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status. 
Results  
On the short to medium-term, the results of the intervention are: 
 Output: The provisions of the Recommendation are adopted by Member States in 
their tax treaties concluded among others or with third countries.   
 Outcome: A minimum protection standard against tax abuses in all Member 
States is achieved. 
 
                                           
191 The Recommendation bases this provision on the definition proposed in OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 
5. 
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Figure 12 Commission Recommendation 2016/271/EU: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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7 Commission Recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence (2018/1650/EU) 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
In the context of taxation in the digital era, official documents at the EU level, including 
the Commission Communication on “A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union 
for the Digital Single Market”192 and the European Council Conclusions of 19 October 2017 
emphasise two general needs:   
 The need for new international rules in line with the developments brought by the 
digital economy with a view to “determine where the value of business is created 
and how it should be attributed for tax purposes”; 
 The need for an effective and fair taxation system fitted for the digital era. 
In addition, Recommendation 2018/1650/EU stresses a more particular third need: 
 The need for the double tax conventions signed by Member States with third parties 
to be appropriately revised in order to ensure the consistency between the Digital 
Single Market and the global economy. 
As noted in a number of official documents193, the main problem relates to the fact that 
international corporate tax rules are no longer adequate in the context of the digitalisation. 
As intangible assets are more difficult to value, the lack of adequate rules creates 
opportunities for aggressive tax planning, allowing digitalised companies to reduce their 
tax burden by benefiting from differences in tax regimes194. Furthermore, the main 
drivers behind this problem are represented by the increasingly digitised companies, the 
diverse business models and the complexity of the value creation process. 
Objectives 
The Recommendation was adopted in the wider context of the proposal for a Council 
Directive laying down the rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence. The Recommendation uses the provisions of the proposal as an example of the 
amendments Member States could introduce in what concerns the double taxation 
conventions concluded with non-Union third parties. Against this background, the 
Recommendation had a number of objectives, as listed below.  
Global objective: To provide an EU instrument to address issues related to taxing the 
digital economy among the Member States in the context of slow progress at the 
international level.195 
Specific objectives196 
 Specific objective #1: To contribute to ensuring that corporate profits are taxed 
where the value is created. It is necessary to maintain a level playing field and a 
                                           
192 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Tax 
System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, Brussels, 21.09.2017, COM/2017/0547 final. 
193 Ibid.; Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication on the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package, SWD/2016/06 final. 
194 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive laying 
down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence and Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, 
SWD(2018) 81 final/2, Brussels, 21.3.2018. 
195 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Tax 
System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, Brussels, 21.09.2017, COM/2017/0547 final, p.3. 
196 Ibid, p.8. 
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system that is resilient against abuse so that all companies pay their fair share 
whether they are large or small, more or less digitalised, EU or non-EU based. 
 Specific objective #2: To contribute to ensuring the corporation tax system is 
future-proofed and sustainable in the long-term. As traditional business models 
become increasingly digitalised, Member States' tax bases could gradually 
disappear if the tax rules are not adapted.  
Operational objectives:  
 Operational objective #1: To promote appropriate revisions and additions to the 
double tax conventions signed by Member States with non-EU countries, based on 
the provisions of the proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to 
the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence (COM(2018) 147 final).197 
 Operational objective #2: To protect the direct and indirect tax bases of Member 
States.198 
Inputs 
The Recommendation contains two main provisions for proposed adaptations to be 
made to the double tax conventions of Member States with third countries: 
 A definition of a significant digital presence. This provision implies (1) amending 
the term “permanent establishment” to include “a significant digital presence” and 
(2) setting thresholds to determine what constitutes “a significant digital presence” 
by taking into account the provisions of the proposal for a Council Directive laying 
down the rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence.199 
 A set of rules for attributing profits to or in respect of a significant digital presence. 
Results 
The following output (i.e. immediate result) related to the Recommendation can be 
identified: 
 Revision of double taxation treaties according to the provisions of the 
Recommendation. 
The expected short to medium-term result (outcome) corresponds to the specific 
objectives of the Recommendation and can be formulated as follows: 
 Avoiding that double taxation treaties of Member States will reduce the 
effectiveness of forthcoming EU rules in the field of corporate taxation concerning 
a significant digital presence. 
When it comes to the impact (longer-term results) of the instrument, this 
recommendation is expected to provide for a level-playing field between EU and third-
country companies in what concerns the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence.200 
                                           
197 Commission Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, 
2018/1650/EU, recitals 5 and 6.  
198 Ibid., p.10. 
199 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence, COM(2018) 147 final. 
200 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council 
Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence and Proposal for a 
Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of 
certain digital services, SWD(2018) 81 final/2, p. 43. 
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Figure 13 Commission Recommendation 2018/1650/EU: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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8 Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation201 identified two main needs linked to harmful 
tax competition: 
 The need for coordinated action at European level to tackle harmful tax 
competition; 
 The need to consolidate the competitiveness of the European Union and the 
Member States at the international level. 
The Conclusions of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council Meeting on the Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxation identifies one main problem, namely the fact that there are 
losses in tax revenues due to tax harmful tax competition. Going more in detail, two main 
drivers that feed into this problem: 
 Commission’s launch of a comprehensive approach to taxation policy; 
 Harmful tax competition between Member States. 
Objectives 
The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation aims to contribute to reducing harmful tax 
competition. It demands Member States to undo or take no new measures that give 
businesses from other Member States a preferential treatment. The Code of Conduct 
identifies the following general objective: 
 General objective #1: To reduce harmful tax competition; 
Two specific objectives are targeted by this intervention: 
 Specific objective #1: To reduce the continuing distortion in the Single Market; 
 Specific objective #2: To prevent excessive losses of tax revenue. 
In addition, two operational objectives can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To target also countries that are not covered by the 
European Treaties, in territories that are dependent and associated with Member 
States; 
 Operational objective #2: To have a balanced application to comparable 
situations, without this delaying the implementation of standstill and rollback. 
Inputs 
The Code of Conduct contains three measures targeting harmful tax measures: 
 Rollback – Aims to have Member States undo existing tax measures that constitute 
harmful tax competition; 
 Standstill – Aims to have Member States refrain from introducing any such 
measures in the future; 
 Geographical extension – Aims to ensure that the measures have a geographical 
base that is as broad as possible, covering, in particular, also dependent and 
associated territories. 
 
                                           
201 Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within 
the Council of 1 December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, available online at 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/harmful-tax-competition_en. 
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Results 
The following output (i.e. immediate results) related to the Code of Conduct can be 
identified: 
 A common agreement between Member States on rollback and standstill of harmful 
tax measures has been reached. 
The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) can be formulated as follows: 
 A group will be set up by the Council to assess the tax measures that may fall 
within the scope of the code; 
 Member States are committed not to introduce new tax measures which are 
harmful within the meaning of this code; 
 Member States are committed to re-examining their existing laws and practises; 
 Member States will inform each other of existing and proposed tax measures which 
may fall within the scope of the code; 
 Member States will amend laws and practices that may fall within the scope as 
necessary; 
 Annual monitoring of the implementation of the rollback and standstill and 
application of fiscal State aid. 
Regarding the long-term results, the Code of Conduct lists two global impacts: 
 Elimination of existing tax measures that constitute harmful tax competition; 
 No new tax measures that constitute harmful tax competition. 
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Figure 14 Code of Conduct for Business Taxation: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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9 The European Semester for economic policy coordination (corporate taxation 
aspects) 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Regulations on the European Semester for economic policy coordination202 provide the 
legal framework for a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU. The 
regulations as such offer limited detail on the recommendations related to aggressive tax 
planning, which only forms part of the European Semester. Therefore, also a selection of 
the recommendations and accompanying Staff Working Documents in which aggressive 
tax planning was an issue203 has been used to define the intervention logic for European 
Semester related to aggressive tax planning. Based on this, four main needs linked to 
the facilitation of corporate tax avoidance and evasion have been identified: 
 The need for sound public finances of Member States;  
 The need for a level-playing field for all businesses; 
 The need to preserve social cohesion; 
 The need for coordinated action of national policies to complement EU legislation. 
The Regulations on the European Semester identify one main problem, namely spill-over 
effects of aggressive tax planning strategies between Member States. Going more in detail, 
five main drivers feed into this problem: 
 Introduction of the euro as a common currency for several Member States; 
 Global financial and Eurozone debt crises; 
 Digitalisation and globalization of the economy; 
 Increasing inequalities in society; 
 Increased tax competition between countries with the development of new tax 
regimes. 
Objectives 
The Regulations on the European Semester aims to contribute to the coordination of tax 
and other policies among Member States whose currency is the euro. They address this 
issue by putting in place a process to coordinate fiscal policies. The Regulations identify 
the following general objective affecting corporate taxation: 
 General objective #1: To ensure closer coordination of economic policies and 
sustained convergence of the economic performance of the Member States. 
                                           
202 Council Regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, No 1466/97 of 7.7.1997; Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction 
of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, No 473/2013 of 21.5.2013. 
203 COM(2017) 770 final, Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area, Brussels, 
22.11.2017; SWD(2017) 660 final, Analysis of the Euro Area economy Accompanying the document 
Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the Euro Area, 22.11.2017; 
COM(2018) 412 final, Council Recommendation on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Cyprus and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2018 Stability Programme of Cyprus, Brussels, 23.5.2018; COM(2018) 407 
final, Council Recommendation on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Ireland and delivering a Council 
opinion on the 2018 Stability Programme of Ireland, Brussels, 23.5.2018; COM(2018) 415 final, Council 
Recommendation on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Luxembourg and delivering a Council opinion on 
the 2018 Stability Programme of Luxembourg, Brussels, 23.5.2018; COM(2018) 417 final, Council 
Recommendation on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Malta and delivering a Council opinion on the 2018 
Stability Programme of Malta, Brussels, 23.5.2018; COM(2018) 418 final, Council Recommendation on the 2018 
National Reform Programme of the Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the 2018 Stability Programme 
of the Netherlands, Brussels, 23.5.2018. 
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The selected Recommendations on the European Semester emphasises the specific 
objective targeted by this piece of legislation related to aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices: 
 Specific objective #1: To prevent negative spill-over effects from tax policies of 
individual Member States. 
In addition, one operational objective can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To operate specific fiscal rules to help ensure the 
overall government budget complies with European rules. 
Inputs 
The Regulations contain three measures that are relevant in the context of aggressive 
tax planning: 
 Economic policy coordination – Aims to include the formulation, and the 
surveillance of the implementation, of the broad guidelines of the economic policies 
of the Member States and of the Union. This also includes the monitoring of 
indicators that might signal facilitation of aggressive tax planning. 
 Assessment of national reform programmes – Aims to ensure that Member States 
consult the Commission and each other before adopting any major fiscal policy 
reforms with potential spill-over effects. This also includes issues related to the 
facilitation of aggressive tax planning. 
 Recommendations – Council adopted recommendations for Member States to 
achieve sustainable, inclusive and long-term growth. These recommendations can 
also cover issues related to the facilitation of aggressive tax planning. 
 
Results 
When it comes to aggressive tax planning, the following outputs (i.e. immediate results) 
stemming from the Regulations can be identified: 
 Implementation of the relevant provisions related to fiscal policies agreed in the 
Regulations. 
The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) can be summarised as follows: 
 Policy dialogue on the Council and Commission recommendations on instruments 
facilitating aggressive tax planning; 
 Synergies among tax policies of Member States to reduce aggressive tax planning. 
Regarding the long-term results, the instrument puts forwards one global impact: 
 Reducing the room for aggressive tax planning among Member States. 
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Figure 15 The European Semester for economic policy coordination (corporate taxation aspects): Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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10 Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Commission Decision to set-up the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum expert group (and 
preceding Decision)204 identified two main needs linked to tax avoidance: 
 The need for non-legislative solutions to practical problems posed by transfer 
pricing practices in the EU; 
 The need to take measures in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations205. 
The Decision identifies one main problem, namely the fact that transfer pricing can 
constitute a problem for cross-border business activities in the Single Market. Going more 
in detail, one driver feeds into this problem: 
 Heterogeneity in Transfer Pricing legislation in the EU. 
Objectives 
The EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum aims to contribute to the Commission non-legislative 
measures concerning transfer pricing tax issues. The Decision to establish this forum 
identifies the following general objective: 
 General objective #1: To enhance the smooth functioning of the Single Market. 
The Decision emphasises the specific objective targeted by this piece of legislation: 
 Specific objective #1: To assist and advise the Commission on transfer pricing 
tax matters. 
In addition, two operational objectives can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To involve both governmental and non-governmental 
sector experts on transfer pricing; 
 Operational objective #2: To advice on measures that are compatible with the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations.206 
Inputs 
The Joint Transfer Pricing Forum works on two main areas related to addressing practical 
problems posed by transfer pricing practices: 
 Arbitration Convention – Aims to function as a dispute resolution mechanism for 
transfer pricing cases; 
 Other transfer pricing issues – Aims to address other transfer pricing issues 
included in its work programme. For example, code of conduct for the effective 
implementation of the Arbitration Convention, code of conduct on transfer pricing 
                                           
204 C(2015) 257 final, Commission Decision on setting up the 'EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum' expert group, 
Brussels, 26.1.2015; COM(2011), Commission Decision on setting up the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum expert 
group, 25.1.2011. 
205 OECD (2017), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, 
available online at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-
enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm. 
206 OECD (2017), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, 
available online at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-
enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm. 
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documentation for associated enterprises in the EU and guidelines on low-value-
adding intra-group services.  
Results 
The following output (i.e. immediate results) related to the Decision can be identified: 
 Establishment of an EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum expert group. 
The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) can be formulated as follows: 
 Advises for the Commission on transfer pricing tax issues; 
 Assisting the Commission on finding practical solutions for transfer pricing tax 
issues. 
Regarding the long-term results, the Decision on the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum lists 
one global impact: 
 Reduction of the obstacles of conducting cross-border activities in the Single 
Market. 
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Figure 16 Joint Transfer Pricing Forum: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation (COM/2016/024 final) 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Commission communication to the European Parliament and the Council on an 
External Strategy for Effective Taxation207 identified five main needs linked to tax 
avoidance: 
 The need for a unified EU position on international tax arrangements; 
 The need for a stronger stance against tax havens; 
 The need to support developing countries in the fight against tax avoidance and 
integration in the international tax good governance agenda; 
 The need to create a level-playing field for all businesses. 
 The need to promote tax good governance internationally. 
The Recommendation208 on which the Communication is a follow-up step identifies one 
main problem, namely the fact that some third countries have opted for a low level or 
no income tax that limits the possibilities for Member States to enforce their tax policy. 
Going more in detail, six main drivers feed into this problem: 
 Differences in the criteria to identify low/no tax and non-cooperative jurisdictions; 
 Heterogeneity in applied sanctions to identified low/no tax jurisdictions; 
 Companies exploitation of loopholes and mismatches to shift profits out of Single 
Market;  
 European developments in corporate tax policies; 
 International developments in corporate tax policies (e.g. OECD/G20 BEPS 
reports209), particularly the enhanced transparency with automatic exchange of 
information; 
 Addis Ababa Action Agenda to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development.210 
Objectives 
The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
an External Strategy for Effective Taxation aims to contribute to the coordination of 
Member States’ tax policies. The Communication addresses this issue by proposing a 
framework for a new EU external strategy for effective taxation. The Communication 
emphasises the general objective targeted by this intervention: 
 General objective #1: To ensure effective taxation within the Single Market and 
secure fairer corporate taxation within the EU and beyond. 
It also identifies three specific objectives: 
 Specific objective #1: To ensure that profits generated in the Single Market are 
effectively taxed where the activity is taking place. 
                                           
207 COM(2016) 24 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an 
External Strategy for Effective Taxation, Brussels, 28.1.2016. 
208 COM(2012/771/EU), Commission Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries 
to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters, Brussels, 6.12.2012. 
209 OECD (2015), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Final BEPS Package, available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
210 UN (2015), Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 
available online at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=2051&menu=35. 
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 Specific objective #2: To have a common approach to third-country jurisdictions 
on tax and good governance matters. 
 Specific objective #3: To create a level playing field between businesses located 
in the EU and in third countries. 
In addition, four operational objectives can be identified: 
 Operational objective #1: To take the level of development of the country into 
account, when promoting tax good governance internationally; 
 Operational objective #2: To have criteria for third countries on exchange of 
information that are at least as stringent as those outlined in the OECD/G20 BEPS 
reports211; 
 Operational objective #3: To improve domestic capacity for tax collection in 
developing countries 212; 
 Operational objective #4: To ensure that EU funds are not invested in or 
channelled through third countries that do not comply with international tax 
transparency standards and/or rely on harmful tax practices. 
Inputs 
The Communication contains five measures to respond to promote tax good governance 
globally and respond to external avoidance threats: 
 Re-examining EU good governance criteria – Demands the Council to endorse the 
Commission proposal to update the EU tax good governance criteria related to 
transparency, information exchange and tax competition.  
 Enhancing agreements with third countries on tax good governance – Aims to 
enhance the number of agreements with third countries including an updated 
clause on tax good governance that allows reflecting the particular situation of the 
third country involved and includes provisions for State aid. 
 Assistance for developing countries to meet tax good governance standards – 
Assisting development countries in improving their tax systems and enhancing their 
domestic resources and inclusion in the global good governance structure (e.g. 
OECD/G20 BEPS, AEOI, ATAF, CREDAF and CIAT). 
 Developing an EU process for assessing and listing third countries – Aims to 
strengthen the instruments at EU instead of Member State-level to respond to third 
countries that refuse to respect tax good governance standards. 
 Reinforcing the link between EU funds and tax good governance – Aims to extend 
the good governance requirements with the EU principles for fair tax competition 
and international financial institutions contracts with financial intermediaries. 
Results 
The following output (i.e. immediate result) related to the Communication can be 
identified: 
 Discussion in the Council on endorsing the updated criteria for tax good governance 
internationally; 
                                           
211 OECD (2015), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Final BEPS Package, available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
212 UN (2015), Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 
available online at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=2051&menu=35. 
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The expected short to medium-term results (outcomes) can be summarised as follows: 
 Inclusion of an updated tax good governance clause and State aid provisions in 
negotiations of all relevant bilateral and regional agreements with third countries; 
 Debate on fair treatment of developing countries in bilateral treaties within the 
Platform on Tax Good Governance; 
 Common EU stance on tax good governance criteria, serving as a base for all EU 
external tax policies and discussions on tax good governance with international 
partners; 
 Help developing countries to secure domestic revenues and fight off threats to their 
tax base; 
 Clear and coherent EU approach to identify third countries that do not comply with 
the good governance standards; 
 Unified response to third countries that are non-compliant with good governance 
standards; 
 Commission proposal on inclusion of tax good governance standards into revised 
Financial Regulation. 
Regarding the long-term results, the Commission on an External Strategy for Effective 
Taxation lists two global impacts: 
 Avoid that developing countries facilitate the creation of opportunities for base 
erosion and profit shifting; 
 Creation of a fairer competition between Member States and third countries in the 
area of business taxation. 
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Figure 17 Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
  
114 
 
B.3 Intervention logic of state aid rules 
Whereas state aid rules are not directly covered by the analysis performed in this Report, 
they are accounted for when assessing the external coherence criterion in Chapter 3 of 
the main report. In this context, the following intervention logic pinpoints the main 
elements of the legal basis of state aid which apply to taxation matters, based on the 
following instruments: 
 Article 107, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)213; 
 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01). 
 DG Competition, Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings, Internal Working 
Paper, Background to the High-Level Forum on State Aid of 3 June 2016. 
Needs, problems, and drivers 
The Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings214 outlines a central need in the field 
of state aid and taxation, namely: 
 The need to examine the particular effects of aid granted in the form of tax 
measures by Member States and to assess whether those measures are compatible 
with the Internal Market. 
One main problem follows from article 107 TFEU, namely competition being distorted as 
a result of state aid in the form of tax measures. 
Two drivers are feeding into the above problem215: 
 Selective tax measures; 
 Discretionary practices of tax administrations, provided that they are selective. 
Objectives 
The following set of objectives of state aid rules applied to tax measures were identified 
based on the three main documents listed above:  
 General objective: To prevent distortions of competition through the granting of 
special tax advantages that are not available to all similarly situated taxpayers in 
a given Member State.216 
 Specific objective: To contribute to an easier, more transparent and more 
consistent application of the state aid rules in order to reduce distortions of 
competition in the Internal Market.217 
 Operational objective: To clarify whether a tax measure can be qualified as state 
aid under the provisions of the TFEU.  
Inputs 
State aid rules have been primarily based on the provisions of art. 107 TFEU, which have 
been in place ever since the Treaty of Rome. Article 107(1) includes four conditions that 
                                           
213 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47. 
214 Par. 1. 
215 This follows from article 107 TFEU and the respective case law. The Working Paper on State Aid and Tax 
Rulings provides additional details on the relevant cases. 
216 DG Competition (2016), Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings, Internal Working Paper, Background to 
the High Level Forum on State Aid of 3 June 2016, par. 24. 
217 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, (2016/C 262/01), par. 1. 
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have to be met in order for any aid granted by a Member State to be considered 
“incompatible with the internal market”: 
1. It represents an intervention by a Member State or through the Member State’s 
resources; 
2. The intervention gives an advantage on a selective basis to the recipient of the aid; 
3. The intervention affects trade between Member States; 
4. The intervention distorts competition. 
 
The incompatibility with the internal market is further assessed based on Article 107(2) 
and 107(3). 
The application of these conditions in the case of tax measures was outlined in the 
Commission notice on the notion of State Aid: 
1. “Foregoing state revenue” is sufficient for a tax measure to be considered an 
intervention by a Member State or through the resources of a Member State.218  
2. Both the granting of positive economic advantages and the relief from economic 
burden can constitute an advantage conferred to economic operators.219  
3. In order to classify a tax measure as conferring a selective advantage, it is first 
necessary to identify the "normal" or common tax regime applicable in the Member 
State concerned, known as the (tax) reference system, and to examine the 
operation of the system with reference to its objective.220 Secondly, it is necessary 
to assess whether the measure in question deviates or derogates from the 
reference system on the basis that it differentiates between economic operators 
who, in light of the objective pursued by the reference system, are in a comparable 
legal and factual situation. If such derogation exists, the measure will be deemed 
to be prima facie selective. Thirdly, if a measure is considered to be a derogation 
from the reference system, it may still be justified by the nature and overall 
structure of the reference system. In that regard, it is up to the Member State 
concerned to demonstrate that the contested measure results directly from the 
basic or guiding principles of the reference system, resulting from inherent 
mechanisms necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of the system. If the 
derogation from the reference system is justified on these grounds, the measure is 
not deemed selective. 
4. The conditions related to competition and trade between Member States are met if 
the recipient of to the distortive fiscal aid is involved in trade between Member 
States.221  
 
In addition, the Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings provides guidance on the 
application of state aid rules to tax rulings in the case of transfer pricing rules.  
Results 
The expected results of state aid rules related to tax issues, defined by Commission notice 
2016/C 262/01, have been the following: 
                                           
218 Par. 51 
219 Par. 68 
220 Case C-374/17 A-Brauerei ECLI:EU:C:2018:1024, paragraphs 35 and 36. 
221 Par 185 - 198 
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 Output: Adoption of decisions by the Commission either authorising state aid as 
compatible with the Common Market or finding it incompatible and possibly illegal 
state aid.  
 Outcome: Cases are analysed by the Commission based on article 107 TFEU and 
its interpreting notice on the Notion of Aid.  
When it comes to the impact (the longer-term result), Commission notice 2016/C 262/01 
emphasises that state aid rules are expected to contribute to an “easier, more transparent 
and more consistent application of the notion of state aid across the Union”.222 
 
                                           
222 Par. 1. 
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Figure 18 State aid rules: Intervention logic 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EU official documents. 
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ANNEX C: Questionnaire for interviews 
 
Reflections on the EU objectives in addressing aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices 
Interview guidelines for in-depth interviews 
 
Background 
DG TAXUD of the European Commission has requested CEPS to prepare a report assessing 
the coherence of the objectives of existing EU hard and soft law instruments to tackle 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. The report considers the potential 
complementarities or gaps between the relevant EU instruments, as well as their 
coherence with the international tax agenda and other EU policies and political priorities. 
For the purposes of this report, aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices are 
briefly defined as follows: 
 Aggressive tax planning constitutes a form of tax avoidance behaviour of 
companies. More specifically, it entails the exploitation of weaknesses and 
mismatches in tax systems or treaty networks to avoid taxation. 
 Harmful tax practices refer to the competition between nation states with 
preferential tax systems. Attempts by countries to attract corporate investment or 
national profit through such preferential tax regimes is one of the main reasons 
behind harmful tax practices. 
Instructions 
This interview aims to gather the views of selected stakeholders on the EU instruments 
against aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices. The information collected will 
feed the above-mentioned report. The interview is conducted by CEPS on behalf of DG 
TAXUD of the European Commission.  
For further details on the pieces of legislation covered by this report, please consult Annex 
A attached to the email accompanying this questionnaire. 
If you wish to receive further information regarding this report, please feel free to contact 
the project manager: 
 Felice Simonelli  
Head of Policy Evaluation, CEPS 
Phone: +32.(0)2.229.39.23 
Email: felice.simonelli@ceps.eu 
 
Thank you for your valuable input. 
 
Personal data protection 
Data and information provided during this interview will not be disclosed to any third party. 
Raw data and information may be shared with DG TAXUD of the European Commission. 
Results will be published so as not to be attributable to any specific respondent unless 
otherwise agreed upon with the interviewee in written form. 
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Registration 
REG.1 Name and surname of the interviewer: 
______________________________ 
REG.2 Date and place of the interview: 
______________________________ 
REG.3 Please indicate the name of the organisation you are part of: 
______________________________ 
REG.4 Please indicate the country or level (EU or international) where the organisation 
operates: 
______________________________ 
REG.5 Please indicate your name and surname and position in your organisation: 
______________________________ 
REG.6 Please indicate your email address: 
______________________________ 
For the following questions, where requested, please provide your best estimate from 1 to 
5 based on the following scale: (1) not at all; (2) to a limited extent; (3) to some extent; 
(4) to a high extent; or (5) to the fullest extent. Select DK/NO if you don’t know or you 
have no opinion. 
REG.7 To what extent are you familiar with the following EU instruments relevant for 
addressing aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices?  
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (1 & 2)  
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Administrative Cooperation Directive (3, 4 & 6) 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax 
planning (2012/772/EU)  1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Commission Recommendation of 28 January 2016 on the 
implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU)  1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Commission Recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the 
corporate taxation of a significant digital presence (2018/1650/EU)  1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation  
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
European Semester (measures related to aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices) 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Joint Transfer Pricing Forum  1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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/NO 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive  
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation  
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 regarding 
measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters (2012/771/EU)  
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
PART I – OVERALL COHERENCE 
I.1 To what extent do you identify complementarities/synergies between the 
objectives of the EU instruments listed on page 2, question REG.7 (i.e. they produce 
a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects)? 
o Not at all 
o To a limited extent 
o To some extent 
o To a high extent 
o To the fullest extent 
o Do not know/No opinion 
I.1.1 If to some extent, to a high extent or to the fullest extent - Please indicate 
examples of complementarities/synergies.  
______________________________ 
I.2 To what extent do you identify overlaps/contradictions/gaps between the 
objectives of the EU instruments listed on page 2, question REG.7 (e.g. two 
instruments try to address the same problem, thus generating duplications or legal 
uncertainty)? 
o Not at all 
o To a limited extent 
o To some extent 
o To a high extent 
o To the fullest extent 
o Do not know/No opinion 
I.2.1 If to some extent, to a high extent or to the fullest extent - - Please indicate 
examples of overlaps/contradictions/gaps.  
______________________________ 
I.3 Are you aware of other EU policies (e.g. competition, development, trade, anti-
money laundering, etc.) that may have synergies/complementarities and/or 
overlaps/contradictions with the objectives of the EU instruments listed on page 2, 
question REG.7?  
o Yes 
o No 
I.3.1 If Yes – Please indicate the relevant EU policies you have identified. 
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______________________________ 
I.3.2 If Yes – Please indicate to what extent the objectives of the EU instruments 
listed on page 2 (question REG.7) and the other EU policies you have identified 
have synergies/complementarities (if any) and elaborate on your answer. 
______________________________ 
I.3.3 If Yes – Please indicate to what extent the objectives of the EU instruments 
listed on page 2 (question REG.7) and the other EU policies you have identified 
have overlaps/contradictions (if any) and elaborate on your answer. 
______________________________ 
I.4 Are you aware of international policies/instruments (e.g. OECD BEPS, UN Model 
Tax Convention) that may have synergies/complementarities and/or 
overlaps/contradictions with the objectives of the EU instruments listed on page 2, 
question REG.7?  
o Yes 
o No 
I.4.1 If Yes – Please indicate the relevant international policies/instruments you 
have identified. 
______________________________ 
I.4.2 If Yes – Please indicate to what extent the objectives of the EU instruments 
listed on page 2 (question REG.7) and the international policies you have 
identified have synergies/complementarities (if any) and elaborate on your 
answer. 
______________________________ 
I.4.3 If Yes – Please indicate to what extent the objectives of the EU instruments 
listed on page 2 (question REG.7) and the international policies/instruments 
you have identified have overlaps/contradictions (if any) and elaborate on your 
answer. 
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PART II - AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING AND HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 
Part II focuses on the following EU instruments: 
 Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (1 & 2)  
 Administrative Cooperation Directive (3, 4 & 6) 
 Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax planning 
(2012/772/EU)  
 Commission Recommendation of 28 January 2016 on the implementation of 
measures against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU)  
 Commission Recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the corporate taxation 
of a significant digital presence (2018/1650/EU)  
 Code of Conduct for Business Taxation  
 European Semester (limited to measures related to aggressive tax planning and 
harmful tax practices) 
The key objectives of these instruments are summarised in Figure 19 below. 
 
Figure 19 General and specific objectives 
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II.1 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in Figure 
19, the selected EU instruments can address the needs listed in the table below? 
Need 1: To coordinate national corporate taxation rules, policies 
and approaches to address aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 2: To ensure more transparency and a more binding approach 
to information exchange on tax rulings as well as on internal 
transactions within multinational groups 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 3: To coordinate the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS 
reports and Common Reporting Standard across Member States 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 4: To ensure a level-playing field for all companies active in 
the EU 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 5: To tackle base erosion and profit shifting between Member 
States due to tax treaty abuse 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 6: To have national feedback processes within tax 
administrations and between tax administrations and their national 
reporters 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 7: To have an international taxation system fit for the digital 
era and adapt double tax conventions accordingly 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 8: To update the definition of permanent establishment to 
prevent tax abuses 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
II.2 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in Figure 
19, the selected EU instruments can address the problems listed in the table below? 
Problem 1: Limited usefulness of non-coordinated, national anti-
abuse measures 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 2: Potential tax losses due to aggressive tax planning 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 3: International corporate tax rules are no longer adequate in 
the digital era 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 4: Tax treaty abuse and specific exceptions to the 
definition of permanent establishment leading to tax avoidance 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 5: National corporate tax rules are no longer adequate and 
allow for tax avoidance 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
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Problem 6: Loopholes in individual tax systems of the Member States 
and mismatches between tax systems in the EU leading to double non-
taxation in cross-border situations 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
II.3 To what extent do you believe that the needs listed in the table below are still 
experienced by EU stakeholders?  
Need 1: To coordinate national corporate taxation rules, policies 
and approaches to address aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 2: To ensure more transparency and a more binding approach 
to information exchange on tax rulings as well as on internal 
transactions within multinational groups 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 3: To coordinate the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS 
reports and Common Reporting Standard across Member States 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 4: To ensure a level-playing field for all companies active in 
the EU 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 5: To tackle base erosion and profit shifting between Member 
States due to tax treaty abuse 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 6: To have national feedback processes within tax 
administrations and between tax administrations and their national 
reporters 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 7: To have an international taxation system fit for the digital 
era and adapt double tax conventions accordingly 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 8: To update the definition of permanent establishment to 
prevent tax abuses 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
II.4 To what extent do you believe that the problems listed in the table below are still 
experienced by EU stakeholders?  
Problem 1: Limited usefulness of non–coordinated, national anti-
abuse measures 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 2: Potential tax losses due to aggressive tax planning 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 3: International corporate tax rules are no longer adequate in 
the digital era 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
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Problem 4: Tax treaty abuse and specific exceptions to the 
definition of permanent establishment leading to tax avoidance 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 5: National corporate tax rules are no longer adequate and 
allow for tax avoidance 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 6: Loopholes in individual tax systems of the Member States 
and mismatches between tax systems in the EU leading to double non-
taxation in cross-border situations 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
II.5 Please indicate any additional needs and problems related to combating 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices that are currently experienced in 
the EU:  
___________________________________________ 
II.5.1 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in 
Figure 19 the EU instruments can address the additional needs and problems you 
have identified in II.5? 
o Not at all 
o To a limited extent 
o To some extent 
o To a high extent 
o To the fullest extent 
o Do not know/No opinion 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
II.6 To what extent have the EU instruments under analysis contributed so far to 
achieving the following objectives? 
General objective 1: To improve the functioning of the Single 
Market by ensuring a fair, efficient and growth-friendly corporate 
taxation, discouraging the use of aggressive cross-border tax planning 
and protecting Member States against cross-border tax fraud and 
avoidance 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
General objective 2: To provide an EU instrument to address issues 
related to taxing the digital economy among the Member States 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
General objective 3: To reduce harmful tax competition 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 1: To close loopholes and the potential for abuse 
of the direct tax systems of Member States 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 2: To implement the OECD/G20 BEPS outputs 
across the EU while accounting for the specific features of national tax 
systems 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 3: To obtain comprehensive and relevant 
information about potentially aggressive tax arrangements 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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/NO 
Specific objective 4: To improve the efficiency of national measures 
against international tax avoidance 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 5: To ensure that the corporate tax system is 
future-proofed and sustainable in the long-term and that corporate 
profits are taxed where the value is created 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 6: To prevent excessive losses of tax revenues 
and other negative spill-over effects from tax policies of individual 
Member States 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
II.7 To what extent do you believe the EU instruments listed on page 5 have achieved 
the following results? 
1. Better protection and improved operation of the Single 
Market 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
2. Adoption of a common EU approach to implementing 
OECD/G20 BEPS agenda 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
3. Automatic and on request exchange of information for tax 
purposes  
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
4. Creation of a central directory database with information on 
tax rulings and pricing arrangements 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
5. Country-by-country reporting by multinational groups 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
6. Instances of double non-taxation are reduced 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
7. Avoiding that double taxation treaties reduce the 
effectiveness of forthcoming EU rules concerning a significant 
digital presence 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
8. Member States are committed to re-examining (and amending 
if necessary) their existing laws and practices and to not 
introducing new harmful tax measures 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
9. Exchange of information between Member States on tax 
measures which may fall under the scope of the Code of Conduct 
for Business Taxation 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
10. Assessment and annual monitoring of tax measures that fall 
within the scope of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation  
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
11. Stronger synergies among tax policies of Member States to 
avoid harmful tax practices 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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/NO 
12. Policy dialogue on the Council and Commission 
recommendations on harmful tax practices and aggressive tax 
planning instruments 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
 
II.8 Can you rank the seven EU instruments listed in the table below from the most 
useful to the least useful when it comes to achieving the objective and results 
listed above and fighting against aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices? 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (1 & 2)   
Administrative Cooperation Directive (3, 4 & 6)  
Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax planning 
(2012/772/EU)  
 
Commission Recommendation of 28 January 2016 on the implementation of measures 
against tax treaty abuse (2016/271/EU)  
 
Commission Recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the corporate taxation of a 
significant digital presence (2018/1650/EU)  
 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation   
European Semester (measures related to aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices) 
 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
II.9 To what extent do you believe that national interventions, in the absence of any 
EU taxation instruments, would be able to achieve the following results?  
1. Better protection and improved operation of the Single 
Market 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
2. Adoption of a common EU approach to implementing 
OECD/G20 BEPS agenda 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
3. Automatic and on request exchange of information for tax 
purposes 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
4. Creation of a central directory database with information on 
tax rulings and pricing arrangements 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
5. Country-by-country reporting by multinational groups 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
6. Instances of double non-taxation are reduced 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
7. Avoiding that double taxation treaties reduce the effectiveness 
of forthcoming EU rules concerning a significant digital presence 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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/NO 
8. Member States are committed to re-examining (and amending 
if necessary) their existing laws and practices and to not 
introducing new harmful tax measures 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
9. Exchange of information between Member States on tax 
measures which may fall under the scope of the Code of Conduct 
for Business Taxation 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
10. Assessment and annual monitoring of tax measures that fall 
within the scope of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation  
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
11. Stronger synergies among tax policies of Member States to 
avoid harmful tax practices 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
12. Policy dialogue on the Council and Commission 
recommendations on harmful tax practices and aggressive tax 
planning instruments 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
 
II.9.1 Can you refer to any examples showing that the EU taxation instruments 
generate/do not generate better results than similar national initiatives (if any)? 
______________________________________  
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PART III BUSINESS FACILITATION 
Part III focuses on the following EU instruments: 
 Parent Subsidiary Directive 
 Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
The key objectives of these instruments are summarised in Figure 20 below. 
 
Figure 20 General and specific objectives 
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III.1 To what extent do aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices jeopardise the 
competitiveness of EU companies (and especially small and medium-sized enterprises)? 
o Not at all 
o To a limited extent 
o To some extent 
o To a high extent 
o To the fullest extent 
o Do not know/No opinion 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
III.2 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in Figure 
20, the EU instruments can address the needs and problems listed in the table below? 
Need 1: To ensure a level-playing field across companies active in 
the EU 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 2: To broaden the definition of parent company (lower 
minimum holding threshold) and the types of legal entities covered 
by the parent subsidiary Directive applies activities 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 3: To protect national tax revenues 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 4: To have measures in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 5: To have non-legislative solutions to practical problems 
posed by transfer pricing practices in the EU 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 1: Cross-border businesses are hampered by restrictions, 
disadvantages or distortions arising in particular from the tax 
provisions of the Member States 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 2: Transfer pricing can constitute a problem for cross-
border business activities in the Single Market 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
III.3 To what extent do you believe that the needs and problems listed in the table 
below are still experienced by EU stakeholders?  
Need 1: To ensure a level-playing field across companies active in 
the EU 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 2: To broaden the definition of parent company (lower 
minimum holding threshold) and the types of legal entities covered 
by the parent subsidiary Directive applies activities 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 3: To protect national tax revenues 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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/NO 
Need 4: To have measures in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 5: To have non-legislative solutions to practical problems 
posed by transfer pricing practices in the EU 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 1: Cross-border businesses are hampered by restrictions, 
disadvantages or distortions arising in particular from the tax 
provisions of the Member States 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 2: Transfer pricing can constitute a problem for cross-
border business activities in the Single Market 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
III.4 Please indicate any additional needs and problems related to facilitate cross-
border and global business operations while combating aggressive tax planning 
and harmful tax practices that are currently experienced in the EU:  
___________________________________________ 
III.4.1 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in 
Figure 20 the EU instruments can address the additional needs and problems you 
have identified in III.4? 
o Not at all 
o To a limited extent 
o To some extent 
o To a high extent 
o To the fullest extent 
o Do not know/No opinion 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
III.5 To what extent have the EU instruments listed on page 10 contributed so far to 
achieving the following objectives? 
General objective 1: To enhance the smooth functioning of the Single 
Market (and thereby support the ability of EU businesses to increase 
their productivity and to improve their competitive strength at the 
international level) 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 1: To exempt dividends and other profit 
distribution paid by subsidiary companies to parent companies from 
withholding taxes and to eliminate double taxation of such income 
at the level of the parent company 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 2: To assist and advise the Commission on transfer 
pricing tax matters 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 1: To protect the national tax revenue and fend 
off circumvention of national laws, in accordance with the Treaty 
principles and taking into account internationally accepted tax rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
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Operational objective 2: To advise on measures that are compatible 
with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 3: To have tax rules which are neutral from the 
point of view of competition 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 4: To avoid situations of double non-taxation 
that generate unintended tax benefits for companies 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 5: To ensure that tax arrangements reflect 
economic reality 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 6: To involve both governmental and non-
governmental sector experts on transfer pricing 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
III.6 To what extent do you believe the EU instruments listed on page 10 have achieved 
the following results? 
1. A common EU approach to addressing double taxation of 
dividends is adopted 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
2. Avoiding situations of double non-taxation 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
3. Advice for the Commission on transfer pricing tax issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
4. Assisting the Commission on finding practical solutions for 
transfer pricing tax issues 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
III.7 Which of the two EU instruments listed below has been more useful when it comes 
to achieving the objective and results listed above and facilitating cross-border and 
global business operations while combating aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
practices? 
 Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
 Parent Subsidiary Directive 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
III.8 To what extent do you believe that national interventions, in the absence of the 
EU taxation instruments, would be able to achieve the following results?  
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1. A common EU approach to addressing double taxation of 
dividends is adopted 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
2. Avoiding situations of double non-taxation 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
3. Advice for the Commission on transfer pricing tax issues 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
4. Assisting the Commission on finding practical solutions for 
transfer pricing tax issues 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
 
III.8.1 Can you refer to any examples showing that the EU taxation instruments 
generate/do not generate better results than similar national initiatives (if any)? 
______________________________________ 
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PART IV External policies 
Part IV focuses on the following EU instruments: 
 Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation  
 Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 regarding measures intended 
to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in 
tax matters (2012/771/EU) 
The key objectives of these instruments are summarised in Figure 21 below. 
Figure 21 General and specific objectives 
 
 
 
IV.1 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in Figure 
21, the EU instruments can address the needs listed in the table below?  
Need 1: To set out minimum standards of good governance in tax 
matters 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 2: To support developing and other third countries in the fight 
against tax avoidance and integration in the international tax good 
governance agenda 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 3: For a unified EU position on international tax arrangements 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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/NO 
Need 4: For a stronger stance against tax havens 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 5: To create a level-playing field for all businesses 
 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 6: To promote tax good governance internationally 
 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 1: Some third countries with low-tax regimes do not comply 
with minimum standards 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 2: Lack of cooperation between Member States and third 
countries leading to harmful tax competition and limiting the exchange 
of information 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 3: Low/no income tax of some third countries that limits 
the possibilities for Member States to enforce their tax policy 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
IV.2 To what extent do you believe that the needs listed in the table below are still 
experienced by EU stakeholders?  
Need 1: To set out minimum standards of good governance in tax 
matters 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 2: To support developing and other third countries in the fight 
against tax avoidance and integration in the international tax good 
governance agenda 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 3: For a unified EU position on international tax arrangements 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 4: For a stronger stance against tax havens 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 5: To create a level-playing field for all businesses 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Need 6: To promote tax good governance internationally 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 1: Some third countries with low-tax regimes do not comply 
with minimum standards 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Problem 2: Lack of cooperation between Member States and third 
countries leading to harmful tax competition and limiting the exchange 
of information 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
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Problem 3: Low/no income tax of some third countries that limits 
the possibilities for Member States to enforce their tax policy 
1 2 3 4 5 DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answers: ______________________________________ 
 
IV.3 Please indicate any additional needs and problems related to combating 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices on a global scale that are 
currently experienced in the EU: 
___________________________________________ 
IV.3.1 To what extent do you believe that by achieving the objectives presented in 
Figure 21 the EU instruments can address the additional needs and problems you 
have identified in IV.3? 
o Not at all 
o To a limited extent 
o To some extent 
o To a high extent 
o To the fullest extent 
o Do not know/No opinion 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
IV.4 To what extent have the EU instruments listed on page 14 contributed so far to 
achieving the following objectives? 
General objective 1: To ensure, through a Union approach, better 
protection of Member State tax systems against abuses and 
loopholes and, in particular, against cross-border international tax fraud 
and avoidance 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
General objective 2: To ensure effective taxation within the Single 
Market and secure fairer corporate taxation within the EU and beyond 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 1: To have a common approach to third-country 
jurisdictions on tax and good governance matters 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 2: To ensure that profits generated in the Single 
Market are effectively taxed where the activity is taking place 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Specific objective 3: To create a level playing field between 
businesses located in the EU and in third countries 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 1: To secure and increase tax revenues for 
Member States 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 2: To take the level of development of the 
country into account, when promoting tax good governance 
internationally 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
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Operational objective 3: To have criteria for third countries on 
exchange of information that are at least as stringent as those 
outlined in the OECD/G20 BEPS reports 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 4: To improve domestic capacity for tax 
collection in developing countries 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Operational objective 5: To ensure that EU funds are not invested in or 
channelled through third countries that do not comply with 
international tax transparency standards and/or rely on harmful tax 
practices 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
IV.5 To what extent do you believe the two EU instruments listed on page 14 have 
achieved the following results? 
1. Fostering third countries to implement principles of good 
governance in the tax area 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
2. Debate on fair treatment of developing countries in bilateral 
treaties within the Platform on Tax Good Governance 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
3. Inclusion of an updated tax good governance clause and State 
aid provisions in negotiations of all relevant bilateral and regional 
agreements with third countries 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
4. Common EU stance on tax good governance criteria, serving as 
a basis for all EU external tax policies and discussions on tax good 
governance with international partners 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
5. To help developing countries to secure domestic revenues and 
fight off threats to their tax base 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
6. Clear and coherent EU approach to identify third countries that 
do not comply with good governance standards 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
7. Efficiency and effectiveness in fighting against aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices by addressing international tax 
challenges at EU level 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
8. Unified response to third countries that are non-compliant with 
the good governance standards 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
9. Commission proposal on inclusion of tax good governance 
standards into revised Financial Regulation 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
IV.6 Which of the two EU instruments listed below has been more useful when it comes 
to achieving the objective and results listed above and fighting against aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices on a global scale? 
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 Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation  
 Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 regarding measures intended 
to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in 
tax matters (2012/771/EU) 
Please elaborate on your answer: ______________________________________ 
 
IV.7 To what extent do you believe that national interventions, in the absence of the 
EU taxation instruments, would be able to achieve the following results?  
1. Fostering third countries to implement principles of good 
governance in the tax area 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
2. Debate on fair treatment of developing countries in bilateral 
treaties within the Platform on Tax Good Governance 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
3. Inclusion of an updated tax good governance clause and State 
aid provisions in negotiations of all relevant bilateral and regional 
agreements with third countries 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
4. Common EU stance on tax good governance criteria, serving as 
a basis for all EU external tax policies and discussions on tax good 
governance with international partners 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
5. To help developing countries to secure domestic revenues and 
fight off threats to their tax base 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
6. Clear and coherent EU approach to identify third countries that 
do not comply with good governance standards 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
7. Efficiency and effectiveness in fighting against aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices by addressing international tax 
challenges at EU level 
1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
8. Unified response to third countries that are non-compliant with 
the good governance standards 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
9. Commission proposal on inclusion of tax good governance 
standards into revised Financial Regulation 1 2 3 4 5 
DK 
/NO 
 
IV.7.1 Can you refer to any examples showing that the EU taxation instruments 
generate/do not generate better results than similar national initiatives (if any)? 
______________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your valuable input.
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ANNEX D: Synopsis report of the consultation activities 
1 Objectives of the consultation activities 
The role of the EU in combatting aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices has 
increased substantially in recent years. Globalisation, digitalisation of the economy and 
the mounting pressure on domestic budgets following the financial and economic crisis 
have, along with various tax scandals, increased overall awareness of the need for a more 
coordinated approach to tax matters. These realities are reflected in the EU instruments 
that have been adopted in the field. 
The aim of the Report “Reflections on the EU objectives in addressing aggressive tax 
planning and harmful tax practices” is to analyse the coherence, relevance and EU added 
value of key EU instruments to tackle tax avoidance. Against this background and in line 
with the requirements set out by the Commission for this assignment, consultation 
activities were carried out with key stakeholders in the field in order to achieve two goals:  
 Understand the different perspectives of stakeholders; and 
 Gather valuable insights to be analysed and presented in the report, alongside 
information from desk research and input from academic experts. 
2 Methodology 
The consultation activities were carried out in two stages. First, scoping interviews were 
conducted to ensure the soundness of the research framework and to collect preliminary 
data and information from EU institutional stakeholders. Second, in-depth interviews were 
performed with a mix of stakeholders active at the national level, the EU level and the 
international level. 
The in-depth interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire agreed upon with 
the Commission, which included a mix of Likert-scale questions and open questions. Likert-
type questions help structure the answers of respondents based on a given scale. For this 
Report, respondents were thus asked to provide their feedback by referring to a scale from 
(1) to (5), where the scores have the following meaning: 1 - not at all; 2 - to a limited 
extent; 3 - to some extent; 4 - to a high extent; 5 - to the fullest extent. Given this 
structure, the Research Team used descriptive statistics for available quantitative data 
(the stakeholders’ opinions collected based on the 1 to 5 scale) to infer main trends arising 
from the input of the different stakeholder groups. In addition, the qualitative information 
provided during the interviews was aggregated, compared and summarised in order to 
support and complement the trends identified through descriptive statistics. 
The questionnaire was structured in four main parts:  
1. Overall coherence;  
2. Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices;  
3. Business facilitation; and  
4. External policies.  
Each interviewee was asked to provide his/her answers limited to one or more specific 
parts of the questionnaire, thus ensuring an appropriate duration of the interviews and 
maximising participation. 
The in-depth interviews targeted not only the international and EU level but also the 
Member States listed in Table 2. The mix of countries ensures adequate coverage of 
different EU regions (Central-Eastern Europe, North-Western Europe and Southern 
Europe), different degrees of economic development, different corporate tax rates and 
different quality of legislation when it comes to fighting against aggressive tax planning.  
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Table 6 Member States selected for country-level analysis 
Member 
State 
Geographical 
region 
GDP per 
capita (€, 
2017) 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
(main rates, 
2018) 
Room for aggressive tax planning 
(European Semester 2018) 
Belgium NWE 38,500 29.6%  yes 
Cyprus SE 22,800 12.50% yes 
Germany NWE 39,600 29.9% no 
Hungary CEE 12,700 10.8% yes 
Ireland NWE 61,200 12.50% yes 
Italy SE 28,500 27.8% no 
Luxembourg NWE 92,800 26.01% yes 
Netherlands NWE 43,000 25% yes 
Romania CEE 9,600 16% no 
Sweden NWE 47,200 21.4% no 
Note: CEE=Central-Eastern Europe, NWE=North-Western Europe and SE=Southern Europe. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat and European Semester Country Reports. 
 
In addition, the questionnaire was designed to be answered by a mix of stakeholders: 
 International stakeholders, namely international organisations working in the field 
of tax avoidance; 
 EU-level stakeholders, including 
o Stakeholders from the European Commission; 
o Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in the field of tax avoidance; 
and 
o Business associations. 
 Stakeholders from the Member States, comprising: 
o Tax authorities; 
o NGOs; 
o Business associations. 
3 Results 
The total number of interviews envisaged for the consultation activities was 35: five 
interviews were planned in the scoping phase and 30 in the fieldwork phase (“in-depth” 
interviews). A total of 31 interviews were ultimately conducted. Four scoping interviews 
were conducted with Commission officials (DG TAXUD, DG COMP and SECGEN) who 
provided feedback on the research framework, ensuring its soundness and helping pave 
the way to the in-depth interviews. Out of a total number of 31 invited organisations for 
in-depth interviews, 27 stakeholders agreed to provide their input on time (Table 3). No 
interview was conducted in Hungary; nevertheless, a thorough expert assessment was 
carried out for this country. 
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Table 7 Overview of in-depth interviews 
Level Type Organisation 
Part I 
Overall 
coherence 
Part II 
Aggressive tax 
planning and 
harmful tax 
practices 
Part III 
Business 
facilitation 
Part IV 
External 
policies 
BE NGO CNDC - 11.11.11   -  
BE 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance * * * * 
CY NGO 
Cyprus Integrity 
Forum 
  -  
CY 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance     
DE NGO 
Netzwerk 
Steuergerechtigkeit 
(Tax Justice 
Network) 
  -  
DE 
Tax 
Authority 
Tax Authority     
EU Institution DG TAXUD   - - 
EU NGO 
Oxfam International 
- EU Advocacy 
Office 
  -  
EU Institution DG COMP   - - 
EU 
Business 
association 
BusinessEurope General remarks 
EU Institution DG TRADE  - -  
EU Institution DG DEVCO  - -  
EU NGO TaxJustice  General remarks - 
General 
remarks 
EU 
Professional 
association 
Confédération 
Fiscale Européenne 
(CFE) - Tax 
Advisers Europe 
   - 
EU Institution DG JUST   - - 
Global Institution 
UN Committee of 
Experts on 
International 
Cooperation in Tax 
Matters 
  - - 
Global Institution OECD   -  
HU 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance * * * - 
HU 
Business 
association 
MGYOSZ – 
BUSINESSHUNGAR
Y; Hungarian 
Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
** ** ** ** 
IE 
Business 
association 
ISME - Irish SME 
Association 
   - 
IE 
Tax 
Authority 
Department of 
Finance 
   
General 
remarks 
IT 
Business 
association 
UnionPMI    - 
IT 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of 
Economy and 
Finance 
    
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Level Type Organisation 
Part I 
Overall 
coherence 
Part II 
Aggressive tax 
planning and 
harmful tax 
practices 
Part III 
Business 
facilitation 
Part IV 
External 
policies 
LU 
Business 
association 
Union des 
Entreprises 
Luxembourgeoises 
  
General 
remarks 
- 
LU 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance     
NL 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance     
NL NGO 
Centre for Research 
on Multinational 
Corporations 
(SOMO) 
  -  
RO NGO 
Transparency 
International 
Romania223 
 - - - 
RO 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance; 
National Agency for 
Fiscal 
Administration 
    
SE 
Business 
association 
Företagarna 
(Swedish 
Federation of 
Business Owners) 
   - 
SE 
Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of Finance * * * * 
Notes: “General remarks”: Some stakeholders chose to offer only general remarks rather than 
following the questionnaire. *Stakeholders unable to take part in the interview. **No answer 
received.  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The input received from stakeholders formed one of three main sources for drafting the 
report “Reflections on the EU objectives in addressing aggressive tax planning and harmful 
tax practices”. Desk research and expert assessments conducted by ten academic 
experts,224 who were part of the Research Team, complemented the insights drew from 
the consultation activities. While the consultation activities gathered the views of 27 
stakeholders (not counting the scoping interviews) active at the EU level and in the 
Member States (including public institutions, business associations and NGOs), the 
findings of the Report do not necessarily represent the views of the consulted stakeholders.  
The main feedback received during the consultation activities is summarised and key 
observations are emphasised in what follows. 
Overall coherence 
Overall, consulted stakeholders indicated that the EU instruments to address tax avoidance 
are generally coherent with one another. However, they also pointed out several gaps and 
                                           
223 Transparency International Romania was invited to respond to parts I, II, and IV of the questionnaire. Given 
their expertise, their answer were most suitable in the context of part I, hence part II and part IV were not 
covered. 
224 One academic expert was selected for each of the ten countries listed in Table 2. 
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potential overlaps. In particular, the main gap in the current EU tax framework identified 
is the absence of an EU approach to digital taxation.  
Consulted stakeholders also gave feedback on the consistency between the EU instruments 
under analysis and other EU policies that may be linked to aspects of tax avoidance. In 
particular, stakeholders emphasised that the EU tax instruments are broadly consistent 
with other policies such as state aid, internal market, financial services, development, 
criminal justice, and trade.  
Finally, when it comes to international initiatives to tackle tax avoidance, the EU tax 
instruments are generally consistent with the international tax agenda, according to the 
stakeholders consulted for this assignment. In particular, most of the interviewees 
mentioned that the EU is reinforcing the work of the OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan. 
Aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices 
Throughout the interviews, respondents argued that existing EU tax instruments have 
been relevant in particular with regard to addressing the following two needs: 
 The need to ensure more transparency and a more binding approach to information 
exchange on tax rulings as well as on internal transactions within multinational 
groups. 
 The need to coordinate the implementation of OECD/G20 BEPS reports and 
Common Reporting Standard across Member States and, more generally, to 
coordinate national corporate taxation rules, policies, and approaches to addressing 
aggressive tax planning and harmful tax practices.  
At the same time, a majority of respondents pointed out that more could be done in the 
field of digital taxation. This currently represents a gap in the framework that needs to be 
addressed. The majority of interviewed stakeholders also believe that most of the results 
of the EU instruments in scope would only have been achieved to a limited extent or to 
some extent by national interventions. When it comes to the added value of having 
common EU instruments rather than individual national measures, the majority of 
interviewed stakeholders confirmed that EU instruments bring more results than national 
interventions. This is particularly the case because the EU plays a coordination role, as 
stakeholders emphasised. 
Business facilitation 
Regarding business facilitation, consulted stakeholders stressed that the EU instruments 
have been relevant for solving the issue of double taxation. Still, there are some 
outstanding needs to be addressed. For instance, as mentioned by stakeholders, more 
should be done when it comes to aggressive tax planning via inter-group dividend 
payments. 
In addition, the interviewees explained that Member States, through individual actions, 
would have succeeded only to a limited extent to avoid situations of double non-taxation, 
advise the Commission on transfer pricing issues and assist the Commission on finding 
practical solutions for transfer pricing tax issues. This means that the Commission’s actions 
have, according to most interviewees, been essential to achieving such results. 
Some interviewees also indicated that the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum and the Parent 
Subsidiary Directive contribute, inter alia, to a more harmonised implementation of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan across the EU. 
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External policies 
With respect to good governance in tax matters and the relations with third countries, 
stakeholders discussed several aspects. Most of the representatives of national tax 
administrations and NGOs interviewed for this assignment stressed that there are two 
main outstanding problems, which are only partially targeted by the current soft law 
approach: 
 The problem generated by low/no income taxes in some third countries that limit 
the possibilities for Member States to enforce their tax policy. 
 The need to support developing and other third countries in the fight against tax 
avoidance and their integration in the international tax good governance agenda. 
At the same time, stakeholders also noted that EU action is needed because the Member 
States would not be able to achieve the same outcomes through individual measures. In 
particular, four aspects stand out from the point of view of consulted stakeholders: i) a 
common EU stance on tax good governance criteria, serving as base for all EU external 
tax policies and discussions on tax good governance with international partners; ii) clear 
and coherent EU approach to identify third countries that do not comply with the good 
governance standards; iii) unified response to third countries that are non-compliant with 
the good governance standards; and iv) the inclusion of tax good governance standards 
into the revised Financial Regulation. 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can 
find the address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en  
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can 
contact this service: 
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or  
– by email via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en  
Finding information about the EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the 
Europa website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications  
You can download or order free and priced EU publications at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be 
obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see 
https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
EU law and related documents 
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1952 in all the official 
language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu  
Open data from the EU 
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en) provides access to datasets from 
the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial 
purposes. 
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